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Preface
International television flows (“travelling nar-
ratives” in my re- definition) can be seen in a 
new light . . . as flows of symbolic mobile and 
mobilizing resources that have the potential to 
widen the range of our imaginary geography, 
multiply our symbolic life- worlds, familiarize 
ourselves with “the other” and “the distant” 
and construct “a sense of imagined places”: in 
short, to travel the world and encounter “oth-
erness” under the protection of the mediated 
experience.
— Milly Buonnano, The Age of Television: 
Experiences and Theories, 108– 109 (emphasis 
in original)
As Milly Buonnano reminds us, watching television always 
involves some kind of imagined interaction with faraway 
places, situations, and symbols, in a way that recalls the 
word’s etymological origins (“tele- vision”: seeing at a 
distance). This idea of television, as an inherently inter-
national medium characterized by a particular way of 
ordering space, is at the heart of this book. In what follows, 
I revisit some long- standing debates in television and global 
media studies to see how they can help us understand the 
rapid transformations that are taking place as television 
morphs unevenly into an online medium.
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Think of this book as an internet- era update to the rich 
literature on international television flows— a book for 
cord- cutting students and scholars who are interested in 
this longer history. Our central case study is Netflix, the 
world’s largest subscription video- on- demand service. We 
will examine how Netflix morphed from a national media 
company to an international one between 2010 and 2016 
and consider what this case means for existing debates 
about global television on the one hand and digital distri-
bution on the other.
Both topics are of personal interest to me. I grew up in 
Melbourne during the 1980s and 1990s, watching a lot of 
television. Australia is a country where the local is always 
experienced alongside and through the imported— mostly 
American and British popular culture, but also some 
European and Asian content. Television has always been an 
international medium here. Local sitcoms share the sched-
ule with U.S. network series, Hollywood movies, BBC tele-
movies, and (on our public- service channels) the occasional 
Japanese cooking show or German police drama.
Australian television was broadcast- only until the 1990s. 
Even now, most Australians do not have cable or satellite 
subscriptions (though they are prodigious users of digi-
tal services, including pirate networks). In the late 1990s, 
I traveled overseas for the first time and observed the 
many ways that people watch television in other countries. 
Staying with relatives in Spain, I watched episodes of Ally 
McBeal in a dual- language track (a fascinating novelty to 
me but unremarkable to my Spanish cousins). In Morocco, 
I had my first taste of satellite TV, watching The Simpsons in 
French, courtesy of my friend’s rooftop satellite dish. These 
were instructive experiences for someone used to Austra-
lia’s five- channel TV environment— an environment that 
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now seemed rudimentary compared to the denser distribu-
tion landscapes available overseas.
All this got me thinking about the relationship between 
television distribution, space, and culture. These issues 
would stay with me as a background fascination for many 
years while I researched in other areas, including film 
distribution and piracy, before returning to the topic of 
television when I started teaching classes on global media. 
Conversations with my students— who had many fascinat-
ing views to share on evergreen topics such as local content 
and cultural identity, and who themselves watch TV in the 
most diverse and interesting ways— prompted me to think 
once more about the difference that space makes to televi-
sion culture. This book is the outcome of those many class 
discussions, filtered through the debates about streaming 
that were exploding around us when Netflix came to 
Australia, belatedly, in 2015.
The impact of Netflix in Australia was immediate and 
profound. Within a year, Netflix had attracted as many 
subscribers as our pay- TV service, Foxtel, which has been 
operating for more than 20 years (Roy Morgan Research 
2016). Roughly one in three Australians now have access to 
Netflix at home (Roy Morgan Research 2017). Even before 
the service had officially arrived, thousands of Australians 
were using VPNs (virtual private networks) to illicitly ac-
cess the U.S. Netflix library. Overall, the demand for Net-
flix in Australia has been remarkable.
This is certainly not the case everywhere— indeed, this 
book is substantially about Netflix’s failure rather than its 
success in various markets around the world. Nonethe-
less, I found the experience of seeing a national television 
market so rapidly and thoroughly transformed by a foreign 
entrant affecting on many levels. This encouraged me to 
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think more about the political, economic, and cultural im-
pacts of streaming services. It also made me curious about 
connections between these services and the longer history 
of transnational television distribution via satellites. These 
were the fascinations that stayed with me as I wrote this 
book— a work of theory and analysis, based on a case study 
of a single platform, that explores the conceptual implica-
tions of internet distribution for global television studies.
There are many aspects of the topic that I have not been 
able to cover in depth here— including Netflix’s original 
production strategy, which really deserves its own book. 
I am also aware that much of what I have discussed may 
have shifted by the time this book appears in print. Given 
these constraints of space and time, the book does not claim 
to offer a comprehensive account of Netflix— and it is cer-
tainly not an insider account (c.f. Keating 2012). Instead, it 
offers a selective analysis of what I see as the most impor-
tant issues raised by Netflix’s internationalization. The land-
scape will continue to change around us, but I hope these 
underlying issues will endure as central concerns for critical 
media scholarship.
Netflix Nations

1Introduction
Every year in January, thousands of technology executives, 
geeks, and journalists make their annual pilgrimage to 
Las Vegas for the Consumer Electronics Show (CES). This 
massive four- day trade fair, one of the largest in the world, 
is where major brands such as Samsung and Sony show 
off their latest smart TVs, wearables, and other gadgets. In 
2016, CES attracted over 170,000 people, including rep-
resentatives from more than 3,000 technology companies. 
One of the keynote speakers was the CEO and cofounder 
of Netflix, Reed Hastings.
Hastings— joined on stage by Chief Content Officer 
Ted Sarandos and a number of Netflix stars— delivered 
the promotional spiel for Netflix’s latest user- experience 
improvements and its new slate of original programming, 
playing clips from The Crown and The Get Down. At the 
end of the 48- minute showcase, Hastings made a surprise 
announcement: Netflix, long known for its patchy avail-
ability from country to country, was now a fully global 
television service, unblocked and accessible (almost) ev-
erywhere. “Today,” said Hastings, “I am delighted to an-
nounce that while we have been here on stage here at CES 
we switched Netflix on in Azerbaijan, in Vietnam, in India, 
Figures I.1 and I.2. Reed Hastings on stage at the Consumer Electron-
ics Show, January 6, 2016, at The Venetian, Las Vegas. Photos by Ethan 
Miller/Getty Images.
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in Nigeria, in Poland, in Russia, in Saudi Arabia, in Singa-
pore, in South Korea, in Turkey, in Indonesia, and in 130 new 
countries. . . . Today, right now, you are witnessing the birth 
of a global TV network.”1 Reading from his teleprompter 
against a backdrop of world maps and national flags, Hast-
ings went on to describe how this “incredible event” would 
make the Netflix experience available in the farthest reaches 
of the globe— everywhere, that is, except China (“where 
we hope to also be in the future”), North Korea, Syria, and 
Crimea (the latter three being countries where Netflix could 
not legally do business because of U.S. trade sanctions). 
“Whether you are in Sydney or St. Petersburg, Singapore or 
Seoul, Santiago or Saskatoon, you now can be part of the 
internet TV revolution,” he promised. “No more waiting. 
No more watching on a schedule that’s not your own. No 
more frustration. Just Netflix.”
This announcement signaled a turning point for Net-
flix. Since the company first unveiled a streaming service 
for its U.S. customers in 2007, there had been specula-
tion about when the company would offer this service to 
subscribers outside the United States. The rumors were 
confirmed when Netflix began its international rollout, 
first to Canada in 2010, then to Latin America in 2011, to 
parts of Europe in 2012 and 2013, and to Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan in 2015. During this period, Netflix 
evolved from a national service (supplying American 
screen content to American audiences) into a globally 
focused business with greater ambitions. With the cul-
mination of this process announced at CES, Netflix had 
become a global media company— available almost ev-
erywhere, with a potential foothold in almost all the 
major national markets.
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Much of the world has embraced Netflix, and series such 
as Stranger Things and Narcos have amassed cult follow-
ings in many countries. Yet Netflix’s metamorphosis into 
a global media provider has not been trouble- free. Shortly 
after Hastings’s announcement, newspapers in a number of 
countries started reporting angry reactions to the Netflix 
global switch- on. In Kenya, the chairman of the Film Clas-
sification Board threatened to block Netflix on the grounds 
of its “shockingly explicit eroticism,” arguing that “we can-
not afford to be [a] passive recipient of foreign content that 
could corrupt the moral values of our children and compro-
mise our national security” (Aglionby and Garrahan 2016). In 
Indonesia, access to Netflix was blocked by the state- owned 
telecommunications company (telco) Telekom Indonesia 
because of “a permit issue” and the “unfiltered” nature of its 
content (Gunawan 2016). In Europe, where there is a long 
history of cultural policy designed to keep Hollywood’s 
power in check, regulators planned a minimum European 
content quota for foreign streaming platforms. Meanwhile, 
Australians fretted that the arrival of Netflix would “break” 
the internet as streamers hogged the bandwidth on the 
country’s creaking internet infrastructure.
Stories such as these give us a sense of the diverse ways 
that countries have responded to the entry of Netflix into 
their media markets. They also show how Netflix’s rise has 
revived some deep- seated tensions in international media 
policy. These tensions stem from differing views on the 
part of regulators, media companies, and audiences about 
the nature of video and its proper modes of distribution. 
They also involve disagreement about where video services 
should operate, which territories and markets they should 
be able to access, and whose rules they should obey.
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This book takes the international rollout of Netflix as 
the starting point for a wider investigation into the global 
geography of online television distribution. By geography, 
I mean the spatial patterns and logics that shape where 
and how internet- distributed television circulates and 
also where and how it does not circulate. The book is orga-
nized around two central questions: How are streaming 
services changing the spatial dynamics of global television 
distribution, and what theories and concepts do scholars 
need to make sense of these changes? In answering these 
questions— one descriptive and the other speculative— 
this book will move across several subfields of media and 
communications research, including global television 
studies, media industry studies, and media geography. 
Along the way, we also delve into the history of earlier sys-
tems for transnational television distribution (especially 
satellite) and consider how they raised similar questions 
in the past.
Understanding Internet- Distributed Television
The rise of what Amanda Lotz describes in her book 
Portals (2017a) as “internet- distributed television”— 
professionally produced content circulated and consumed 
through websites, online services, platforms, and apps, 
rather than through broadcast, cable, or satellite sys-
tems— is an excellent opportunity to bring together two 
previously disconnected strands of television scholar-
ship. The first of these is the rich body of literature about 
global and transnational television, which focuses on the 
connections (and irreconcilable differences) between 
institutions, practices, textual forms, and viewing cultures 
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around the world (Barker 1997; Parks and Kumar 2003; 
Straubhaar 2007; Chalaby 2005, 2009; Buonnano 2007). 
The second is the literature on television’s digital transfor-
mations, which explores the recent history of television 
technologies and their cross- pollination with other media 
and internet technologies (Spigel and Olsson 2004; Ben-
nett and Strange 2011; Murphy 2011; Lotz 2014, 2017a). 
The arrival of internet- distributed television requires 
a rethinking of the potential connection between these 
two fields and their underlying categories: space and 
technology.
It is not merely that the future of television looks 
rather different in different places (Turner and Tay 
2009, 8), although this is certainly true. Rather, internet 
distribution of television content changes the fundamen-
tal logics through which television travels, introducing 
new mobilities and immobilities into the system, add-
ing another layer to the existing palimpsest of broadcast, 
cable, and satellite distribution. Internet television does 
not replace legacy television in a straightforward way; 
instead, it adds new complexity to the existing geography 
of distribution.
The arrival of mature internet- distributed television 
services such as Netflix is significant in global media de-
bates. Until direct- broadcast satellite systems arose in the 
1980s, television signals were mostly contained within 
national boundaries.2 Even though programming was 
traded internationally, television distribution did not yet 
have a strongly transnational dimension. Recall Raymond 
Williams’s classic anecdote in Television: Technology and 
Cultural Form (1974) about sitting in a Miami hotel room 
and watching American broadcast television, with its 
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 unfamiliar and disorienting “flow,” for the first time. While 
Williams was familiar with American television as an 
imported medium, its actual broadcast distribution was 
something he could only experience by traveling to the 
United States.
One can only guess what Williams would make of 
today’s television landscape, with its dizzying array of 
platforms and on- demand content. Today, one no lon-
ger needs to travel overseas to access international tele-
vision, for a great deal of it is easily accessible online 
(under certain circumstances, and with many gaps and 
restrictions, which we will consider later). Similarly, the 
circulation of content is no longer determined by broad-
cast and satellite signal reach. The advent of internet- 
distributed television services means that it is now 
significantly easier for audiences in many parts of the 
world to view content from overseas— and even in some 
cases to access live channels— through browsers, apps, 
and set- top boxes.
This online proliferation of content is one conse-
quence of television’s digital transformation. The inter-
net has become a distribution channel and archive for 
a diverse range of content, scattered unevenly across 
hundreds of platforms and portals. The digital mobil-
ity of content raises questions for scholars and students 
of media distribution, and also requires a rethinking of 
some of the assumptions that lie at the heart of televi-
sion studies, because television content now circulates 
through the same infrastructure as other media, in-
cluding ebooks, music, short videos, feature films, and 
podcasts. This has a number of significant conceptual 
implications for television studies that will be examined 
throughout this book.
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Internet- Distributed Television as an Ecology
The first step in our analysis is to disaggregate the ecology of 
services, platforms, set- top boxes, and apps that constitute 
the field of internet- distributed television. Internet distribu-
tion of television content is not a unitary phenomenon; it 
involves a wide array of different services, institutions, and 
practices. Consider the way many viewers in broadband- 
enabled areas, especially younger audiences, watch TV: 
they use Google to search across sites for relevant free video 
streams, moving between the bits and pieces of content scat-
tered around free video sites; they use third- party apps that 
filter and suggest particular programs; they follow recom-
mendations from friends’ posts on social media; they have 
active and lapsed subscriptions to video portals, some of 
which may be shared with friends and family; and they may 
also purchase individual episodes or season passes on their 
laptops and phones. In addition, some may use BitTorrent 
and illegal streaming sites, or share downloaded episodes 
and full seasons via USB sticks, cloud storage, and Bluetooth 
transfers. Depending on where they live and how tech- savvy 
they are, they may also use a VPN (virtual private network) 
or a proxy service to access offshore media or get around 
government restrictions on digital media services.
A point that is not new but bears repeating is that an 
increasing proportion of the global audience now under-
stands television as an online service dispersed across an 
ecology of websites, portals, and apps, as well as a broad-
cast and cable/satellite- distributed medium. Key elements 
of this distribution ecology include
•	 online TV portals, such as BBC iPlayer (United King-
dom), ABC iView (Australia), NRK TV (Norway), and 
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Toggle (Singapore), which are provided by major broad-
cast networks and cable/satellite providers through web-
sites and apps and typically include some combination 
of new- release content, library content, and live channel 
feeds;
•	 subscription video- on- demand (SVOD) services, such as 
Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, Hulu, HBO Now, Hayu, 
and CBS All Access, which offer a curated library of  
content for a monthly subscription fee;
•	 transactional video- on- demand (TVOD) services, such as 
iTunes, Google Play Store, Microsoft Films & TV, and 
Chili, which offer sell- through content at different price 
points for purchase and/or rental;
•	 hybrid TVOD/SVOD/free portals, such as YouTube, Youku, 
and Tencent Video, which offer free user- uploaded and 
professional content plus an additional tier of premium 
content available through subscription or direct purchase;
•	 video- sharing platforms, such as Daily Motion, which offer 
a range of free, ad- supported amateur and professional 
content, often informally uploaded;3
•	 informal on- demand and download services, including 
BitTorrent, Popcorn Time, file- hosting sites (cyberlockers), 
and illegal streaming sites;
•	 unlicensed live, linear channel feeds, delivered through pirate 
websites, illegal TV streaming boxes, and live streaming 
services such as Periscope; and
•	 recommender and aggregator apps, such as JustWatch, that 
advise what content is available across the various services.
This ecology is interconnected and highly dynamic, 
and therefore difficult to measure. To give a sense of 
scale, the European Audiovisual Observatory’s MAVISE 
database of online video services currently lists 546 
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free streaming services, 448 transactional services, 367 
subscription services (including adult sites), and 28 
video- sharing platforms.4 There is a lot of leakage be-
tween these categories. For example, catch- up services 
are becoming more and more SVOD- like, adding recom-
mender systems and personal logins, while SVOD ser-
vices are becoming more and more like conventional 
networks by producing their own exclusive content. 
Meanwhile, YouTube, Youku, and other hybrid sites tend 
to absorb innovations from many directions, combining 
advertising- funded free content, original content, live 
streams, user uploads, and pirated material in the one 
platform. To make things more complicated, there are also 
a wide range of gaming consoles, set- top boxes, dongles, 
and media players (Apple TV, Playstation, Amazon Fire 
stick, generic Android streamer boxes, Kodi boxes) that 
aggregate content from various sources, further blurring 
the line between distributors, aggregators, channels, and 
hardware providers.
Recent scholarship in media and television studies 
draws our attention to different parts of this ecology for 
different analytical purposes. For example, Stuart Cun-
ningham and David Craig (2019) and Aymar Jean Chris-
tian (2017) emphasize the centrality of open platforms 
(especially YouTube) and networked sharing practices 
to contemporary television industries, thus advancing 
an expanded definition of internet television that in-
cludes social media platforms. Lotz’s (2017a) category of 
internet- distributed television is defined more narrowly 
to refer to portals for professionally produced content 
(“the crucial intermediary services that collect, curate, 
and distribute television programming via internet dis-
tribution,” such as CBS All Access, Netflix, and HBO 
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Now). Catherine Johnson uses a distinct term, “online 
television,” to refer to a larger category of “closed and 
editorially managed” services that distribute “actively 
acquired/commissioned content” (Johnson 2017, 10)— a 
definition that would include public- service broadcaster 
portals as well as commercial SVODs and AVODs, but 
not open video platforms. These different ways of defin-
ing internet television are all instructive because they 
bring into focus particular parts of the ecology. This 
book focuses specifically on SVOD, but it does so with 
the understanding that SVOD represents only one line 
of development within a wider ecology.
The present instability within television distribution is 
remarkable, although historical precedents do exist. Re-
call that broadcast television evolved as a hybrid medium 
combining prerecorded material, live programming, mov-
ies, short- form programming, and advertisements. Early 
television was an empty container into which existing art 
forms and business models could be poured. The internet 
is now doing something similar for television, absorbing 
its existing textual forms and associated business models 
and putting them together in new combinations. Present 
distinctions between some of these categories may soon be 
rendered obsolete, a question addressed further in Chap-
ters 1 and 2.
While I am interested in these historical questions, 
my primary focus is on the international geography of 
online television distribution— the spatial patterns that 
determine the availability and unavailability of television 
content to audiences in different parts of the world. These 
patterns are highly complex and volatile. This book de-
scribes a number of different phenomena that may some-
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times appear contradictory. For example, while internet 
distribution has created new forms of mobility for con-
tent and audiences, it has also served to reduce mobility 
in other cases (e.g., via geoblocking), leading to increased 
territorialization. The relationship between television and 
its intended “zone of consumption” (Pertierra and Turner 
2013) is variously stretched, dissolved, and reinforced. I 
want to emphasize that this is not the same thing as saying 
television is now everywhere, that it has been spatially lib-
erated or deterritorialized, that space does not matter, or 
that content now circulates in a totally friction- free man-
ner. This is not the case at all. Television is still bounded 
and “located” in all kinds of ways, as we will see in later 
chapters. The more accurate claim would be that internet 
distribution has introduced a new degree of complexity 
into the existing ecology. As a result, we are starting to 
see different kinds of relationships emerge between tele-
vision’s fundamental spatial categories: territory, market, 
nation, and signal area.
Why Netflix?
Netflix is presently the major global subscription video- 
on- demand service. It is not, however, the first television 
service with global aspirations. Various transnational 
channels, including CNN, MTV, Al Jazeera, and CGTN,5 
came before it, along with quasiglobal digital platforms 
such as YouTube. In calling this book Netflix Nations, then, 
I am not suggesting that Netflix is popular in every nation; 
my point is that Netflix, as a multinational SVOD service 
that spans national borders and operates in a large num-
ber of countries simultaneously, represents a particular 
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configuration of global television that requires study and 
theorization.
I am also interested in Netflix for a different reason— 
because it draws our attention to unresolved questions 
about media globalization more generally. Specifically, 
the Netflix case provides an opportunity to test, advance, 
and refine our conceptual models of “global television” 
and to rethink what this term means in a context of digi-
tal distribution. As a company that has internationalized 
very quickly, Netflix’s story also tells us a lot about what 
happens when a digital service enters national markets, 
coming in over the top of existing institutions and regula-
tions. Netflix, in other words, is a case study with larger 
relevance to ongoing debates in media studies about 
convergence, disruption, globalization, and cultural 
imperialism.
The early history of Netflix is well known. The com-
pany was founded in California in 1997 by a direct- sales 
executive (Marc Randolph) and a Stanford- educated en-
trepreneur (Reed Hastings). Its first offering was a mail- 
order DVD rental service that proved wildly popular with 
American movie- lovers. Netflix unveiled its own stream-
ing service in 2007 and fought off archrival Blockbuster, 
which declared bankruptcy in 2010. Along the way, the 
company became famous for its data- driven strategy, lean 
management ethos, and Silicon Valley– style human re-
sources policies, which combine new- economy working 
freedoms (including unlimited leave time) with extremely 
high performance expectations.6
Netflix’s staged international rollout began with its 
most strategically important markets— Canada and Latin 
America. These were the low- hanging fruit for Netflix: 
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Canada is a high- income, majority English- language 
market adjacent to the United States, while most of Latin 
America has a single regional language (Spanish), a large 
middle class, decent cable infrastructure, and a strong 
familiarity with pay- TV. Having successfully trialed its 
SVOD model in these territories, Netflix then expanded 
into key markets in Western Europe (2013– 2015), Japan 
(2015), and Australasia (2015). In most of these countries, 
Netflix established partnerships with local telcos and in-
ternet service providers (ISPs), licensed locally relevant 
content and prepared promotional activities to coincide 
with the launch. Finally, the global switch- on at CES in 
January 2016 took care of the other lower- value or oth-
erwise difficult global markets that had not yet been 
covered.
Netflix is one of the few media brands of the internet 
era to penetrate so deeply into households and the broader 
popular consciousness that it has become a verb (“let’s 
Netflix it,” “Netflix and chill”). It is a quintessential Silicon 
Valley success story, bridging two of America’s signature 
fascinations— home entertainment and e- commerce. But 
Netflix is still a media company that trades in the estab-
lished film and television industries’ intellectual property, 
and since 2013 it has also invested heavily in its own origi-
nal content. Unlike YouTube and Facebook, Netflix dis-
tributes only professionally produced content rather than 
user- generated content.
More than half of Netflix’s subscribers now live outside 
the United States, and that figure is increasing. To cater to 
local tastes, the company has licensed thousands of non-
U.S. titles— from Indian Bollywood movies to Turkish 
dramas— for its increasingly diverse user base, and it has 
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invested billions of dollars in producing its own content in 
30 national markets. As Netflix continues to reach a wider 
international audience, the service becomes more geo-
graphically differentiated and localized. Titles appear and 
disappear, and catalogs shrink and expand, as the platform 
is accessed from different parts of the world. Languages, 
currencies, and library categories are all customized for 
each country.
Just as Netflix is changing, users are changing Netflix. 
The platform learns from its new global audiences, track-
ing tastes and viewing habits. As a result, different “cul-
tures of Netflix,” as Ira Wagman and Luca Barra (2016) 
describe them, are starting to emerge— different ways of 
using the platform, talking about it, and watching it.7 
These user data feed back into the company’s strategic de-
cisions about original programming, licensing, and mar-
keting. Netflix, then, should not be seen as a static cultural 
object or one that is consistent from market to market. 
It is constantly evolving, acquiring new layers of use and 
association.
This book is not a corporate history of Netflix, nor is it 
an insider account. Instead, it studies the debates and dis-
courses around Netflix: how the service has been received 
by audiences, industry, and regulators in various countries. 
Since 2013, I have been closely following Netflix’s rollout, 
drawing on a range of public sources, including trade pa-
pers, technical documents, press releases, corporate fil-
ings, promotional videos and texts, online user discourse, 
government and third- party policy documents, and vari-
ous other sources to piece together the story. I have also 
been fortunate to work with a number of talented, multi-
lingual research assistants— Wilfred Wang, Ishita Tiwary, 
Renee Wright and Thomas Baudinette— who wrote re-
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ports on key territories (China, India, Russia, and Japan), 
providing vital context for the study. Netflix Nations, then, 
is a study of Netflix from the outside: a study of impacts, 
discourses, and debates, grounded in a tradition of critical 
media research. It makes no claim to get inside the black 
box or the boardroom.
I have written this book with several kinds of readers in 
mind. For students and scholars of television, it is first and 
foremost a book that tells a critical story about the world’s 
largest SVOD service and what its international rollout 
has meant for television distribution and media policy. 
At a conceptual level, the book is about the problem of 
media globalization and the rich history of intellectual de-
bate around it. Finally, it is also a reflection on the state of 
television research in the internet age. It asks how scholars 
in this field might engage critically and productively with 
challenging new issues— such as localization and search 
technologies, and internet policy and regulation.
The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1, 
“What Is Netflix?,” provides a critical survey of current 
debates in television studies and internet studies as they 
relate to digital distribution. It also discusses the ontol-
ogy of new television services, tracing connections to a 
range of different media forms. Chapter 2, “Transnational 
Television: From Broadcast to Broadband,” explores how 
debates about multinational and transnational television 
services have evolved over the years. Placing Netflix in a 
longer history of transnational television services, includ-
ing broadcast and satellite channels, it explores how fa-
miliar anxieties about national sovereignty are returning 
in a different guise through internet distribution. Chapter 3, 
“The Infrastructures of Streaming,” takes an infrastruc-
tural approach to understanding Netflix. Here we examine 
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some of the platform’s underlying systems, including its 
Content Delivery Network (Open Connect), and related 
policy issues such as net neutrality. Chapter 4, “Making 
Global Markets,” considers how Netflix has attempted to 
enter diverse national markets and adapt its offering to 
conform to local audience expectations. Case studies of 
Netflix’s experience in three key Asian markets— India, 
China, and Japan— reveal the challenges of localization 
and market entry. Chapter 5, “Content, Catalogs, and 
Cultural Imperialism,” focuses on cultural policy debates 
relating to Netflix catalogs, especially regarding local 
content, and examines how regulators in the European 
Union (EU) and Canada are attempting to develop local 
content policies for over- the- top services. Chapter 6, “The 
Proxy Wars,” tells the story of how Netflix sought to man-
age VPN use and geoblocking circumvention by users 
during the early years of its internationalization. I also 
consider how Netflix’s policies on copyright and piracy 
evolved over those years. The book concludes with some 
reflections on parallel models of evolution in television in-
dustries beyond SVOD, including recent developments in 
China, which reflect a different pattern of transformation.
As this structure suggests, my aim in this book is to 
use the controversies that have swirled around the Netflix 
service as a starting point for building a theory about the 
relationship between global television and internet distri-
bution. In this way, the book develops a series of argu-
ments and analyses that position Netflix within a longer 
trajectory of debate, reaching back through the history of 
transnational television. Each chapter begins with a par-
ticular analytical problem relating to global media, such as 
infrastructure, cultural imperialism, or localization; con-
siders how this problem plays out in the case of Netflix; 
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and then finally asks what Netflix can add to our under-
standing of these concepts. Netflix, in this sense, becomes 
a resource— or perhaps a platform— for revisiting endur-
ing critical debates in global media studies.
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What Is Netflix?
In the introduction to their book YouTube: Online Video 
and Participatory Culture (2009), Jean Burgess and Joshua 
Green make an important point about the challenges of 
studying emergent digital media. For Burgess and Green, 
one of the most interesting and difficult things about 
writing a book on YouTube was the fact that it was still 
evolving. Late in the last decade, YouTube had a chame-
leonic character: it was a “distribution platform that can 
make the products of commercial media widely popular” 
while at the same time being “a platform for user- created 
content where challenges to commercial popular culture 
might emerge” (Burgess and Green 2009, 6). Its creators, 
investors, and users— not to mention media academics— 
had yet to agree on what YouTube actually was, meaning 
that there was still much uncertainty over what the plat-
form could be used for, how it should be regulated, and 
how it could be understood in relation to other media. 
Burgess and Green argue that
because there is not yet a shared understanding of You-
Tube’s common culture, each scholarly approach to un-
derstanding how YouTube works must make different 
choices among these interpretations, in effect recreating 
Figure 1.1. Netflix mobile interface, as of January 2018. Screenshot by 
the author.
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it as a different object each time— at this early stage of re-
search, each study of YouTube gives us a different under-
standing of what YouTube actually is. (6– 7, emphasis in 
original)
This basic ontological problem (what is a digital media 
service, and how do we interpret and theorize it?) applies 
to a range of phenomena that exist at the boundaries of 
television, cinema, and digital media. Scholars studying 
Netflix must therefore make certain choices about what 
kind of service it is and what the appropriate frames of 
analysis should be. These decisions work to re- create the 
object anew each time by opening up or closing off lines 
of comparison.
While Netflix is an established global brand with 20 
years of history, there is still very little agreement about 
what Netflix is or how it should be understood by the 
public, scholars, or media regulators. Netflix— like many 
disruptive media phenomena before it, including radio 
and broadcast television— is a boundary object that ex-
ists between, and inevitably problematizes, the conceptual 
categories used to think about media. This definitional 
tension can be seen in the marketing slogans Netflix uses 
to describe itself, which reflect evolution in both the com-
pany’s distribution model and its discursive positioning in 
relation to other media. Presently, Netflix defines itself as 
a “global internet TV network,” but in the past it has pre-
ferred terms such as “the world’s largest online DVD rental 
service” (2002), “the world’s largest online movie rental ser-
vice” (2009), and “the world’s leading Internet subscrip-
tion service for enjoying TV shows and movies” (2011).1 
Others have referred to Netflix as “a renegade player in 
the television game” (Farr 2016, 164), “a pioneer strad-
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dling the intersection where Big Data and entertainment 
media intersect” (Leonard 2013), a “monster that’s eating 
Hollywood” (Flint and Ramachandran 2017), and even 
“a company that’s trying to take over the world” (FX 
CEO John Landgraf, cited in Lev- Ram 2016). Other pos-
sible responses to the question “what is Netflix?” might 
include
•	 a	video	platform,
•	 a	distributor,
•	 a	television	network,
•	 a	global	media	corporation,
•	 a	technology	company,
•	 a	software	system,
•	 a	big-	data	business,
•	 a	cultural	gatekeeper,
•	 a	lifestyle	brand,
•	 a	mode	of	spectatorship,	or
•	 a	ritual.
Clearly, Netflix means different things to different peo-
ple. Part of the issue here is that there are a number of in-
compatible interpretive frames in use. Each frame brings 
with it a set of assumptions and invokes a particular his-
tory of industrial and technological evolution. As we move 
through these various descriptors, Netflix’s location within 
industry sectors also seems to shift around— between the 
television, video, technology, internet, digital media, en-
tertainment, and information industries. The conceptual 
frameworks we use to understand Netflix are important 
because they shape the kind of thinking we bring to the 
analysis. Consequently, these frameworks require some 
critical reflection.
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This chapter traces out two different analytical perspec-
tives that can be applied to Netflix and in so doing criti-
cally synthesizes two related fields of scholarly literature. 
The first of these can be found within television studies, 
in the form of research on TV’s digital and postbroadcast 
transformations. The second comes from outside television 
studies, via new media theory, internet studies, and plat-
form studies. As I will argue, it is helpful to move between 
and across these two ways of knowing so as to avoid the in-
tellectual lock- in effects that result from following one line 
of thinking too closely. For example, if we study Netflix 
in terms of its similarities to and differences from televi-
sion, we can miss its connections to other digital media. 
Similarly, focusing exclusively on the software dimension 
obscures Netflix’s structural relationships with established 
screen industries. We need to be aware of the natural 
pull of particular ways of thinking and what they reveal 
and obscure when applied to different kinds of media 
objects.
Television Studies and the Future- of- TV Debate
Today, the academic field of television studies is in a state 
of flux as it undergoes another round of self- reflection. In 
recent years, a rich corpus of postconvergence research and 
theory has emerged to explore how digital technologies of 
various kinds have variously transformed, extended, and 
sustained existing television industries. This literature asks 
questions such as: What is television now? What might 
it become? Is what we used to call the “idiot box” dead, 
dormant, or as dominant as ever? In the age of televisual 
“expansion and overflow” (Gray 2009, 85, citing Brooker 
What Is Netflix? | 23
2001), where do the boundaries around a medium, a dis-
tribution system, or an individual text lie?
Questions such as these have been carefully examined 
by scholars, including William Uricchio, Milly Buonanno, 
Chuck Tryon, Amanda Lotz, Lynn Spigel, and Graeme 
Turner, among others. A number of influential antholo-
gies have appeared, including Television after TV: Essays 
on a Medium in Transition (Spigel and Olsson 2004), Tele-
vision Studies after TV (Turner and Tay 2009), Television 
as Digital Media (Bennett and Strange 2011), and After the 
Break (de Valck and Teurlings 2013), as well as numerous 
monographs and trade books. Television studies journals, 
including Television and New Media, Flow, and View, have 
played host to vibrant debates about these issues. A wider 
body of technical and policy literature also exists, much 
of it authored by telecommunications experts; for exam-
ple, Columbia University media economist Eli Noam has 
been writing about internet- distributed television since 
the 1990s, before it was of mainstream interest to media 
scholars.
Broadly, this literature maps an ongoing but uneven 
set of transitions in the history of television that are col-
lectively working to transform it from a mass medium to 
a niche one through technological and institutional de-
velopments that “fragment the previously mass audience 
of television into a series of personalized choices” (Bennett 
2011, 2). Kelsey (2010, 231) writes that, “We don’t just watch 
TV, we send and receive it, gather and organize it on our 
personal touch screens, meanwhile interacting with sites 
to produce, wittingly or not, the consumer feedback that 
helps broadcasters determine a season’s programming (if 
TV still even thinks in terms of seasons).” Tryon (2013, 14) 
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 argues that “contemporary media platforms actively so-
licit an individualized, fragmented, and empowered media 
consumer, one who has greater control over when, where, 
and how she watches movies and television shows,” warn-
ing that “this offer of liberation from the viewing sched-
ule is often accompanied by increased surveillance.” 
In response to these shifts, alternative periodizations of 
television technology are also emerging. Some experts 
now refer to TVI (broadcast only), TVII (cable era), and 
TVIII (digital distribution), terms that draw our attention 
to the successive waves of transformation that have swept 
through television technology and the television industry 
(Todreas 1999; Pearson 2011; Johnson 2007).
The work of U.S. television scholar Amanda Lotz of-
fers a richly textured account of these transformations. 
Across a number of books— especially the second edition 
of The Television Will Be Revolutionized (2014), Portals: 
A Treatise on Internet- Distributed Television (2017a), and 
We Now Disrupt This Broadcast (2017b)— Lotz provides 
a forensic examination of the changes in the underlying 
economic models of television when it moves online, and 
how these models shape programming, production, and 
circulation. Lotz begins by explaining how the fundamental 
logic of television has been predicated on linearity: “Al-
most all the conventions of television— a flow of content, 
program length, expectations of weekly episodes— derive 
from practices developed to cope with the necessity of 
the linear schedule” (Lotz 2017a, 15). In contrast, the on- 
demand character of internet- distributed television, and 
its precedents in earlier on- demand services (such as pay- 
per- view movies delivered by cable), presents a different 
mode of distribution that has more in common with the 
record store, bookstore, or library. In this way, internet- 
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distributed television “allow[s] behaviors that were pe-
ripheral in an age of analog, physical media such as time 
shifting, self- curation, and à la carte access to become cen-
tral and industrialized practices” (17).
Lotz sees Netflix as a central part of this story, not only 
because the company “disrupted the long acculturated 
sense that television content should be viewed on a tele-
vision set” (Lotz 2014, 71) but also because it introduced 
new kinds of filtering, aggregation, and recommendation 
systems that have since become widespread. She points to 
the Netflix Queue (now called a List) as a key site through 
which users negotiated the shift to nonlinear television, 
noting that “the queuing that Netflix introduced provided 
its subscribers with a different paradigm for thinking 
about and organizing viewing behavior, and one that sub-
stantially challenges the long dominant, linear, ‘what’s on’ 
proposition” (74). In other words, Lotz regards the online 
distribution of content as highly significant because it 
marks a transformation in the underlying structure and 
business models of television by freeing content from a 
linear schedule and by introducing new pricing models 
(including all- you- can- stream subscription packages) 
and audience expectations about the content, novelty, and 
value of TV services. As she writes, “The affordance of in-
ternet protocol technologies to deliver personally- selected 
content from an industrially curated library is the central 
difference introduced by this new distribution mechanism” 
(Lotz 2017a, 4).
Within the various contributions to the future- of- TV 
debate, we can see different degrees of emphasis on change 
as opposed to continuity. Lotz foregrounds the transfor-
mative dimensions of internet distribution in her work, 
while other scholars focus on the continuities. In this 
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second category, we often find the work of media histori-
ans, who are— by training and temperament— ambivalent 
about diagnoses of radical change. William Uricchio, for 
example, stresses that notions of personal TV and interac-
tive TV go back much further than the internet era and 
can be traced right through the history of the medium, 
with precursor concepts to be found throughout the twen-
tieth century:
Television offers a striking case where both the techno-
logical platform and its deployment protocols have shifted 
radically and more or less continually since the late 19th 
Century. We’ve seen the project of the televisual ally it-
self with platforms such as the telephone, radio, film, and 
networked computer; and we’ve seen its protocols include 
person- to- person communication, entertainment and 
news, surveillance, telepresence and so on (not to mention 
legal and regulatory rule sets). (Uricchio, forthcoming, 11)
Uricchio reminds us that if we wish to understand the 
future of television we do not have to start with the inter-
net. Instead, we can look back to early video game tech-
nologies, the introduction of cable and satellite systems, the 
VCR and TiVo, and even the remote control— all of which 
have contributed in different ways to television’s person-
alized, postbroadcast present by variously expanding the 
range of content available, increasing viewer control over 
the flow of images, and introducing elements of interac-
tivity (Wasser 2002; Boddy 2004; Uricchio 2004; Thomas 
2008). Following Uricchio, we can look back even further, 
to a range of visionary early twentieth- century experimen-
tal television technologies that prefigured “what in today’s 
terms might be understood as Skype, surveillance video, 
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large screen public display, and domestic news and enter-
tainment” (Uricchio 2004, 7– 8). This is why many scholars 
who use terms such as postbroadcast and postnetwork are 
careful to emphasize that they signify not epochal change 
(from X to Y) but rather the sedimented layering of dif-
ferent technologies, systems, institutions, and viewing 
cultures, such that cable, satellite, internet, and mobile 
technologies coexist with and are structurally integrated 
into broadcast television (Turner and Tay 2009; Parks 2004; 
Lotz 2014).
A second lesson from this literature is that we should 
not write off the institutional power of television just yet. 
Toby Miller lucidly argues that television as an industry 
sector is far from dead— and anyone who claims otherwise 
is likely to be proven wrong by history. Miller is highly 
critical of the death- of- TV discourse and mocks the as-
sumption that “the grand organizer of daily life over half a 
century has lost its pride of place in the physical layout of 
the home and the daily order of drama and data” (Miller 
2010, 11). Instead, he emphasizes the industrial continu-
ities (especially in production and advertising) that persist 
into the internet age. Miller offers a series of counterar-
guments in response, noting that a lot of internet media 
is basically television; that television institutions are still 
structurally central to digital media markets; that broad-
cast television is still strong and important globally; that 
there are more TV stations opening up worldwide than 
ever before, especially in emerging economies; and that 
audience ratings suggest we are actually watching more 
television content than ever before (it is just distributed 
differently).
This is indicative of one response to the future- of- TV 
debates, which is to affirm the centrality and vitality of 
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television institutions in the face of their digital dethrone-
ment. As Tim Wu (2015) reminds us, “Overestimating 
change in the television industry is a rookie mistake.” 
A different formulation of the argument can be found in 
media business commentator Michael Wolff ’s book Tele-
vision Is the New Television (2015). Setting out to destroy 
what he sees as the Silicon Valley myth of television’s dis-
ruption at the hands of the digital, Wolff argues that the 
recent history of media is better understood the other 
way around— that television has ultimately tamed and 
absorbed digital media. For Wolff, Netflix is a classic ex-
ample of this reverse engineering of the digital. The service 
is much more television- like than internet- like, Wolff ar-
gues, because it shuns many of the interactive affordances 
of internet media in favor of established narrative struc-
tures, aesthetics, and experiences. In Wolff ’s account, as 
Netflix morphed from a DVD rental company to a digital 
studio, it actually moved closer to television by “bring-
ing television programming and values and behavior— 
like passive watching— to heretofore interactive and 
computing- related screens” (Wolff 2015, 91). He adds:
Other than being delivered via IP, Netflix had almost 
nothing to do with the conventions of digital media— in 
a sense it rejected them. It is not user generated, it is not 
social, it is not bite size, it is not free. It is in every way, ex-
cept for its route into people’s homes— and the differences 
here would soon get blurry— the same as television. It was 
old- fashioned, passive, narrative entertainment. (93– 94)
In this argument, we can see a variation on the future- 
of- TV arguments: the idea that television has already 
shaped the future of digital media in its own image and 
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will continue to exert influence on audience expecta-
tions and industrial norms. In Wolff ’s view, internet 
television services— while introducing all manner of new 
innovations— are likely to succeed only to the extent that 
they offer television- like experiences and a corresponding 
value proposition. In this sense, television is fated to live 
on both as a resilient industry sector and as an experien-
tial gold standard that will shape audience expectations 
regarding content, no matter what transformations take 
place at the point of distribution.
For industry analysts, there is much at stake in pre-
dictions of industry change. For media scholars, the key 
issues are somewhat different and also require consider-
ation of the agency of particular arguments about what 
television was, is, and might become. If we follow Uric-
chio in thinking that television has never been ontologi-
cally or technologically stable but can only be stabilized 
to a greater or lesser degree, then the critical question for 
media scholarship becomes identifying the ways in which 
particular discourses of change and continuity operate to 
lend a “conceptual coherence” to a medium or technology 
at particular points in time (Uricchio, forthcoming, 7– 8; 
Uricchio 2004). In other words, while we cannot predict 
the future of television in the internet age, we can try to 
understand how particular ways of thinking about that fu-
ture might help to shape the way such a future— or range 
of futures— will play out.
For this reason, it is necessary for certain branches of 
media scholarship to become more self- reflexive about 
their own investment in the object of television as a dis-
crete medium and in television studies as a discrete field 
of inquiry. As Lotz writes in The Television Will Be Revolu-
tionized, “In many ways, HBO and Netflix are more alike 
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because they are non- advertiser- supported subscription 
services than different because one comes in through 
cable and the other over broadband— a distinction I sus-
pect will be technologically nebulous the next time I re-
visit this book” (Lotz 2014, xii). From the point of view of 
media studies, this raises questions about whether a plat-
form such as Netflix should be studied as television and 
what is gained or lost in doing so. After all, most users of 
streaming services are still likely to think of profession-
ally produced scripted content as television content, but 
they do not always watch it on the TV and perhaps do 
not care about whether it comes over the top, via cable, 
or over the airwaves. Nor may they be concerned about 
whether the analytical integrity of television- as- industry 
or television- as- medium has been compromised.
In a much- cited essay published more than a decade 
ago, Lynn Spigel asked, “What is to be gained from studying 
TV under the rubric of new media?” (Spigel 2005, 84). This 
question is still important, and largely unresolved, because 
it prompts us to think about what is revealed and obscured 
as one moves between ontological frameworks. One of the 
questions we need to think about is not whether the fu-
ture of television is going to look more like the internet or 
more like cable but rather whether emergent media forms 
should be understood in terms of their similarities to past 
media or through entirely new paradigms. The trick may 
be to build productively on past knowledge without let-
ting existing frames of reference overdetermine objects 
of analysis. Academic disciplines are slow; they rely on 
the incremental accumulation of knowledge. In the case 
of television studies, it is neither useful nor desirable to 
throw out all this knowledge and deep thinking behind it 
every time a new distribution technology appears on the 
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horizon (as has already happened with video, Tivo, mobile 
devices, and so on). But, at the same time, there are some 
risks in trying to assimilate a wide array of convergent and 
new phenomena into an existing paradigm, just as there 
are risks in taking the reflex position that we have seen 
it all before and that it is all still television. Even though 
we can trace many paths between past and present, we 
also need to acknowledge the differences and find ways to 
come to terms with them analytically. This need is espe-
cially acute when the everyday terminology may remain 
unchanged (“watching TV”) but might refer to quite a dif-
ferent set of practices that are ontologically distinct from 
what that terminology referred to in the past.
In grappling with the conceptual problem of internet 
television, then, we need to be alert to diverse and some-
times contradictory effects. On the one hand, it is quite 
possible that nonlinear internet distribution will come to 
function primarily as simply another distribution chan-
nel for existing content or new content that still looks and 
feels like TV as we know it. Seen from this perspective, 
internet distribution can reasonably be understood as 
something that is easily assimilated into existing business 
models. But there are longer- range effects at work here, 
too, and not all of them can be predicted in advance. Over 
time, the nonlinear affordance of internet distribution is 
likely to lead to further specialization and expansion in 
content production, such that new texts may increas-
ingly be designed for the experiential specificities of in-
ternet rather than broadcast or cable distribution. We can 
already start to see this with the kinds of quality dramas 
made explicitly for binge viewing, and in the prolifera-
tion of short- form web comedies that would not fit well 
into a traditional schedule, not to mention the vast pool of 
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amateur content on YouTube. This suggests that changes 
in distribution can have longer- term effects in other areas 
of the system, including production and reception. While 
we may still watch TV in familiar ways, in familiar spaces 
and formats, transformations are taking place that slowly 
recalibrate the whole system.
The question “is it still TV?” is problematic precisely 
because its framing invites a reductive “yes” or “no” an-
swer that works to solidify a category (television) that may 
instead be better deconstructed, or at least reformulated. 
Cunningham and Silver (2013) argue that instead of ask-
ing whether new media has changed old media, and thus 
lapsing into familiar binaries of technological crisis ver-
sus continuity, we should focus instead on how to account 
for the rate of change, and the particular combinations 
of change and stasis that exist at any one time in the his-
tory of a medium. They reject both the “everything has 
changed” and “nothing has changed” positions as inad-
equate responses to the question of media industry trans-
formation. Following this lead, we could also ask what 
other intellectual resources are available to us for think-
ing about the relationship between, rather than merely the 
“impact of,” internet distribution vis- à- vis television.
An excellent model is provided by Thomas Elsaesser 
and Malte Hagener, who have worked through this prob-
lem in a different context. In their chapter “Digital Cinema 
and Film Theory— The Body Digital,” they extrapolate 
Lev Manovich’s idea of the inside- out to advance the argu-
ment that digitization can create simultaneous stasis and 
change, leading to their apparently paradoxical conclusion 
that, “With digital cinema everything remains the same 
and everything has changed” (Elsaesser and Hagener 
2015, 202). What Elsaesser and Hagener mean by this is 
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that there has been great change within the boundaries of 
an existing category such that the referent of the category 
itself is transformed and we are no longer talking about 
the same thing we thought we were talking about. Hence 
it is not so much a matter of tracing lines of continuity and 
change around a fixed axis but rather grappling with the 
“inside- out” ontological transformation of a medium.
Consider how Elsaesser and Hagener work through this 
paradox in relation to cinema. Their account insists that 
the social experience of cinema- going remains popular, 
durable, and powerful (“stars and genres are still the bait, 
concessions and merchandise provide additional or even 
core revenue for the exhibitor, and the audience is still of-
fered a social experience along with a consumerist fantasy,” 
202). However, they also claim that the textual form of 
digitally shot cinema has been reorganized through digital 
production, such that the relationship between image and 
representation is now completely recast. Digital cinema 
now produces the effect of cinematic representation as just 
one of its potential applications. Hence there is not only a 
combination of stasis and change but also a series of internal 
changes that produce the same external appearance. This is 
change from the “inside out,” such as when a parasite takes 
over its host, “leaving outer appearances intact but, in the 
meantime, hollowing out the foundations— technological 
as well as ontological— on which a certain medium or 
mode of representation was based” (204– 205).
This is a compelling theory of technological change, a 
reminder that change and stasis not only coexist but can 
also envelop each other. Elsaesser and Hagener are refer-
ring to production techniques in the main. However, there 
is some parallel to distribution. The inside- out transforma-
tion of internet television allows the TV experience (the 
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reception technology, domestic space, textual formats, and 
so on) to remain consistent with established norms while 
unfurling a substantive change on the inside— specifically, 
the inherent nonlinearity and interactivity of the digital 
video platform. Viewers pick and choose individual items 
from a database rather than watch what is “on” at any given 
time. There is no scheduled flow of programming (even 
though much of the licensed content offered on SVOD 
services was produced for such a schedule); there are 
only individual pieces of content within a database of of-
ferings that can be consumed in any order, at any time, 
and that will often continue to play automatically thanks 
to the Netflix Post- Play feature (which automatically cues 
the next episode). Depending on how we evaluate such 
structural changes in distribution, this aspect of internet 
television may indeed embody the same inside- out qual-
ity that Elsaesser and Hagener identify in digital cinema 
production.
As we can see from these various arguments, there are 
benefits and risks to seeing Netflix through the lens of 
television. Such a perspective opens our eyes to important 
continuities in the experience, production norms, and do-
mestic context of moving- image entertainment, but it can 
also produce some analytical traps. This is why it is help-
ful to take a both/and approach, so we can approach our 
object from multiple perspectives simultaneously. As we 
have seen, Netflix may still feel like TV to viewers, and it 
relies on this familiar pleasure for its success, but its distri-
butional logic is markedly different— technologically, eco-
nomically, and structurally. It is too early to tell, of course, 
but we should at least entertain the possibility that the af-
fordance of internet protocol distribution may well prove 
to be the parasite inside the host— the agent of change that 
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ends up quietly overtaking the organism from the inside 
out— while still retaining its outward features.
Digital Media Studies and the Platform Perspective
Let us consider a second analytical approach and what 
it might bring to an understanding of Netflix. This sec-
ond approach would consider Netflix as a digital media 
service— a computational, software- based system that 
can produce a television- like experience as just one of its 
potential applications. Following this line of thought— 
which in fact aligns with the historical origins of the 
company and the way it presents itself to investors and 
regulators, if not to users— we can start to see how Netflix 
fits in with a quite different set of debates that have been 
playing out in fields such as new media studies, internet 
studies, and platform studies. In this section, I explore 
some of the arguments relevant to Netflix that have 
emerged from these debates. This will push our analysis 
of Netflix in a direction different from where television 
studies might take us.
This second way of thinking is less concerned with 
under standing Netflix in relation to television, cinema, or 
any other form of screen media, however one defines it. In 
contrast, it sees Netflix as a complex sociotechnical soft-
ware system. It is more interested in looking sideways to 
other digital media, rather than backward to television, to 
assess similarities and differences. There is, then, a funda-
mental difference between a television studies approach 
and a digital media approach. The former is inherently his-
toricizing; it sees its object in relation to a particular media 
technology (television) and its evolution. In contrast, the 
latter implicitly frames its object as a set of computational 
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technologies tied together into a common user interface 
while also understanding each digital media service as 
a kind of communication system in its own right— with 
unique design, affordances, and limitations. This allows 
us to think about Netflix alongside a much wider range 
of digital media, including not only video platforms (You-
Tube, Youku, Hulu) but also e- commerce and social media 
networks (Facebook, Twitter, Ebay, Amazon, Weibo) as 
well as other software artifacts, such as electronic program 
guides (EPGs), gaming consoles, or desktop operating 
systems.
The term “platform” requires some explanation. In 
new media and internet studies, platforms are commonly 
 defined as large- scale online systems premised on user 
interaction and user- generated content— including Face-
book, Twitter, Medium, Snapchat, YouTube, Flickr, Grindr, 
and others. Platform studies, as it has become known, is 
a field of critical, empirical, and theoretical research con-
cerned with these new institutions of the internet age and 
the specific ways in which they have been able to harness 
user communication and labor. It seeks to understand how 
platforms mediate and organize our daily interactions, ask-
ing what this means for communication practices, econo-
mies, and identities. Of course, Netflix is not a platform 
in the same way as social media services like Facebook or 
Twitter are. Netflix is not open, social, or collaborative. One 
cannot upload content to Netflix or design software appli-
cations to run within it. In this sense, it is fundamentally 
different from video sites containing both user- uploaded 
and professionally managed content (YouTube, Youku, 
etc.). Unlike these sites, Netflix does not (at this stage) have 
an advertising business model; nor does it have the char-
acter of a multisided marketplace like Amazon or Ebay, 
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which host a more complicated ecology of commercial ac-
tivity. Netflix is closed, library- like, professional; a portal 
rather than a platform; a walled garden rather than an open 
marketplace. This said, we can still learn a lot about Netflix 
through platform studies perspectives.
Platform studies has evolved along two main lines. The 
first of these comes out of the work of Nick Montfort and 
Ian Bogost. In their book Racing the Beam: The Atari Video 
Computer System and related working papers— which are 
widely read in games studies, though less so in television 
studies— Montfort and Bogost outline a specific under-
standing of platforms and how they can be studied. They 
define a platform as the “hardware and software frame-
work that supports other programs” (Bogost and Montfort 
2009a, 1) and as “a computing system of any sort upon which 
further computing development can be done” (Bogost and 
Montfort 2009b, 2). They note that a “platform in its pur-
est form is an abstraction, simply a standard or specifica-
tion” (Bogost and Montfort 2009a, 1). Consequently, their 
vision of platform studies involves “investigating the re-
lationships between the hardware and software design of 
standardized computing systems and the creative works 
produced on those platforms” (ibid.). Montfort and Bogost 
insist that researchers pay close attention to the materiality 
of the platform, including its design, construction, and even 
wiring, as well as to the platform’s user- facing and symbolic 
dimensions. Their approach is better suited to gaming sys-
tems such as Atari and PlayStation than to online services 
like YouTube, Steam, or Netflix— though the material di-
mensions of the latter are also amenable to research and 
critique, as we will see in Chapter 3.
A second strand of thinking about platforms comes 
out of critical communications and internet research. The 
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work of Tarleton Gillespie in particular draws our atten-
tion to the expanding range of everyday communication and 
consumption practices that take place within online plat-
forms, especially social media networks. Gillespie defines 
platforms as “sites and services that host, organize, and cir-
culate users’ shared content” (Gillespie 2017, 254). His essay 
“The Politics of ‘Platforms’ ” (Gillespie 2010) was an early 
critique of the way online services such as Facebook and 
YouTube strategically defined themselves as neutral inter-
mediaries— as technology companies rather than media 
companies— thus obscuring their power as mediators of 
communication, identity, and politics.2
A key theme in Gillespie’s work is the agency of the 
platform itself. Far from being neutral, platforms shape the 
communications, interactions, and consumption that they 
facilitate— through interface design, moderation policies, 
terms of service, algorithmic recommendation, and so on. 
Consider the Facebook “Like” button and how it subtly 
institutes a norm of extroverted positivity as the default 
practice for online communications— there is no “Dislike” 
or “Don’t Care” button— while at the same time generating 
valuable commercial data for Facebook by turning “per-
sonal data into . . . public connections” (van Dijck 2013, 
49; Gerlitz and Helmond 2013). We should not, then, make 
the mistake of seeing a platform as a “neutral” distributor 
of content, because the nature, design, and business model 
of the platform will always have an effect on what passes 
through it. Platforms, according to Gillespie,
have precise (and shifting) technical affordances that 
constrain and guide practice— both in their own design 
and in their fit with a myriad of infrastructures, includ-
ing their back- end data systems, the protocols of the Web, 
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and the dictates of mobile providers. They have rules and 
norms that bless some practices and are used to restrict 
others. They have myriad international, sometimes con-
flicting, legal obligations they must enforce. They have 
commercial aspirations and pressures that drive decisions 
about how they’re marketed, how they’re updated, and 
how they’re positioned against their competitors. (Gil-
lespie in Clark et al. 2014, 1447)
Following Gillespie’s arguments, it is possible to see how 
Netflix— while certainly not a social media platform— 
exploits the same quality of discursive slipperiness as these 
other platforms. Netflix, like Facebook and YouTube, is 
presently engaged in a number of disputes with govern-
ment agencies about how and whether it should censor its 
film and television content. In India, for example, Netflix 
claims that because it is an internet- delivered service 
rather than a broadcaster, it should not have to follow the 
obscenity policies that apply to Indian television stations 
(see Chapter 4). This is not all that far from Uber’s insis-
tence that because it is a technology platform it should not 
have to follow the licensing and tax laws that apply to taxi 
companies, or Facebook’s insistence that it is not a media 
company and therefore should not have to fully regulate 
the communications taking place through its networks. In 
each case, a service’s digital status is invoked to sidestep 
regulatory responsibilities.
Even though these three companies operate in very 
different markets (transport, communications/advertis-
ing, and scripted entertainment), they have a common 
operational logic that hinges on their status as a digital 
service that is (a) categorically dissimilar to the established 
incumbents they now compete with and (b) operating in 
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global markets from a U.S. base, partially outside the ju-
risdictional reach of national governments. Following this 
logic, and notwithstanding the lines of historical evolu-
tion between Netflix and television traced in the previous 
section, one can also argue that these structural similari-
ties with other digital services place Netflix within the 
platform economy as much as within the entertainment 
industries.
Another common characteristic of digital media plat-
forms is a reliance on algorithmic recommendations. Along 
with Amazon and Pandora, Netflix has played a pivotal 
role in the development and popularization of recommen-
dations generally, having invested heavily in this area since 
its years as a DVD rental service. The company famously 
ran an open engineering competition, the US$1 million 
Netflix Prize of 2006– 2009, to improve its predictive pow-
ers by 10%. The fruits of these efforts have paid off in the 
form of its eerily accurate prediction engine, which seeks 
to, in Hastings’s words, “get so good at suggestions that 
we’re able to show you exactly the right film or TV show 
for your mood when you turn on Netflix” (The Economist 
2017). On the Netflix home screen, algorithmic recom-
mendations are used to autocurate selections of content 
geared around individual users’ data profiles. Every video 
selection that appears on the home screen is the result of 
intricate calculations based on user- submitted data (movie 
ratings and viewing history), collaborative filtering (pre-
dictions based on other people’s activities), and manual 
coding of films for all conceivable metadata points, from 
character types to endings.
This naturally puts Netflix squarely in the middle of 
debates about the datafication of culture, filter bubbles, 
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and big- data politics (Pariser 2011; boyd and Crawford 
2012; Beer 2013). Its recommendation system has been 
accused of everything from unjustified consumer surveil-
lance to the demise of the mass audience and the end of 
serendipity. Film scholars in particular have voiced con-
cern about the way personalization leads to filter bubbles. 
In an essay on Netflix’s “mathematization of taste,” Neta 
Alexander (2016, 94) warns that “the rise of predictive per-
sonalization might be good news for the study of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning, but it is bad news for 
anyone who wishes to encounter what Sontag calls ‘great 
films.’ ” We should, however, bear in mind that algorithms 
can be programmed for diversity as well as for taste repro-
duction (Blakley 2016).
The debate about Netflix’s effect on taste and consump-
tion continues to rage, though it is not a primary focus 
of this book. For our purposes, let us instead focus on 
the design of the Netflix interface and how this mediates 
relations between television, cinema, and digital media. 
The Netflix interface changes regularly but at the time of 
writing is organized into categories that are curated au-
tomatically from a list of thousands of potential options, 
including popular genres (romantic comedies) as well as 
hyperspecific microgenres (fight- the- system documen-
taries) (Madrigal 2014). This smorgasbord of content is 
arranged into celluloid- like strips of color that slide off 
the right- hand side of the page, suggesting an infinite va-
riety of choices. In this way, the viewer is positioned as the 
sovereign navigator- user of an endless archive of screen 
content. Such design choices are carefully constructed to 
create the appearance of textual abundance and conceal 
limitations in what is a finite Netflix catalog.
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Until 2015, the Netflix desktop interface had a light grey 
background. Video artwork was formatted in vertical, DVD- 
style boxes, so that the overall effect was reminiscent of a 
video store. Now, the background is dark— as in a movie 
theater— and the DVD covers have been rearranged into a 
horizontal format suggesting frames on a celluloid filmstrip. 
This site update seems designed not only to make the service 
as tablet- friendly as possible, hence the shift to the horizon-
tal format, but also to discursively reposition the site within 
the pantheon of older media technologies by moving the 
idea of Netflix away from video- store and DVD culture— 
surely a fading memory for most of its users— and realign-
ing the service with that most resilient medium, cinema. 
Interestingly, the iconography of television is nowhere to 
be found in Netflix’s interface design, despite the abun-
dance of TV series available through Netflix. There are 
no remote controls, advertisements, or schedules. Even 
Figure 1.2. Netflix desktop interface, as of January 2018. The interface, 
designed in such a way as to conceal catalog limitations, suggests an 
endless bounty of content available to the user. Screenshot by the 
author.
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though the idea of television is central to Netflix’s com-
mercial ambitions— recall Hastings’s description of Netflix 
as “a new global Internet TV network”— the television ex-
perience does not seem to be central to how Netflix wishes 
its users to imagine streaming. Perhaps this is because of 
the degraded nature of the “idiot box,” and Netflix’s related 
desire to market itself as a premium service. In any case, it 
is one of the ironies of internet television that its referent 
medium, television, is being simultaneously reimagined, 
integrated, erased, and remediated through the emergence 
of streaming services.
Toward a Synthesis
This brings us back to Netflix’s relationship to screen 
media. As we have seen, Netflix is a shape- shifter: it 
combines elements of diverse media technologies and 
institutions. This has implications for the analytical frame-
works we use in media research. The trick is not to take 
an either/or approach, trying to shoehorn Netflix into 
one box or another, but rather to see it as a media object 
that performatively enacts its association with these media 
at different times and for different purposes. In its deal-
ings with government, Netflix claims to be a digital media 
service— certainly not television, which would attract 
unwelcome regulation. Yet, in its public relations, Netflix 
constantly refers to television, because of its familiar-
ity to consumers. Its interface design, on the other hand, 
prefers to evoke the cinema experience. Meanwhile, its 
subscription business model has echoes of pay- TV, but its 
algorithmic recommendation system is pure new media. 
In other words, Netflix is a hybrid technology that reme-
diates a range of earlier media technologies in different 
44 | What Is Netflix?
aspects of its operation, and this mix of associations is 
constantly changing.
The good news for television studies is that these issues 
are already quite familiar to scholars. Television is a hybrid 
medium that combines and rearranges elements of pre-
vious media forms, including radio, cinema, newspapers, 
and the theater. Equally, television studies— to the extent 
that it exists as a discrete academic field— has evolved as 
a historical amalgam of different critical approaches, re-
search methods, and ways of knowing. Television studies 
is a malleable discipline, and this natural flexibility will be an 
asset as we enter further into an era of internet- distributed 
television services, which requires us to keep an open 
mind as to what exactly television is and how it might be 
studied. In this respect, Netflix is an important object les-
son precisely because it invites us to revisit what we think 
we know about television and to reconstitute that knowl-
edge anew.
Arguably, what is more important than what we call 
Netflix is how we think about it. In this chapter, I have ar-
gued for a both/and perspective, suggesting that we should 
acknowledge the specificities of Netflix as a digital media 
service (such as its mode of interactivity, algorithmic fil-
tering, and regulatory slipperiness) and what this means 
for its distribution function (its catalog structure, lack 
of capacity limitations, and nonlinearity) while also ap-
preciating the continuities between Netflix and broadcast 
media, which are especially noticeable at the level of text, 
engagement, and experience (the “it’s still TV” argument). 
It is not enough to treat Netflix just like any other digital 
platform, because this misses its specificity as a hybrid TV- 
cinema- digital media distribution system with a unique 
set of experiential and aesthetic connections to older 
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media. Nor is it enough to wheel out the standard theories 
of television studies and apply them to Netflix. A better 
approach would be one that is literate in both screen and 
digital media studies and can move between these ways of 
knowing. The need for such an approach will become evi-
dent in the next two chapters, when we turn our attention 
to Netflix’s distribution model and infrastructure.
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Transnational Television
From Broadcast to Broadband
There are few issues in contemporary television stud-
ies that cannot be traced back in some way to the 1974 
book Television: Technology and Cultural Form by Ray-
mond Williams. Of particular interest for scholars of 
internet- distributed television is the book’s final chapter, 
“Alternative Technology, Alternative Uses,” which offers a 
richly textured account of new distribution technologies 
and their sociopolitical implications. Writing in the early 
1970s, Williams could not have foretold the rise of Netflix. 
Nonetheless, his discussion of emerging satellite televi-
sion services identifies issues that are directly relevant to 
today’s debates about transnational television in the inter-
net age.
Williams viewed satellite television as a site of structural 
conflict— between competing institutions, business mod-
els, and visions of what television is and should be— as 
well as being a staging ground for Cold War politics. He 
was especially interested in the transnational dimen-
sion of satellite distribution and what this might mean 
for global communication. Noting on the one hand that 
Figure 2.1. Video platforms, including YouTube, operate transnationally 
but are territorialized through geolocation and personalization. Photo 
by Kapustin Igor/Shutterstock.
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satellite’s “probable” evolutionary trajectory would be to 
“penetrate or circumvent existing national broadcasting 
systems, in the name of ‘internationalism’ but in reality 
in the service of one or two dominant cultures” (Williams 
1974, 147), Williams offers a highly ambivalent assessment 
of the forms of television that may result from satellite 
distribution:
A world- wide television service, with genuinely open 
skies, would be an enormous gain to the peoples of the 
world, as short- wave radio, bypassing national controls, 
has already clearly been. Against the rhetoric of open 
skies, which in fact, given the expense and sophistica-
tion of satellite technology, would be monopolised by a 
few large corporations and authoritarian governments, 
it will sound strange and reactionary to defend national 
autonomy. But the probable users of the technology are 
not internationalists, in the sense of any significant 
mutuality. The national or local components in their 
services would be matters merely of consent and pub-
licity:  tokenism. (149)
In this quote, we can observe several clashing ideas that 
continue to structure today’s debate about internet- 
distributed television. On the one hand, there is the 
utopian vision of a “world- wide television service,” seen 
here as a potential global agora— a space of free and recip-
rocal exchange. On the other hand, there is the recognition 
that this space is likely to be organized around existing 
forms of industrial and geopolitical power; hence the cos-
mopolitan space of transnational communication also 
becomes a space of domination. Finally, there is Williams’s 
qualified appeal to national regulation as a bulwark against 
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multinational corporations. Using language reflecting 
1970s debates about cultural imperialism, Williams warns 
that the advent of commercial direct- to- home satellite 
television systems may make independent production 
“very difficult or impossible” and that most “inhabitants of 
the ‘global village’ would be saying nothing . . . while a few 
powerful corporations and governments, and the people 
they could hire, would speak in ways never before known 
to most of the peoples of the world” (149).
It is not difficult to see the links between Williams’s 
Cold War– era predictions of cultural imperialism from 
above and current fears about U.S. cultural domination in 
internet- distributed television services. More than 40 years 
after the publication of Williams’s book, we still do not have 
a single “world- wide television service”— a distribution sys-
tem or platform that is widely accessible in every part of 
the world. We do, however, have a range of transnational 
multiplatform television services— including international 
news channels (CNN, Al Jazeera, Russia Today), internet- 
distributed subscription services (Netflix, Amazon Prime 
Video), and online video- sharing platforms. Each of these 
services has its own underlying technologies, distribution 
patterns, and ways of reaching dispersed markets. They are 
all transnational but in different ways, and just as Williams 
predicted, many of these services have become contro-
versial because of the way they impact national markets, 
allegedly reshape national cultures, and evade national 
regulations.
This chapter asks: What is distinctive about the trans-
national character of internet- distributed television com-
pared to earlier forms of transnational television? In 
answering this question, it seeks to locate current debates 
in a wider historical context. While we often think about 
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digital media in a vacuum, as though each new innovation 
was the first of its kind, many of the concerns about Netf-
lix and other transnational internet- distributed television 
services have clearly been raised before— including the 
fear of cultural penetration by powerful nations, the weak-
ened power of the nation- state, the lack of local content, 
and the privatization of public institutions. With these 
issues in mind, the present chapter will describe key struc-
tural changes in television distribution since the 1970s and 
explain how today’s multiterritory SVOD services appear 
when seen through the lens of historical debates.
From National to Transnational Television— 
and Back
“Transnational television,” as I use the term here, refers to 
the propensity for television distribution systems to cross 
one or more national borders. It is a deceptively simple 
term that invokes a wide range of scenarios, including 
both cosmopolitan and culturally intrusive distribution. 
For our purposes, the related term “global television” will 
refer to television services that operate in a large number 
of international markets simultaneously. Netflix, by my 
definitions, is both transnational and global. HBO, in con-
trast, is transnational but not global, because it offers its 
standalone internet- distributed service (HBO Now/Go) 
only in select markets in Latin America, Central Europe, 
and Asia. Most national catch- up services are neither 
transnational nor global, at least from the point of view 
of distribution.
The history of broadcast television is closely tied to the 
history of the nation- state. Since the interwar period, the 
organization of television systems in almost every country 
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has mirrored and indeed reinforced national boundar-
ies. The nationwide distribution of television has shaped 
advertising markets, has propagated official language 
policies, and has established common frames of national 
discourse. As Jean K. Chalaby writes,
For much of its history, television has been closely bound 
to a national territory. Broadcasters exchanged pro-
grammes and set up international associations, but op-
erated within national boundaries. Their signal covered 
the length and breadth of the country, from the nation’s 
capital to the remotest parts of the countryside. Foreign 
broadcasters were not allowed to transmit on national 
territory and attempts to do so were seen as breaches of 
sovereignty. Television was often tied up with the national 
project and no other media institution was more central 
to the modernist intent of engineering a national identity. 
(Chalaby 2005, 1)
These institutional contexts produced a particular indus-
trial structure. Distribution was contiguous with territory, 
and control over television institutions rested clearly 
(though not always easily) with national governments. 
Regulation ensured a national “container” around televi-
sion, creating markets, institutions, and viewing cultures 
that aligned predominantly with national borders.
Since the 1970s, successive technologies have under-
mined this structure, complicating television’s spatial 
dynamics. Satellite and cable distribution have taken tele-
vision signals into new places. Digitization and compres-
sion have increased the number of channels. Successive 
waves of liberalization have swept through the interna-
tional TV system, leading to the privatization of state 
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broadcasters, and the deregulation of infrastructure, ad-
vertising, and content controls. Contemporary television 
industries are now characterized by dense, overlapping 
palimpsests of technologies, markets, and viewing hab-
its, none of which are easily contained within national 
borders.
As a result, scholars are increasingly conceptualizing 
television as both a national and a transnational technol-
ogy. Since the 1990s, a rich body of descriptive and theo-
retical literature has emerged. Chalaby (2005, 2009) has 
analyzed the industrial logics of satellite channels. Lisa 
Parks (2005) has studied the infrastructural and cultural 
dimensions of satellite television. Naomi Sakr (2001) has 
examined satellite television cultures in the Middle East. 
Richard Collins (1993, 1998) has analyzed transnational 
television policy in Europe. Other scholars have looked 
at the transnational reception of texts, genres, and for-
mats (Katz and Wedell 1977; Gillespie 1995; Iwabuchi 
2004; Moran 2009; Chalaby 2016). Reading across these 
studies, the nomenclature of the transnational appears to 
represent an attempt to come to terms with a variety of in-
terlocking issues: the cross- border mobility of television 
content, talent, and formats; the interaction of interna-
tional broadcasters, regulators, and institutions; and the 
cosmopolitanization of television audiences, styles, and 
viewing habits.
A related body of scholarly literature on global televi-
sion has also emerged. Sometimes this term is used in-
terchangeably with “transnational television” or as an 
umbrella term for “all the world’s television” (Barker 
1997). It may also refer to a particular scale of operation— 
commonly associated with channels such as CNN or BBC 
World, or platforms such as YouTube and Netflix, that are 
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available in a large number of countries simultaneously. 
Alternatively, “global” may evoke a particular critical epis-
temology. For example, Lisa Parks and Shanti Kumar 
see the rubric of global television as an opportunity to re-
think the objectives of television studies in a cross- cultural 
frame:
How do we write in a way that captures the movement of 
television programs across national borders and cultures? 
How do we describe the unequal technological access 
and television production around the world— what could 
be called global television’s ebbs and flows? How can we 
describe television in places where we do not speak lo-
cal languages? How do we study transnational audiences, 
viewers scattered across continents? How did certain 
television institutions and industries emerge in different 
parts of the world? (Parks and Kumar 2003, 3, emphasis 
in original)
This passage was written before internet distribution was a 
mainstream feature of television, but its relevance to con-
temporary concerns is clear. The themes of “movement,” 
“ebbs and flows,” translation, access, “scattered” audiences, 
and patterns of emergence, central to the television studies 
agenda outlined by Parks and Kumar, are also central to 
the account of digital distribution offered in this book.
Clearly, there are many aspects of internet- distributed 
television that are unambiguously transnational, if not 
global: the simultaneous release of content across dozens 
of national markets, the ability to instantly stream material 
from faraway countries, the rise of online translation net-
works, and so on. But we must also pay attention to the 
ways in which internet- distributed television is bounded, 
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“placed,” and restricted, and how its patterns of inclu-
sion and exclusion are spatially organized. Rather than 
conceptualizing the relationship between these scales in 
a dialectical way (the national versus the transnational or 
global), the best way forward may be to develop more 
finely honed analyses of the different kinds of mobility 
enabled by television distribution technologies and their 
associated market forms. After all, what we call television 
is in fact a bundle of different technologies and practices, 
each with its own spatial characteristics, its own ways of 
crossing borders. To understand what transnational televi-
sion means in the internet age, we need a more granular 
account of the key distribution technologies in this bundle, 
including broadcast, satellite, and internet distribution. 
We begin with broadcast.
Spatial Logics of Television Distribution
From a technical perspective, all broadcast media are 
potentially transnational in the sense that radio waves 
are multidirectional. Radio transmission may be limited 
by topography (mountains and skyscrapers block out sig-
nals), but it is not limited, in a technical sense, by political 
boundaries. Television as a broadcast medium has always 
had a transnational dimension because radio waves do 
not respect borders. While most broadcasting takes place 
within, rather than across, national borders, there is noth-
ing inherent in the technology that says this must be the 
case; indeed, the history of broadcasting is full of examples 
to the contrary.
Radio— television’s predecessor— was an international 
medium well suited to crossing borders. Michele Hilmes 
(2012, 2) claims that “no previous medium possessed the 
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equally important capacity of radio waves to transgress na-
tional borders, to defy barriers of both time and space, to 
travel unseen through the air and enter the ears of private 
citizens in their homes, undetected by public gatekeepers” 
(emphasis in original). Since the earliest experiments with 
cross- border broadcasting at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, entrepreneurs, enthusiasts, and government officials 
have all found ways of using radio to reach faraway minds 
and markets. This inherent transnationalism was the rea-
son that governments all over the world sought to strongly 
regulate radio or to use it as their own propaganda chan-
nel (Hilmes 2012).
With its ultralong transmission range, shortwave radio 
was the favored medium for government propaganda 
broadcasting during the Cold War. Radio Free Europe 
penetrated deep into the Eastern Bloc, while Radio Mos-
cow could be heard in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, North 
America, and Western Europe until the 1980s. Creatures 
of national government, these were transnational media 
from the point of view of distribution. There are also many 
examples of commercial radio stations operating trans-
nationally, usually without authorization. Radio Luxem-
bourg (later Radio Television Luxembourg, or RTL) is the 
most famous case. In the 1930s, it used its transmitter— 
then the most powerful in the world— to beam out multi-
lingual services across much of Western Europe. In the 
1960s, pirate radio stations such as Radio Caroline tar-
geted British listeners from international waters, breaking 
the monopoly of the BBC and breeding new youth cultures 
(Johns 2011). The U.S.- Mexico frontier was another popu-
lar site for transnational broadcasting: “border- blaster” AM 
radio stations in Mexico reached large audiences in the 
southwestern United States, interfering with the signals 
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of local channels and attracting large youth audiences, 
as noted by Burroughs (2015), who has analyzed these 
continuities between transnational radio and digital 
streaming.
A common distribution logic of transnational broad-
casting is signal spillover. Wherever two nations share a 
border, there is often accidental reception of TV signals 
on one or both sides. European markets, with their dense 
patchwork of languages, cultures, and media systems all 
jostling for territory, are particularly susceptible to spill-
over. Many Europeans can choose between broadcast 
services based in their own and neighboring countries— 
Belgians, for example, can access Dutch, French, and 
German broadcast television channels. The politics of 
spillover were heightened during the Cold War, when East 
Germans watched West German channels, Hungarians 
watched Austrian channels, and Albanians watched Ital-
ian and Yugoslav channels (Jakubowicz 1994). Similarly, in 
Canada, spillover from U.S.- based media is an everyday fact 
of life: most Canadians live near the U.S. border, thereby 
constituting an unofficial advertising market for U.S. tele-
vision stations. Africa also has its own patterns of spill-
over, related to uneven geographies of development. In the 
northern part of Tanzania— which did not have a national 
television service until the 1990s— people have long been able 
to watch Kenyan television, while audiences in Botswana and 
Lesotho similarly enjoyed South African television broad-
casts long before they had their own national TV channel 
(Mytton, Teer- Tomaselli, and Tudesq 2005, 97).
These examples provide a modest correction to the ac-
counts of broadcast television that seek to characterize it 
as essentially a national medium. While the institutional 
history of broadcast television is a history of nationally 
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defined regulation, markets, and audiences, its techno-
logical and social history (how signals traveled and how 
audiences were formed) is full of unofficial and unavoid-
able border crossings. These leakages generally occurred 
through spillover or deliberate targeting of foreign audi-
ences, as in the case of RTL. Given the limited reach of 
broadcast distribution, it is more appropriate to call these 
transnational rather than global media. Aside from short-
wave radio, with its ultralong- range capacity, most forms of 
transnational broadcast media involved localized leakages 
across one or at most a few national borders.
With the advent of satellite technology, the transna-
tional aspect of television increased significantly. A broad- 
beam satellite’s footprint can cover up to 40% of the earth’s 
surface, providing signals to an unlimited number of re-
ceivers and overcoming geographical obstacles, including 
mountain ranges and oceans. Satellite therefore entails a 
different reception model from broadcast television, as 
well as a different political economy, characterized by high 
start- up costs but formidable geographic reach. As Lisa 
Parks writes, “satellite television practices . . . have helped 
to determine (that is, to shape and set the limits of) the 
spheres of cultural and economic activity that constitute 
what we know as ‘the global’ ” (Parks 2005, 2).
The history of satellite TV can be divided into two over-
lapping periods. Beginning in the 1960s, communications 
satellites were used as a business- to- business distribution 
technology enabling retransmission of signals (Straubhaar 
2007). The Russians were the first to develop a nationwide 
satellite TV system, using the Molniya satellites in 1967. 
In the United States, HBO and Ted Turner’s WTBS used 
satellite feeds to relay programming to their partners 
(thus removing the need to courier videotapes between 
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stations). These applications changed the industrial logic 
of television by accelerating the development of particular 
formats, genres, and modes of address. Direct transmis-
sion of programming from big- city TV studios to regional 
affiliates led to the rise of national networks, and the 
ability to beam content to international partners created 
global made- for- TV spectacles such as Our World and 
Live Aid. In the 1980s, with the advent of satellite TVRO 
(TV receive- only) and, later, direct broadcast satellite 
TV, satellite evolved into a domestic consumer technol-
ogy. Millions of people installed satellite dishes on their 
rooftops and decoder boxes in their living rooms, many 
of them tuning in to transnational channels such as CNN, 
Sky TV, Music Box, and MTV.
Satellite was (and still is) a controversial technology. A 
driver of competition, a form of cultural trespassing, an af-
front to national sovereignty, a vehicle of marketization, an 
accidental nation- builder— satellite was all these things and 
more. The key political debates of the satellite age were about 
whether signals from “foreign” countries should be allowed 
“into” national space. Views on this topic varied greatly, of 
course, depending on the countries in question, their fear of 
cultural domination, and the industry stakeholders involved. 
Spatial metaphors— trespassing, intrusion, spillover, and 
leakage— ruled the debate.
The impact of satellite technology on national com-
munications policies was profound. Bitter debates about 
satellite technology’s effect on national media sovereignty 
raged across the world, including at the United Nations, 
UNESCO, and the International Telecommunication 
Union. On one side, advocates of the new communica-
tions order championed the emancipatory possibilities of 
transnational communications. Liberal social scientist and 
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futurist Ithiel de Sola Pool was particularly enthusiastic, 
noting satellite technology’s power to engender “multi-
lateral flows” (de Sola Pool 1990, 70) and celebrating “that 
extraordinary march of progress which modern technology 
has brought” (129). For de Sola Pool, the key to satellite’s 
magic was its border- crossing qualities:
With a satellite, the communications distance between all 
points within its beam has become essentially equal. In 
the non- Euclidean communication plane that results, no 
point lies between two other points. Boundaries partition 
nothing. The topology of commerce, government, and so-
cial life may change to reflect that space warp. (65)
Yet there were many detractors. Leftist scholars warned of 
the potential for “trespassing over national boundaries on 
an unprecedented scale” (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1979, 
ix). Ploman (1979, 155) predicted “an unregulated flood of 
satellite- born television programs . . . that could impair cul-
tural identity and media policy in the ‘receiving’ countries.” 
Raymond Williams lamented the prospect of satellite TV 
becoming a pretext for “penetration by para- national 
corporation advertising” (Williams 1974, 149).
A classical anxiety provoked by satellite television con-
cerns unwelcome market entry, or the capacity for satellite- 
delivered channels to unfairly compete with national 
media companies. Satellite distribution redraws market 
boundaries to include new players so that incumbents with 
decades of history in a national market are suddenly in 
competition with powerful foreign operators— companies 
that have not “paid their dues” to the government through 
licensing fees, regulatory adherence, and political patron-
age. Forty years later, this unfair competition argument 
60 | Transnational Television
is staging a comeback in contemporary debates about 
SVOD, as local operators bemoan the unwelcome pres-
ence of Netflix and Amazon Video in their home markets.
In the 1990s, a series of books by influential media 
scholars pointed to other, more subtle effects of satellite 
technology on national television markets. In Spaces of 
Identity (1995), David Morley and Kevin Robins wrote 
eloquently about satellite television policy in Europe dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s— a period of intense debate about 
the European Union’s plans for liberalization and unifi-
cation of its member states’ audiovisual industries, laws, 
and regulations. Its cornerstone policy, Television without 
Frontiers, adopted in 1989, emphasized the free movement 
of European content across the region. In their book, Morley 
and Robins provided a rich theoretical account of the chang-
ing spatiality of television in Europe and the new kinds of 
media geography thus created, emphasizing the “restructur-
ing of information and image spaces and the production of 
a new communications geography, characterised by global 
networks and an international space of information flows” 
(Morley and Robins 1995, 1):
There is, then, an expansionist tendency at work, pushing 
ceaselessly towards the construction of enlarged audiovi-
sual spaces and markets. The imperative is to break down 
the old boundaries and frontiers of national communities, 
which now present themselves as arbitrary and irrational 
obstacles to this reorganisation of business strategies. Audio-
visual geographies are thus becoming detached from the 
symbolic spaces of national culture, and realigned on the 
basis of the more ‘universal’ principles of international 
consumer culture. The free and unimpeded circulation of 
programmes— television without frontiers— is the great 
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ideal in the new order. It is an ideal whose logic is driving 
ultimately towards the creation of global programming 
and global markets— and already we are seeing the rise to 
power of global corporations intent on turning ideal into 
reality. (11)
Discussing some apocryphal moments of 1990s- era glo-
balization rhetoric,1 Morley and Robins emphasized the 
difficult interactions between transnational media and the 
tastes, values, and practices of actually existing audiences. 
“The question that we must now consider,” they wrote, “is 
how this logic unfolds as it encounters and negotiates the 
real world, the world of already existing and established 
markets and cultures” (15). What Morley and Robins were 
pointing to here was the scalar tension between the global 
and the local, and what happens when the former meets 
the latter. This remains a fundamental tension within 
television distribution, as the current controversies about 
Netflix and local content suggest (see Chapters 4 and 5).
Around the same time that Spaces of Identity appeared, 
John Sinclair, Liz Jacka, and Stuart Cunningham published 
New Patterns in Global Television: Peripheral Vision (1995). 
Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham placed special emphasis 
on satellite’s power to create regional geolinguistic markets 
(e.g., a transcontinental Spanish- language market) rather 
than simply erasing national differences and instituting a 
flat plane of global flow. They noted the structural impacts 
of satellite technology for the wider political economy of 
television:
There is no doubt that the satellite has acted as a kind of 
“Trojan horse” of media liberalization. Although evidence 
from Europe and elsewhere indicates that satellite services 
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originating outside national borders do not usually attract 
levels of audience that would really threaten traditional 
national viewing patterns, the ability of satellite delivery 
to transgress borders has been enough to encourage gen-
erally otherwise reluctant government to allow greater 
internal commercialization and competition. (Sinclair, 
Jacka, and Cunningham 1995, 2)
The authors identified a further consequence of sat-
ellite  television, which was to vastly increase channel 
capa city. This had the effect of stimulating demand not only 
for imported Hollywood content but also for “programmes 
from new sources, including some formerly peripheral 
regions,” including Australia, Canada, Latin America, India, 
and the Middle East (3). They argued that satellite distribu-
tion, as well as expanding and liberalizing media systems, 
was also creating capacity for what Thussu (2006) later 
called “contra- flow.”
Joseph Straubhaar, in his wide- ranging study World 
Television: From Global to Local (2007),2 identified further 
contradictory effects of satellite technology. The first was 
to “permit complete national distribution and penetration 
of television” (Straubhaar 2007, 124) in large countries such 
as China, Canada, Brazil, and the former USSR, thus para-
doxically reaffirming the centrality of the nation by bring-
ing its territory into the same satellite footprint. A second 
effect was to foster the growth of global news and enter-
tainment channels and niche services targeting diasporic 
audiences. Straubhaar also noted a third effect, reflecting 
“a quite different logic of globalization” (125), which was 
to hook elite classes directly into regional and global flows 
(for example, by letting middle- class viewers in Latin 
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America watch global channels like MTV, thus signaling 
their difference from the masses who prefer local chan-
nels). In an important qualification to previous research, 
Straubhaar argued that satellite’s spatial effects were not 
just about facilitating transnational flows. Satellite distri-
bution also had nation- building effects.
What can we learn from these revisionist accounts of 
satellite television? The key point is that disruptive dis-
tribution technologies such as satellite often turn out to 
have diverse and unexpected effects on national television 
markets. A frequently observed feature of satellite distri-
bution was that it enabled long- distance market entry for 
transnational broadcasters. However— as Straubhaar and 
Sinclair, Jacka, and Cunningham noted— there were also 
countervailing tendencies to build national and regional 
markets. Satellite, while certainly a transnational technol-
ogy in terms of its inherent technological affordances, also 
worked to integrate national and regional spaces.
We can see similar things happening with internet tele-
vision today. For example, there is a strongly national di-
mension to many portals, especially catch- up and AVOD 
services offered by public- service broadcasters, commer-
cial networks, and pay- TV companies, which tend to pro-
vide on- demand redistribution for content that is already 
available or familiar to local audiences, sometimes with a 
few digital exclusives thrown in. This is the model used 
by many portals, whether CBS All Access in the United 
States, ABC iView in Australia, or Blim in Mexico. Inher-
ently transnational from the point of view of its distribu-
tion technology (IP distribution), these platforms acquire 
a strongly national character in their institutional form. 
This kind of internet- distributed television is not generally 
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in the business of introducing new transnational flows 
that were not already a feature of their home markets. Its 
aim is to extend an existing paradigm of television view-
ing into the digital space and provide more of the same to 
a nationally defined audience.
Other internet television services have more explicitly 
transnational and transcultural effects. SVOD services for 
cinephiles and genre fans (such as Mubi, Viki Pass, and 
Doc Alliance Films) tend to operate transnationally by ag-
gregating small audiences in many nations, license terms 
permitting. YouTube is also highly transnational because 
of its open nature, catering to a very wide range of viewing 
communities.
Netflix, as a transnational service operating in many 
different markets simultaneously, is an unusual case. On 
the one hand, Netflix’s over- the- top model resembles sat-
ellite and, to a lesser extent, broadcast distribution, in that 
it can penetrate national media spaces without state sanc-
tion. Netflix’s arrival in international markets has there-
fore resurrected the specter of cultural trespassing— a 
spatial logic embodied in the term “over- the- top.” For ex-
ample, in January 2016, after the Netflix global switch- on, 
officials at the Kenya Film Classification Board issued a 
press release objecting to the unauthorized arrival of this 
culturally foreign service within the Kenyan media space. 
“The board regards this development as a gross contra-
vention of the laws governing film and broadcast content 
distribution in Kenya,” read the board’s statement. “As a 
progressive country, we cannot afford to be [a] passive 
recipient of foreign content that could corrupt the moral 
values of our children and compromise our national se-
curity. . . . The pornography, child prostitution and mas-
Transnational Television | 65
sive violence themes in some of the movies threaten our 
moral values” (Rajab 2016; Aglionby and Garrahan 2016; 
Kuo 2016). Statements like this recall the satellite- era para-
digm of cultural intrusion from above, in which a foreign 
media service encroaches into the sovereign space of the 
nation— unwelcome and uninvited.
Authorities in Russia have also objected to Netflix’s un-
authorized arrival using similar language. “Before enter-
ing the market,” said Deputy Communications Minister 
Alexei Volin, “Netflix should have had consultations with 
Russian representatives, including regulating agencies” 
(Volin in Kozlov 2016). Russian culture minister Vladi-
mir Medinsky (cited in Borenstein 2016) went somewhat 
further in a June 2016 interview, stating that, “Our ideo-
logical friends [the U.S. government] are well aware what 
constitutes the most important of all art forms [cinema, 
according to Vladimir Lenin], and they understand how 
to enter everyone’s homes by getting into every television 
with the help of Netflix. And through this television, [they 
get into] the heads of everyone on Earth.” In 2017, Russian 
regulators passed a law limiting the foreign ownership of 
major streaming services to 20%— thus effectively ban-
ning many U.S. services from operating on Russian soil, 
or obliging them to team up with Russian media compa-
nies in joint ventures. This regulatory model is an exten-
sion of laws governing Russian media companies, which 
had previously led to the exit or forced restructuring of 
 U.S.- owned corporations doing business in Russia. At the 
time of writing, Netflix is still operating in Russia, because 
of a provision in the law that gives a free pass to smaller 
companies with under 100,000 daily viewers. Netflix— 
which has not commented publicly on the law and never 
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reveals national subscriber numbers— is thought to be 
under the threshold (Kozlov 2017).
How well founded are these regulators’ concerns, given 
Netflix’s distribution model? Just because Netflix was sud-
denly switched on in Russia and Kenya, does this mean 
that it is now present in the same way as a broadcast, satel-
lite, or cable channel? What degree of cultural power can 
be ascribed to an internet- distributed service as it enters 
a new market? How governments and citizens feel about 
“foreign” media is fundamentally dependent on the origin, 
target, and cultural context of the content being transmit-
ted. Shortwave radio broadcasts were welcome from allies 
but unwelcome when they came from enemies. Satellite 
beams can diversify national media landscapes or arro-
gantly trespass on sovereign territory. Similarly, trans-
nationally distributed internet television can be seen by 
governments as beneficial when reconnecting commu-
nities with national discourses, benign when circulating 
“mere entertainment,” and threatening when undermin-
ing national media regulation or introducing unwelcome 
ideas into the national media space.
Given that the political discourse around Silicon Valley 
tech companies is changing rapidly at the moment, over 
the next few years it will be instructive to follow how Net-
flix and other internet television services are construed 
as allies or enemies in various national contexts. This is a 
highly volatile area for media policy. Just as the history of 
satellite television cannot be divorced from the wider ho-
rizon of Cold War politics, cultural imperialism debates, 
and economic liberalization, contemporary debates about 
internet television must be seen in light of monopoly fears, 
local- content protectionism, tax- evasion scandals, and the 
general policy backlash against big tech.
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Rethinking the Transnational
It is difficult to compare the degree of transnationalism 
inherent in different technologies of television distri-
bution, even though we can see clear differences in 
affordances. Internet- distributed television is both more 
and less transnational than older television systems, 
depending on the criteria you use to measure such things. 
One of the challenges here is that we lack an adequate 
vocabulary to describe the geographical configurations 
characteristic of internet- distributed television. We may 
need to go beyond terms like global, national, and trans-
national; however, as yet there is no consensus regarding 
viable alternatives.
In his 1994 book Virtual Geography, Mackenzie Wark 
used the vector as the appropriate spatial metaphor for 
describing the geography of emergent media. Borrowing 
from Paul Virilio, Wark describes the vector’s ability to 
“link almost any points together” and to “connect enor-
mously vast and vaguely defined spaces together and move 
images, and sounds, words, and furies, between them” 
(Wark 1994, 11– 12). Although Wark was writing about 
transnational television events of the 1990s (including 
satellite- distributed CNN broadcasts of the first Gulf War) 
rather than the internet, his formulation influenced a gen-
eration of cyberculture theorists, resonating with the idea 
of global connectivity found in manifestos such as Nicho-
las Negroponte’s Being Digital (1995). Other metaphors 
have been offered by Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge in 
their book Code/Space (2011) and, most famously, by so-
ciologist Manuel Castells in his account of the “space of 
flows” in The Rise of the Network Society (1996) and the 
“Internet galaxy” in The Internet Galaxy (2001).
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Other scholars have questioned the possibility of ascrib-
ing a single spatial metaphor to internet distribution. As 
David Golumbia notes, even terms such as “centralized” 
and “decentralized” have conflicting meanings when ap-
plied to internet phenomena:
Facebook, for example, might be seen as decentralized be-
cause it is made up of its millions of users, spread out all over 
the planet; as centralized, because one company collects all 
of the data from those users; as decentralized, because all 
that data is not housed in a single geographic location but 
on servers all over the world; as centralized, because those 
locations are nevertheless tightly held together via software 
and hardware; and so on. (Golumbia 2016, 51)
As Golumbia shows, the weak applicability of analog- era 
spatial concepts to the internet presents a problem for crit-
ical analysis. Matthew Zook (2006, 54) similarly observed 
that the internet has no singular geography, only multiple 
economic, political, and human “geographies . . . created 
through the interaction of this technology with the places 
in which and the people by whom it is used.”
Clearly, it is a challenging task to describe the spatial 
logics of internet distribution in the same way that we 
have described broadcast and satellite distribution. No-
tions of a signal zone or footprint do not translate well 
into this paradigm. To make things more complicated, 
each internet- distributed service has its own unique spa-
tial pattern because of the interactions of variables such as 
geographic availability, content licensing terms, user base, 
pricing, and so on. There are also important differences in 
business models that shape the geographic availability of 
individual platforms (see Table 2.1).
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Netflix is an interesting case because the company has 
so proudly and loudly proclaimed its global status. “You 
are witnessing the birth of a global TV network,” said 
Reed Hastings at CES in January 2016. “With the internet, 
global distribution no longer needs to be fragmented. It 
means that everyone pretty much everywhere should be 
able to see great films and TV shows at the exact same mo-
ment,” he added. Global simultaneity is certainly a striking 
feature of Netflix, when seen in the context of the longer 
history of sequential film and television distribution (win-
dowing). There are also other attributes that make Netflix 
a distinctly transnational, even cosmopolitan, service. It 
hosts a very diverse, though Hollywood- centric, spread 
of multilingual content, and it now translates its original 
content into dozens of languages. By aggregating large 
amounts of content into the one platform, Netflix also 
Table 2.1. Examples of national, multiterritory, and global 
internet- distributed TV services as of January 2018
National
single- territory
Transnational
multiterritory
Transnational
global
AVODa SBS On Demand 
(AU)
Crackle (21 countries) YouTubed
DailyMotion
TVODb UniversCiné (FR)
Maxdome (DE)
RakutenTV (11 
countries)
Microsoft Movies & 
TV (22 countries)
iTunes
Google Playe
SVODc Blim (MX)
CraveTV (CA)
HBO Now/Go (43 
countries)
Netflix
Amazon Prime Video
a AVOD: Advertising- based video on demand.
b TVOD: Transactional video on demand.
c SVOD: Subscription video on demand
d YouTube, while predominantly used as a free AVOD service, is technically a hybrid 
service, which also includes SVOD (YouTube Premium) and transactional purchases.
e Movies are available through Google Play globally, though TV shows are presently only 
available to customers in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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enables a certain cosmopolitan consumption experience 
that is highly valued by some subscribers. Some of my fa-
vorite Netflix memories involve stumbling on television se-
ries and telemovies from the far reaches of the catalog that 
would otherwise be inaccessible in Australia— from Russian 
gangster shows to Turkish soap operas. In this sense, Netflix 
can rightly be considered transnational, global, and cosmo-
politan, at least to some degree.
But Netflix is also fundamentally national in several 
important ways. Headquartered in the United States, it 
has largely projected and expanded its existing business 
model and philosophy of entertainment into new coun-
tries (while localizing itself through licensing and origi-
nal production). In this sense, one could argue that it is 
more multinational than transnational. Conversely, its re-
liance on territorial copyright licensing means that it may 
best be understood as a series of national media services 
stitched together into a single platform. It seems that Net-
flix does not fit particularly well with the scalar vocabu-
lary of national/transnational/global on which the field of 
media studies has traditionally relied. As a digital service, 
it takes elements from each of these scales and combines 
them in new ways.
Perhaps the best way to describe Netflix would be to 
follow Golumbia’s lead and simply note the contradictions. 
Netflix was born global in the sense that it is an internet- 
distributed service, but it is highly territorial because of its 
licensing model. It is quasiglobal in its reach (available 
every where but China, Iran, North Korea, and Crimea), 
but its actual uptake and use is thus far concentrated in a 
few regional markets (Western Europe, the Nordic coun-
tries, Latin America, and the Anglosphere). It is central-
ized in the sense that its headquarters and its ways of 
Transnational Television | 71
understanding the world are firmly located in California, 
but it is also decentralized at a technical level through its 
content delivery architecture (see Chapter 3). In other 
words, Netflix simultaneously reflects, embraces, and re-
sists the possibilities for transnational distribution that are 
inherent in internet- distributed services.
To put this differently, Netflix is global but is not a 
“wraparound”; it does not evenly envelop the world. It has 
wide reach but narrow impact. Perhaps it may be better 
to imagine Netflix as a kind of loose mesh, one that is full 
of gaps, that comes into contact unevenly with local and 
national surfaces; or, alternatively, as a cluster of network 
trajectories— similar to shipping route maps— that cohere 
around preexisting concentrations of connectivity and 
capital. These distinctions are to some degree semantic, 
but they point to a larger problem for media theory, which 
is that current vocabularies for describing space and scale 
in digital media may no longer be fit for purpose. Part of 
the job of global television research over the next decade 
should be to invent alternative analytical vocabularies that 
might better reflect this changing landscape.
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The Infrastructures of Streaming
Internet television promises instant access to content at 
the touch of a button or the swipe of a finger. Behind this 
apparent simplicity lies enormous technical complexity. 
Once we begin to look into the back end of a service like 
Netflix, we get a sense of the interlocking systems that are 
essential to the experience of digital media but that are hid-
den from view in everyday usage.
Consider for a moment everything required to deliver 
a Netflix stream to a user located in Singapore or Santiago. 
An inventory of these systems (which would be many 
pages long) might include the viewing devices, modems, 
routers, and other consumer hardware that enable users 
to connect to internet television services (and their asso-
ciated programming languages, protocols, and technical 
standards); the telephone lines and fiber- optic cables that 
carry voice and data traffic to the home; the content de-
livery networks (CDNs) that cache video content in serv-
ers near end users; customer management software and 
third- party payment processing systems; and of course 
the power grids and undersea cables that make all this 
activity possible. Internet television never just works 
but must be made to work, through a vast complex of 
Figure 3.1. The Netflix “hourglass” icon that appears while a stream is 
loading. The length of the delay depends partly on the user’s internet 
connection speed. Screenshot by the author.
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 engineering, maintenance, pipes, pits, and governance— in 
short, infrastructure.
Infrastructure, Paul Edwards writes, is “the invisible 
background, the substrate or support, the technocultural/
natural environment, of modernity” (Edwards 2003, 191). 
Ostensibly hidden from view, at least until something goes 
wrong, infrastructure is a challenging topic for contempo-
rary media studies. This chapter, while not a comprehen-
sive technical account, provides some starting points for 
understanding Netflix from an infrastructural perspective. 
In so doing, it poses a number of conceptual questions: 
What happens to our ideas about internet television when 
we look not at the content or interface but at the under-
lying systems that deliver video to users? How are these 
systems spatially organized, and how do content and data 
move across them? What might all this add to our under-
standing of global media?1
The Infrastructural Optic
As the first step, let us revisit some conceptual debates 
surrounding infrastructure as they have been taken up 
in media studies. In recent years, scholars have become 
increasingly interested in the invisible networks, systems, 
and standards that underlie our everyday media experi-
ences. Media infrastructure is now becoming a rich area 
of study in its own right, as evidenced by the publica-
tion of books such as Jonathan Sterne’s cultural history 
of audio compression, MP3: The Meaning of a Format 
(2012), and the anthology Signal Traffic: Critical Studies 
of Media Infrastructures (Parks and Starosielski 2015), a 
collection of essays on data centers, mobile phone towers, 
and e- waste. Popular trade books, such as Andrew Blum’s 
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Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet (2012), are 
also opening people’s eyes to the scale and complexity of 
international telecommunications infrastructure.
Parks and Starosielski, writing from a screen and visual 
studies perspective, define media infrastructures as “situ-
ated sociotechnical systems that are designed and con-
figured to support the distribution of audiovisual signal 
traffic” (Parks and Starosielski 2015, 4). Other scholars un-
derstand infrastructure in a more expansive sense. Urban-
ist Vyjayanthi Rao, for example, describes infrastructure as 
“the organizational medium of urban life” (Rao 2014, 39). 
Notwithstanding definitional differences, what is exciting 
about this turn to infrastructure in critical humanities and 
social science is that it invites engagement with topics that 
were previously out of bounds, or at least inaccessible, for 
many humanists— issues related to electrical engineering 
or information systems design, for example. It also reflects 
a new intellectual curiosity: a desire to use infrastructure 
as “an analytic and a research method” (Sandvig 2015, 91). 
The infrastructural turn involves not only new objects of 
analysis— fiber- optic cables, data centers, compression 
technologies, standards, internet routing protocols— but 
also new ways of seeing and narrating those objects and con-
necting the resulting discussions to critical and theoretical 
debates.
The roots of the infrastructural turn in media stud-
ies can be traced along different lines. Pioneering schol-
ars of communication, including Harold Innis (1951) and 
Ithiel de Sola Pool (1990)— both now rediscovered by a 
new generation of media researchers, though in different 
ways— have long drawn our attention to the materiality of 
communications technologies and their far- reaching con-
nections to land, state, and empire. Looking further afield, 
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there is the enduring influence of science and technology 
studies (STS)— especially the work of Bruno Latour, John 
Law, and their colleagues— which is concerned with the in-
teraction between users, systems, standards, metrics, and 
other nonhuman actors. The “infrastructure studies” move-
ment in the United States, a loose grouping of  historians, 
social scientists, and information researchers, has produced 
many engaging works on technical systems and standards 
(Edwards 2003; Edwards et al. 2007; Star and Ruhleder 
1996; Star and Bowker 2000; Lampland and Star 2008). 
There is also a tradition of geography of telecommunica-
tions that emphasizes the situated and material aspects 
of communication networks (Graham and Marvin 1996; 
Warf 2013).
While all of these approaches are different, together 
they provide powerful concepts for thinking about infra-
structure and how it shapes communication. The key ideas 
can be summarized as follows:2
•	 Reliance Digital media would not exist without both 
“hard” infrastructure (for electricity, lighting, and tele-
phony) and “soft” infrastructure (programming languages, 
standards, and protocols). These are the preconditions for 
the digital media experiences we take for granted (Abbate 
1999; Blum 2012).
•	 Invisibility and breakdown Infrastructures “reside in a 
naturalized background, as ordinary and unremarkable 
to us as trees, daylight, and dirt” (Edwards 2003, 185). In 
other words, we only tend to notice infrastructure when it 
breaks or slows down. In digital media, the materiality of 
infrastructure often surfaces through the user experience 
of dropouts, slow loads, freezing, pixilation, and missing 
subtitles (Larkin 2008; Jackson 2013).
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•	 Codetermination Infrastructure shapes communication 
and vice versa. Infrastructures are more than dumb pipes 
through which content travels. They play a role in shaping 
the experience of media, in the sense that the capacities 
and limitations of infrastructure are built into the system 
(as when online video services autoadjust their resolu-
tion to account for users’ broadband speeds) (de Sola Pool 
1990; Braun 2015).
•	 Layering Infrastructure builds on other infrastructure, 
resulting in palimpsests of interdependent systems. 
The geography of the internet, for example, adheres to the 
preexisting geography of telephone lines, which in turn 
follows the telegraph network. This results in the “layering 
or bundling of distinct systems” (Parks and Starosielski 
2015, 9; Jackson et al. 2007).
•	 Standardization For infrastructures to work effectively, 
consensus is required as to the equipment, materials, pro-
cesses, and formats used within it. This consensus is often 
the result of industrial conflict (as in the case of differing 
railway gauges, videocassette format wars, or battles over 
digital video and audio formats). Hence consensus is an 
outcome of competing interests and compromises, and 
must be actively maintained rather than taken for granted 
(Lampland and Star 2008; Sterne 2012).
These ideas provide a starting point for thinking about 
the infrastructure of internet television. When approached 
from this angle, Netflix— the world’s biggest and most 
complex SVOD service, which distributes a billion hours 
of video content per week (Solsman 2017)— can be seen as 
the end product of interlocking and co- reliant technical 
systems, including a mix of public and private, open and 
closed, and soft and hard systems. Looking at Netflix from 
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the perspective of these various systems (rather than from 
the platform or the content it hosts) produces a rather dif-
ferent image of how internet television works. For exam-
ple, it might render visible the layering effects that result 
from decisions about how to regulate public communica-
tions infrastructure and whether the state should invest in 
data networks. It might draw our attention to the political 
economy of video standards and compression technolo-
gies, and how a platform’s decision to use, say, Flash or 
Microsoft Silverlight is shaped by complex network ef-
fects and the dynamics of technological lock- in. Netflix, 
which previously used Silverlight for browser playback 
but switched to HTML5 from 2013 onward, was among 
the corporations that successfully campaigned for the in-
clusion of native digital rights management (DRM) capa-
bilities within the open HTML5 standard— a move fiercely 
resisted by internet user groups such as the Electronic 
Frontiers Foundation. This shift away from a proprietary 
Microsoft plug- in made Netflix more accessible for some 
communities, including Linux users, but the flipside was 
that DRM was now built into the browser, a position Net-
flix strongly supported.
Another implication of approaching Netflix in this way 
is to bring into focus the number and diversity of infra-
structures on which the service relies. From a software 
engineering perspective, Netflix— rather than being a 
single, monolithic architecture— actually relies on more 
than 700 microservices that run independently and talk 
to each other through APIs (application programming 
interfaces). Each microservice is programmed to do one 
specific thing— such as loading artwork for recommended 
titles or deducting the monthly fee from a customer’s 
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account (Nair 2017). Hence an infrastructural view reveals 
that Netflix is not really a singular platform; it is an ecol-
ogy of small, purpose- built systems that work together to 
produce the effect of a singular platform.
A second implication here is that we need to pay attention 
to hard, soft, and human infrastructures simultaneously. 
Netflix relies on telecommunications and electricity infra-
structures that provide energy and data routing through to 
the customer. It also relies on software- based infrastruc-
tures that are computational in nature but have their own 
material substrate. In addition, there is the human infra-
structure of Netflix’s programmers, customer service staff, 
marketing teams, and so on, not to mention its massive 
engineering workforce. As we move between hard, soft, 
and human infrastructures, socioeconomic variables be-
come quite important in determining inclusion/exclusion 
dynamics. Hence it is not just a matter of Netflix requir-
ing stable power to serve its customers (something that 
cannot necessarily be assumed in some developing coun-
tries). “Soft” infrastructures also require that we consider 
more subtle questions, such as: How does Netflix’s reliance 
on credit card payment systems in most countries, rather 
than alternatives like cash and debit cards, work to exclude 
certain kinds of customers? How might the kind of op-
erating system you use on your mobile device or set- top 
box shape your ability to use Netflix effectively? In other 
words, issues of infrastructural connectivity (power supply, 
bandwidth speed, etc.) are not the only things to consider 
in understanding Netflix’s global reach. Payments, pricing, 
language availability, and various other matters are also 
infrastructural in nature and can be theorized infrastruc-
turally alongside the pipes and cables.
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Joshua Braun’s (2013, 2015) work on digital video distri-
bution explores these issues in depth. Braun, who works 
across the boundary of media studies and STS, argues that 
analysis of digital video services should not simply be an 
extension of existing paradigms of screen research but 
must also come to terms with the wide range of “transpar-
ent intermediaries” (Braun 2015) characteristic of internet 
technologies. “Unlike physical media, and their attendant 
icons of the paperboy or delivery truck,” he writes, “we 
often have little intuitive sense of the route that electronic 
media take to get to us” (Braun 2013, 433). In an essay about 
Hulu and Boxee, Braun documents some of the more ob-
scure intermediaries that now form part of the television 
distribution ecosystem:
As video content wends its way to us online, it now goes 
through intermediaries most viewers have never heard 
of. Transpera (recently acquired by Tremor Media) for 
example, is a company that converts streaming video 
from numerous providers, ranging from Disney to CBS 
News, into a plethora of special formats tailored to our 
ever- growing menagerie of mobile devices, and packages 
advertising with it on its way to the consumer. YuMe 
is another company with major industry clients. It scans 
the blogs, homepages, and other sites on which users 
place embeddable videos and determines whether a page 
is ‘‘brand- safe’’ (i.e., that it features no objectionable 
 content) before displaying paid ads with a clip. (Braun 
2013, 433)
Braun’s work shows how attention to the interlocking 
software systems that underlie digital media services can 
reveal a rather circuitous route between producer and 
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consumer, changing our understanding of what distribu-
tion entails. Following John Law, Braun argues that an 
infrastructural approach to media research involves “a sort 
of archaeological interest in the various kinks, epicycles, 
and roundabouts found in a distribution route” that can 
ultimately “expose sociotechnical systems at work and 
lay bare the influence of infrastructure” (Braun 2015, 9). 
Following Braun’s lead, we now turn to Netflix to see what 
this approach can tell us about the infrastructural geogra-
phy of an SVOD platform.
Digital Divides and Download Speeds
Netflix is an internet- distributed service. As such, it relies 
on at least two different kinds of infrastructure: public and 
private telecommunications networks and its own internal 
networks and systems, including a bespoke CDN, which 
has a fascinating geography of its own. These two levels 
of infrastructure each have different affordances and spa-
tial dynamics, and they interact to determine the kind of 
Netflix experience (or lack thereof) that users located in 
different parts of the world are likely to have.
Let us start with the geography of internet infrastruc-
ture: the mesh of fiber and coaxial cable, copper telephone 
wires, and satellite data links that form the internet’s under-
lying foundation. While today’s conversation about the 
digital economy often presumes a backdrop of constant 
connectivity, it remains the case that internet access is still 
unevenly distributed. As geographer Barney Warf writes,
While those with regular and reliable access to the inter-
net drown in a surplus of information— much of it super-
fluous, irrelevant, or unnecessary— those with limited 
82 | The Infrastructures of Streaming
access have difficulty comprehending the opportunities it 
offers, the savings in time and money it allows, and the 
sheer convenience, entertainment value, and ability to ac-
quire data from bus schedules to recipes to global news. 
(Warf 2013, 2)
The location and reach of telephone cables; connection 
speeds and reliability; the variety of services available in 
particular locations; the relative takeup of home versus 
mobile internet and the use of cybercafés and public wifi; 
and the relations between communications infrastruc-
ture and urbanization are essentially spatial issues. Warf 
explains how access to the information revolution is not 
only unequally distributed but also spatially organized to 
include some and exclude others.
Sociospatial questions of access are the focus of what 
has become known as the digital divide debate. Initially 
focusing on the question of who is online and who is not, 
today’s digital divide debate is also concerned with how 
different barriers to access interact and are compounded 
by variables such as class, age, gender, location, and edu-
cation. It has shifted toward redefining access in “social 
as well as technological terms” (DiMaggio and Hargittai 
2001, 3). As a result, today’s conversations about digital in-
clusion and exclusion are increasingly about issues like the 
speed and reliability of connections, ISP pricing, mobile 
data allowances, interface design, consumer protection 
laws, and public wifi policies, as well as the geographic 
reach of telecommunications networks.
Consider how bandwidth limitations shape access to 
Netflix. The minimum bandwidth recommended by Net-
flix for a stable user experience is 0.5 Mbps (megabits per 
second). However, Netflix recommends a minimum of 
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3.0 Mpbs for HD streams, and 5.0 Mbps is required for 
Super HD. Furthermore, Netflix will dynamically adjust 
its resolution level upward or downward to match a cus-
tomer’s bandwidth, choosing automatically between more 
than 120 different “recipes” of video encoding to find the 
best match for the consumer’s device given the available 
bandwidth (Ueland 2015). At the bottom end, “a file en-
coded with a bitrate of 235 kbps . . . would work even on 
very slow connections, but also only deliver a resolution 
of 320 by 240 pixels” (Roettgers 2015). Since 2016, there 
has also been an option within the Netflix app to down-
load shows over wifi to watch later— a feature designed for 
commuters, users with irregular access to wifi, and those 
who need to carefully manage their bandwidth.
These bandwidth demands present a problem for many 
users, given that reliable high- speed connections are not 
always available outside the major cities. Many populous 
nations with booming middle classes, including Indo-
nesia, India, and the Philippines, all have sub- 3.0 Mbps 
average speeds for wired connections and much slower 
and more expensive connections via mobile devices. 
This effectively makes the full Netflix experience inacces-
sible to many users in these countries. (This is not just an 
emerging- world problem, for several rich countries, in-
cluding Australia and Taiwan, barely meet the 3.0 Mbps 
average threshold.) While Netflix is now potentially avail-
able to users in almost all countries, access to the service 
depends in practice on both the reach and the capacity of 
a country’s broadband infrastructure, as well as the pricing 
structures that regulate both internet access and SVOD 
services. This varies considerably both between countries 
and within countries, with urban areas typically much 
better served by telcos than rural areas are. Taking such 
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variables into account, one sees how the global expansion 
of premium streaming services is unlikely to extend very 
far beyond the urban middle classes, at least in the me-
dium term. Premium video streaming services are funda-
mentally different from basic internet protocols, such as 
email, which have greater flexibility and capacity to cater 
to mobile- first or mobile- only and low- bandwidth users. 
The need for credit card payments also restricts the dif-
fusion of subscription services. In other words, there is a 
spatial as well as an economic logic at work in determin-
ing the scale and extent of streaming takeup.
This tension between promised and actual availability 
can be seen in the case of Cuba. In February 2015, Net-
flix announced that it would be one of the first Ameri-
can companies to do business there following the Obama 
administration’s removal of Cold War– era trade sanctions 
against the island state. A Netflix (2015b) press release 
quoted Reed Hastings as saying that, “We are delighted to 
finally be able to offer Netflix to the people of Cuba, con-
necting them with stories they will love from all over the 
world.” However, as Fidel Rodríguez (2016) notes, the bar-
riers to access in Cuba cannot be surmounted by flicking a 
switch in Los Gatos. Cuba’s extremely restricted and slow 
public internet makes watching Netflix virtually impossi-
ble. Furthermore, nobody in Cuba can legally use Netflix, 
because Cubans do not have credit cards and Netflix does 
not accept local payment. There is also the issue of pricing: 
Netflix’s Cuba service costs $7.99 a month, but the average 
Cuban wage is US$17 a month. In other words, Netflix’s 
Cuba service exists only in a virtual or theoretical sense. 
Infrastructurally and in terms of actual user practices, the 
service has no meaningful presence.
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Sociospatial differences in connectivity within a coun-
try also shape access to digital services. In many develop-
ing countries, while elites may have access to high- speed 
home internet connections, the majority of the population 
are either offline or access the internet through mobile de-
vices (often sharing devices among friends and family, with 
prepaid credit purchased in small amounts) and public cy-
bercafés, kiosks, and shared- password wifi connections. In 
this context, access to SVOD services is limited not only 
by geography but also by the nature of internet use “on the 
ground” and the commercial and social practices around it, 
which may make it difficult to install apps, use personal-
ization features, and so on. Hence, even when high- speed 
internet infrastructure exists in a particular city, pricing, 
practices, and social context may be more important in de-
termining levels of access. This adds another layer to the 
digital inclusion problem, meaning that any maps of global 
SVOD usage require multiple overlays to understand not 
just what cities and regions but also which communities 
within them will be able to enjoy streaming services as 
intended.
Politics of Bandwidth
Netflix is aware of these hard and soft infrastructural bar-
riers and what they mean commercially. The company’s 
future is dependent on the takeup of high- speed internet 
by the global middle classes; in the long term, this is where 
the growth in subscriber numbers will come from. For this 
reason, Netflix expends considerable energy lobbying for 
investment in internet infrastructure, both directly and 
through various intermediaries.
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Netflix’s public relations around these issues include 
some clever initiatives that seek to engage users in in-
frastructure debates. For example, Netflix has developed a 
simple internet speed test for users (fast.com), as well as 
the Netflix ISP Speed Index (ispspeedindex.netflix.com), 
which ranks countries according to their highest, low-
est, and average internet speeds, as detected by Netflix 
servers. It also ranks ISPs in each country on the same 
basis. Described by Evan Elkins (2018: 2) as “consumer 
education projects presented through the altruistic rheto-
ric of global Internet infrastructure development,” these 
tools encourage scrutiny of ISPs in terms of how well each 
delivers the Netflix experience. Table 3.1 shows the results 
for selected countries, taken from the Global ISP Index 
in late 2016. Clicking on any of these countries will take 
you to another table, listing the major ISPs in that country 
and their average download speeds. In Portugal— to give a 
random example— four ISPs are listed (MEO, Cabovisao, 
Nos, and Vodafone), with average speeds ranging from 
2.85 to 3.57 Mbps.
The ISP Speed Index is now used widely by Netflix sub-
scribers as well as other parties seeking comparative data 
on internet speeds. Its apparent transparency (it claims to 
provide a purely technical diagnosis) belies a wider policy 
by Netflix to name and shame underperforming ISPs— and 
the internet infrastructure of entire countries— to encour-
age scrutiny, advocacy, and investment in internet infra-
structure. While internet users in many countries would 
support these principles, we should bear in mind that this 
is a commercial calculus on Netflix’s part. Perceived long- 
term benefit to digital service providers, achieved through 
market growth, is the driving force behind these public 
campaigns.
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There is an institutional dimension to these policy 
debates. Netflix is a key player in the Washington- based 
Internet Association (“the voice of the internet economy”), 
which is active across a range of issues, including inter-
mediary liability and internet freedom, and whose other 
members include Facebook, Google, Dropbox, eBay, 
and Spotify.3 In its home market, Netflix has also been 
a vocal critic of capped internet plans (Brodkin 2016). 
Like many other technology companies, Netflix is clearly 
engaged— for its own commercial reasons— in long- term 
Table 3.1. Average global internet speeds for selected 
countries according to Netflix
Country Average Speed (Mbps)
Venezuela 1.11
India 1.83
Jamaica 2.35
Malaysia 2.84
Australia 2.88
Mexico 2.99
Taiwan 3.03
Thailand 3.04
Canada 3.15
Spain 3.15
France 3.23
Indonesia 3.29
Italy 3.30
USA 3.34
Japan 3.45
Germany 3.72
Sweden 3.84
Switzerland 4.11
Data source: Netflix ISP Speed Index, November 2016, selected countries.
88 | The Infrastructures of Streaming
lobbying for investment and beneficial regulation of tele-
communications. Like mining companies that pressure 
governments to build road and rail connections to their 
extraction sites, or shipping companies that demand state 
investment in ports, container infrastructure, and road 
connections, Netflix is part of a wider internet industry 
agenda that sometimes blurs the line between public in-
vestment and private gain.
This is complex policy terrain, and it is not easy to dis-
tinguish corporate self- interest from good public policy. 
As Davies (2016) suggests, there is a circular logic in many 
of the discussions about high- speed internet services: 
video providers, including Netflix, reasonably claim they 
are adding value for ISPs by creating consumer demand for 
fast internet access, while ISPs may claim that bandwidth- 
intensive video services are free- riding on their infrastruc-
ture or undercutting their other pay- TV offerings. These 
tensions reflect the leaky boundaries between different 
industry sectors, and the consumer demand dynamics 
that connect them in an internet economy. They also 
raise difficult ethical questions: Who ultimately pays for 
the high- speed internet capable of delivering HD video 
streams? On whose shoulders do the costs fall, and which 
users are likely to reap the most benefit?
From an infrastructural perspective, the contemporary 
internet is very much about video. In the United States, 
Netflix accounts for more than a third of total downstream 
internet traffic on wired connections (Sandvine 2016a). 
When combined with YouTube’s traffic, this figure jumps 
to around 50%. Consider Table 3.2, which shows the rela-
tive significance of video services as opposed to music 
and web applications. This thirst for video has implica-
tions not only for digital divide debates but also for wider 
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policy debates about who ultimately benefits from invest-
ment in internet infrastructure. For example, it could be 
argued that— based on overall trends in internet traffic— a 
disproportionate amount of the value that arises from 
high- speed internet accrues to providers of video services 
and their users rather than to those who make do with 
basic email and web browsing. The Sandvine reports note 
that this hunger for video is apparent in other parts of the 
world as well, although it is more often directed toward 
free services, notably YouTube and BitTorrent, rather than 
toward subscription services like Netflix.4 So, while recog-
nizing the apparent disparity, we should be mindful that 
demand for video is not just a first- world phenomenon, 
although capacity to deliver on that demand is largely con-
centrated in rich nations.
ISPs and telcos are naturally wary of high- definition 
video because of the demands it places on their networks 
(though these same companies may benefit commercially 
from increased demand for high- speed and uncapped 
Table 3.2. Top ten peak period applications and their 
relative bandwidth use— North America, 2016
Netflix 35.15%
YouTube 17.53%
Amazon Video 4.26%
HTTP (other) 4.19%
iTunes 2.91%
Hulu 2.68%
SSL (other) 2.53%
Xbox One Games Download 2.18%
Facebook 1.89%
BitTorrent 1.73%
Data source: Sandvine (2016a).
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data plans). Even if we do not trust the motives of these 
companies— and there are good reasons to be skeptical— 
there is still a substantive issue here about infrastructure. 
High- speed internet is a scarce, inequitably distributed 
resource, subject to struggle and vested interests, rather 
than a ubiquitous feature of modern life.
Netflix and the Net Neutrality Debate
In the United States, public discussion around these issues 
often centers on net neutrality, or whether ISPs should be 
able to charge service providers extra fees for “fast lane” 
treatment (and, conversely, whether nonpaying services 
can be slowed down, by design or in terms of relative 
performance). Netflix has played an important, and some-
what controversial, role in this ongoing debate.
The net neutrality issue came to a head in 2014, when 
subscribers to some of the major ISPs started to complain 
about poor streaming quality on Netflix. Netflix reluctantly 
started paying interconnection fees to Comcast, AT&T, 
and Verizon to resolve “congestion at the connection point 
where we transfer content to the ISP” (Hastings 2014)— 
and thus to improve some subscribers’ streaming experi-
ence, which within days went from VHS quality to Super 
HD quality. At the same time, its executives mounted a 
public campaign to draw attention to the risks of such pay-
ments. “Customers pay companies like AT&T, Comcast, 
and Verizon a monthly fee, and some are even financially 
penalized if they exceed usage caps,” Reed Hastings (ibid.) 
wrote in Wired, “Charging us a separate fee ultimately 
means consumers pay twice— first for their broadband 
connection and second through higher- cost or lower- 
quality Internet services.”
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At issue here were interconnection fees, or payments 
by service providers to ISPs for direct connection to their 
networks— a practice that is technologically distinct from 
fast- lane payment. Interconnection fees are seen by some 
industry observers as a routine part of network traffic man-
agement (Rayburn 2014); Netflix, however, sees them as a 
kind of profit- gouging. Interconnection payments may be 
best understood as an additional layer of soft infrastructure 
that has evolved over time through negotiations between 
platforms and ISPs, reflecting the commercial evolution 
of network traffic management in the United States rather 
than the inherent properties of the underlying network.
In a response posted online, which is worth reading in 
its entirety for what it reveals about the politics of video 
streaming, AT&T CEO Jim Cicconi (2014) offers a rebut-
tal to Hastings. Cicconi argues that video- on- demand ser-
vices are “driving bandwidth consumption by consumers 
to record levels,” and ISPs are therefore obliged to “build 
additional capacity to handle this traffic,” which means some 
costs must be passed on to consumers. The real question, 
according to Cicconi, is about which consumers should 
pay for Netflix’s traffic:
If there’s a cost of delivering Mr. Hastings’s movies at 
the quality level he desires— and there is— then it should 
be borne by Netflix and recovered in the price of its service. 
That’s how every other form of commerce works in our 
country. It’s simply not fair for Mr. Hastings to demand 
that ISPs provide him with zero delivery costs— at the 
high quality he demands— for free. Nor is it fair that other 
Internet users, who couldn’t care less about Netflix, be 
forced to subsidize the high costs and stresses its service 
places on all broadband networks. (Cicconi 2014)
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These comments and the net neutrality issue more broadly 
reflect the blurred line in internet policy between public 
and private infrastructure, and public and private needs. 
What are the ethics of bandwidth intensity, and what do 
they mean for consumers and nonconsumers of video 
services? How do we allocate the real costs of internet 
infrastructure?
Granted, this is not a zero- sum game; high- bandwidth 
uses and users do not have to crowd out other kinds of uses 
and users. Netflix would point to a range of ways in which it 
is containing its overall bandwidth demands: by improving 
its encoding processes, for example, and by building its own 
content delivery network (discussed later), Open Connect, 
to take pressure off the public internet. Indeed, Open Con-
nect now carries the vast majority of Netflix video traffic 
(Florance 2016), rendering moot some of the earlier con-
cerns about net neutrality. From a technical perspective, 
the ISPs’ argument about video services hogging available 
bandwidth is also simplistic, because there are so many 
factors that interact to determine end- user speed and expe-
rience. The image of congestion, like a traffic jam on a high-
way, is misleading. Finally, we should not forget the unique 
conflicts of interest and regulatory failures that lie behind 
this debate in the United States, where ISPs are also cable 
TV providers. The potential for abuse of market power is 
quite real, as are the risks of introducing further conflicts 
of interest into the system.
Nevertheless, there is something disquieting about 
Hastings’s insistence that “broadband is not a finite re-
source” and that “network limitations are largely the result 
of [ISPs’] business decisions to not keep pace with sub-
scriber demand” (Hastings 2014). Perhaps it is the vision 
of digital infinitude that underlies this statement— the idea 
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of more and more devices requiring ever- higher definition 
and ever- faster connections— or perhaps it is the flat re-
fusal to countenance any material consequences to the race 
for high- definition video. This is a vision that can never 
scale meaningfully in a global sense. It is grounded in a 
first- world idea of the internet, premised on an assumption 
of unbounded capacity. It does not ring true with how the 
internet is experienced in many countries, including my 
own (Australia), where high- speed internet access is still 
relatively scarce because of our aging copper- wire phone 
network.
While not begrudging Netflix’s position here— which is 
commercially sensible within the context of North Ameri-
can net neutrality debates— as critical media scholars we 
need to interrogate the implicit geography of inclusion 
and exclusion that is embedded within this vision of the 
internet’s future. Such are the complexities that emerge 
when we take an infrastructural view. Having considered 
some of the constraints that shape the geography of video- 
on- demand over the public internet, let us now move on 
to consider some additional layers of infrastructure that sit 
within Netflix’s internal systems architecture.
Clouds and CDNs
As we move further into the internet age, the evergreen 
Marxian imperative to follow the money and uncover the 
truth has been augmented with a second imperative: to 
follow the data. Current media studies research on data 
centers and the geography of networks challenges us to 
think critically and spatially about where data resides, how 
and where it travels, and who controls these movements 
(Starosielski 2015; Holt and Vonderau 2015; Rossiter 2016). 
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Consider the following account by a New York Times jour-
nalist, written in 2009, about the geography of their own 
personal data:
I have photos on Flickr (which is owned by Yahoo, so 
they reside in a Yahoo data center, probably the one in 
Wenatchee, Wash.); the Wikipedia entry about me dwells 
on a database in Tampa, Fla.; the video on YouTube of a 
talk I delivered at Google’s headquarters might dwell in 
any one of Google’s data centers, from The Dalles in Or-
egon to Lenoir, N.C.; my LinkedIn profile most likely sits 
in an Equinix- run data center in Elk Grove Village, Ill.; 
and my blog lives at Modwest’s headquarters in Missoula, 
Mont. (Vanderbilt, cited in Sandvig 2015, 90)
Here we have a very complex yet manageable scenario 
because both the user and the servers are located in the 
same country. In the case of Netflix, a global user com-
munity is accessing a U.S.- based service, making things 
considerably more complex in terms of the geography of 
information sent and received. What actually happens, 
and where does the data go, when a user in Manila or 
Manchester fires up the Netflix app?
There are two layers of infrastructure that we must 
understand before we can follow the data to answer such 
questions. The first controls the Netflix user interface, cus-
tomer data, recommendation algorithms, personalization, 
and other elements of the platform (what you see before 
you hit Play). The second is Netflix’s content delivery 
network, called Open Connect, which stores video and 
audio content in servers located close to end users (this 
controls what happens after you hit Play). Let us start 
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with the preplay data. In the past, Netflix used to serve 
everything from its own data centers in the United States. 
After a major crash in 2008, it started progressively moving 
to the public cloud, where its service could be more easily 
scaled. Netflix now uses Amazon Web Services (AWS)— a 
profitable arm of Jeff Bezos’s Amazon e- commerce empire— 
exclusively for this purpose; hence understanding the ge-
ography of Netflix data requires that we know something 
about AWS.
AWS has servers all over the world. As of 2016, the 
three AWS “regions” used by Netflix were located in 
Northern Virginia, Oregon, and Ireland.5 Data are served 
from the AWS region closest to the customer: subscribers 
in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa are served from 
Ireland; subscribers in the Asia- Pacific region are served 
from Oregon; Latin American subscribers are served from 
Northern Virginia; and U.S. subscribers are served either 
from Oregon or Northern Virginia (Madappa et al. 2016). 
In the case of a crash, the system is also designed in such 
a way that customer data can be fetched from any of the 
other AWS servers. Not every request is actually processed 
in real time by these servers. Netflix precomputes some 
calculations (especially recommendations) to cut down on 
processing time and cost (Amatriain and Basilico 2013).
Now consider what happens after you push Play. Video 
providers have to think carefully about their network or-
ganization, given the massive amounts of bandwidth in-
volved. Things work best when they pre- position content 
as close as possible to the end user, so that data delivery is 
as cheap and fast as possible. This is the job of the CDN, a 
network of distributed servers that reduce latency in video 
transmission by caching popular video content in local 
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servers closer to the end user, thus reducing load times 
and buffering. Many major web services use a commer-
cial CDN, such as Akamai or Amazon CloudFront, which 
have global networks of servers designed for this purpose.
Netflix is a special case. It used to contract with third- 
party network companies for CDN services, but in 2011 
it decided to start building its own CDN to bring this in-
frastructure under its direct control. This in- house CDN, 
called Open Connect, has since become a vital part of the 
Netflix service, delivering over 125 million hours of view-
ing per day.
The system relies on thousands of boxes such as the one 
pictured in Figure 3.2. Netflix provides participating ISPs6 
with these Open Connect server boxes, each of which 
contains a full Netflix library— roughly four years of HD 
Figure 3.2. A Netflix Open Connect server in 2012. Image by Andrew 
Fresh (CC- BY2.0 license).
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video. ISPs place the Open Connect servers in their net-
work so that users streaming Netflix can connect directly 
to the box rather than to faraway servers over the public 
internet. Each day, during off- peak hours, the Open Con-
nect servers are refreshed with a copy of every Netflix title 
so that they have an up- to- date catalog of content. Netf-
lix uses predictive modeling to estimate the demand for 
certain kinds of titles in certain places, and it tries to en-
sure there is sufficient network capacity within local Open 
Connect servers to serve all those streams effectively. As 
Ken Florance, Netflix’s vice president of content delivery, 
explains,
We now have Open Connect Appliances in close to 1,000 
separate locations around the world. In big cities like New 
York, Paris, London, Hong Kong, and Tokyo, as well as 
more remote locations— as far north as Greenland and 
Tromsø, Norway and as far south as Puerto Montt, Chile, 
and Hobart, Tasmania. ISPs have even placed OCAs 
[Open Connect Appliances] in Macapá and Manaus in the 
Amazon rainforest— on every continent except Antarctica 
and on many islands such as Jamaica, Malta, Guam, and 
Okinawa. This means that most of our members are get-
ting their Netflix audio and video bits from a server that’s 
either inside of, or directly connected to, their ISP’s net-
work within their local region. (Florance 2016)
Open Connect is a massive, paradoxical thing— a private 
network built on top of the public internet. As such, it is 
beneficial for ISPs, Netflix users, and Netflix nonusers alike 
because it relieves pressure on internet infrastructure. But 
it also represents, from a certain perspective, a privatiza-
tion of the idea of the public internet— a purpose- built fast 
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lane to the consumer, reserved for Netflix traffic. Open 
Connect allows a quality of service that gives Netflix a sig-
nificant competitive advantage over other streaming sites, 
few of which could afford such elaborate infrastructure.
We tend to think of the internet, with its egalitarian 
routing procedures, as “a silky web in which every place 
is equally accessible to every other place” (Blum 2012, 6), 
but at the infrastructural level this idea does not hold 
water. The complex network engineering strategies used 
by major providers— including peering or interconnection 
payments, CDNs, and so on— remind us that internet in-
frastructure is not neutral: there are many ways in which 
certain kinds of traffic can be made to move faster and to 
connect better than other traffic. Indeed, the rise of CDNs 
presents regulatory problems that we are only now begin-
ning to understand. As Palacin et al. (2013) note, while the 
net neutrality debate focused on the provision of fast lanes 
for certain kinds of traffic, it has been remarkably silent 
about CDNs and other network arrangements that simi-
larly work to prioritize some uses and users over others:
CDNs are not being considered as violating network neu-
trality principles, although they offer “faster lanes” for 
those content providers who can afford it, possibly also 
leading to a two- class (or more) Internet. In this context, 
one can argue that CDNs are not degrading the rest of 
the traffic, but how can a long tail video website compete 
against a “hyper- giant” whose content is distributed using 
high speed connections? (Palacin et al. 2013, 323)
Current debates about internet policy often overlook 
the “transparent intermediaries” (Braun 2015), such as 
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CDNs, that play a vital role in digital media distribution. 
These constitute an additional, opaque layer of mediation, 
because of their private nature. Netflix, in its defense, can 
rightly point to its considerable investment in Open Connect 
as representing its contribution to carrying the costs of net-
work capacity, as Cicconi demanded.
Looking closely at the Open Connect structure also 
reveals some interesting things about the priorities of 
Netflix when it comes to their international markets. In a 
technical paper published shortly after the Netflix global 
launch, a team of computer scientists (Boettger et al. 
2016) mapped the Open Connect network to determine 
which areas had the most capacity and how traffic flowed 
across the network. Their analysis points to some strange 
quirks in the Open Connect network— for example, the 
tiny Micronesian island of Guam is well served by Open 
Connect servers, presumably because of its U.S. military 
bases, while the “server deployment in Africa is very lim-
ited, representing a tiny market for Netflix” (Boettger 
et al. 2016, 9). Reading across all these measurements, the 
authors conclude that “the latest expansion in 130 coun-
tries announced by Netflix in January 2016 was only a vir-
tual expansion” and that “many countries where Netflix is 
officially available still remain without any Netflix infra-
structure” (10). This attempt to follow the infrastructure 
reveals a rather different story about Netflix’s globalization 
than the one suggested in the company’s public relations. 
It gives us a sense of the unevenness of Netflix’s presence 
around the world, and its finite capacity to deliver on its 
promise to be a global television network (recall Hastings’s 
words at CES: “No more waiting . . . no more frustration. 
Just Netflix”). The infrastructural footprint of Netflix, 
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while formidable, is certainly not everywhere, and is tailored 
around the company’s idea of what the most important 
global markets might be and where they are located. The 
geography of infrastructure is, once again, inextricable 
from the geography of capital.
The Long View
This chapter has traced the rough geography of Netflix’s 
hard and soft infrastructure to better understand the 
degrees to which Netflix can and cannot be considered 
a global media service. Evidently, describing the geog-
raphy of internet television is no easy thing. There are 
many different layers of infrastructure here, forming a 
series of nested maps rather than one single map. As we 
have seen, the base- level constraint is the availability or 
nonavailability of high- speed internet service sufficient 
for video streaming (which is largely restricted to major 
cities, and usually to elites within those cities). On top of 
this base layer, there are many layers of soft infrastructure 
that interact to further shape the actual availability and 
experience of streaming, including data pricing, ISP net-
work policies, payment systems, and others. There is also 
the internal network architecture of Netflix’s CDN, which 
works to effectively prioritize certain regions over others 
when it comes to speed and user experience.
These layers of infrastructural inclusion and exclusion 
interact to shape the actual experience of internet televi-
sion. It does not ultimately matter to a user whether their 
video will not load because of the slow speed of a DSL con-
nection, congestion at the interconnection point, the ab-
sence of a local CDN, or because they have run out of data 
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on their mobile plan. The result is essentially the same. As 
scholars, we should be mindful of the infrastructural in-
equalities that underlie these scenarios. At the same time, 
our analyses must drill down into the finer details of how 
various layers of infrastructure are interacting in the back-
ground to produce such an effect.
A second insight arising from the discussion so far 
relates to how we think about Netflix itself— its infrastruc-
tural ontology, if you will. Netflix is not a unitary thing but 
a complex and dynamic metasystem made up of hundreds 
of different software processes that relies on hard and soft 
technical infrastructures, open and closed knowledge sys-
tems, and public and private investment. These apparent 
contradictions are built into the platform, and their echoes 
linger in the ongoing debates that Netflix has become em-
broiled in, such as net neutrality. In some respects, Netflix 
can also be seen as an infrastructure builder. It has also 
developed a content delivery network of its own, as well 
as various software tools and processes, some of which 
it releases back into the world as open- source projects 
(McEntree 2010). It is also involved in policy and advo-
cacy around internet infrastructure generally, especially in 
the United States.
Peering under the hood— or, in Netflix’s case, into the 
network— is a useful exercise. I have suggested that the 
tactic of looking through the object and out to the infra-
structure is essentially an extension of Marxian critical 
techniques— the imperative to trace the circuitous paths of 
the commodity, revealing the materiality of industrial pro-
duction that forms its constitutive secret (from the sweat 
of the worker to the glittering commodity in the display 
case). In the case of video- on- demand, this also involves 
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tracing the path of data through networks to understand 
where our digital entertainment comes from, what terri-
tory it moves through on its way to us, and how its passage 
is materially and politically governed— in Braun’s words, the 
“kinks, epicycles, and roundabouts found in a distribution 
route” (Braun 2015, 9).
Infrastructural thinking is above all a mode of theo-
rizing. It allows us to see (indeed, demands that we see) 
media systems from unusual perspectives. It can help us 
to think in completely different terms about those ob-
jects. In a lucid essay, media scholar and anthropologist 
Brian Larkin (2013, 329– 330), following Paul Edwards, 
uses the computer as an example to show how infrastruc-
tural thinking can productively dissolve the boundaries 
around a given object so that the “simple linear relation 
of foundation to visible object turns out to be recursive 
and dispersed”:
Take, for example, the computer I have used to write this 
article. What is its infrastructure? Electricity may be the 
most obvious substratum that allows the computer to op-
erate. But, as Edwards (1998) notes, although electricity is 
the infrastructure of the computer, the computer is the in-
frastructure of electricity supply, as the entire transmission 
industry is regulated by computers. Electricity, in turn, has 
other infrastructures [including] oil production[,] . . . finan-
cial mechanisms . . . that allow electricity to be sold on an 
open market, or the labor networks necessary to produce 
and transmit power. (Larkin 2013, 329)
When we start thinking infrastructurally about media, 
the distinction between foreground and background, and 
The Infrastructures of Streaming | 103
between object and context, can start to blur. Such a move 
brings new kinds of relations into view. What if we were 
to apply this kind of thinking to Netflix? Instead of look-
ing behind the object and into the constitutive back end, 
what might happen if we looked out from Netflix at the 
various other infrastructures to which it is in some way 
connected?
Following Edwards and Larkin, an infrastructural view 
of Netflix would include not only the systems on which 
it relies (electricity, telecommunications, internet gover-
nance) but also more obscure technical infrastructures 
such as standardized text and character inputs, video and 
audio encoding standards, metadata formatting, and user 
interface design standards, as well as international bank-
ing transfers, credit card systems, personal credit rating 
providers, and payment processing systems.
From this perspective, the story of Netflix has as much 
to do with longer- term, larger- scale social and technical 
transformations that lie well outside the boundaries of 
media studies. These include the history of electrifica-
tion and lighting, which provide the basic conditions 
for domestic leisure as we know it today; heating, air- 
conditioning, and other forms of climate control, as well 
as modern plumbing and sewerage, which have helped 
to create a modern idea of home as a space of comfort 
protected from the natural elements; modern architec-
tural forms premised on separation of private and pub-
lic space, with family rooms, TV rooms, and bedrooms 
in which Netflix can be enjoyed; and social practices of 
family rearing that welcome technology into the home. 
The advantage of this explanation for the uneven avail-
ability and uptake of Netflix globally is that it does not 
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seek to essentialize the leisure practices associated with a 
particular urban condition into a general diagnosis about 
needs and wants. Nor does it presume that people out-
side the internet television market for whatever reason 
do not necessarily wish to have something like Netflix 
in the future— at their price point, in their language, and 
in a format appropriate to their needs. Instead, it invites us 
to see technology use in relation to particular trajectories 
of infrastructural development that come together in par-
ticular places at particular times. It helps to explain the 
cultural specificity of Netflix— which is clearly bound up 
with a very particular kind of idea about leisure that, as we 
have seen throughout this book, does not always travel 
well internationally— in more structural terms.
To the extent that Netflix is a global media service, then, 
its relative popularity may well be a function of these urban-
ization processes that produce the basic conditions for its 
enjoyment— domestic space, disposable income, connectiv-
ity, and consumer society— as much as advances in video 
compression and consumer hardware. Here, paradoxi-
cally, we see the strongest continuities between the new 
internet television services and older forms of broadcast 
television. Just as Raymond Williams described television 
in the 1970s as a medium of “mobile privatisation”— “one 
of the characteristic ‘machines for the home’ ” (Williams 
1974, 4)— the account of Netflix’s infrastructural geogra-
phy offered in this chapter reaffirms this fundamentally 
important observation about the nature of television as 
a domestic technology. Netflix’s fundamental vision of 
entertainment is a personalized experience built around 
the individual consumer/family unit, equipped with their 
own credit card and data profiles, to be enjoyed in private 
spaces. To the extent that these infrastructural conditions 
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exist in different places, we can expect there to be some in-
terest in Netflix in those markets. For the rest of the world, 
it is likely that SVOD services may continue to hover some-
where between novelty on the one hand and irrelevance on 
the other.
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Making Global Markets
To put the internationalization of Netflix in historical 
perspective, let us go back in time to August 1981, when a 
new and disruptive cable channel called MTV: Music Tele-
vision was launched in the United States. MTV— which 
began as a joint venture between Warner Communications 
and American Express and was purchased by Viacom 
in 1985— was the first channel to show music videos 24 
hours a day. Massively popular with American teenag-
ers, MTV was a pop- culture phenomenon in its day and 
is often credited with inventing (or at least popularizing) 
the music video format. Within a few years of its launch, 
MTV was available in almost all U.S. cable households. 
Soon, MTV executives started hatching plans to take the 
channel global, starting with the newly liberalized media 
markets of Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Their aim 
was to build an international advertising market and youth 
culture around American pop music, with the music video 
at its center: “One world, one music” was the company’s 
slogan at the time. “Our goal is to be in every home in the 
world,” stated Tom Freston, president of MTV Networks 
(Banks 1997, 44).
Figure 4.1. Japanese comedian Ryota Yamazato and Reed Hastings at 
the launch event for Netflix Japan at the SoftBank Ginza store in Tokyo, 
September 2, 2015. Photo by Ken Ishii/Stringer.
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MTV Europe was launched in 1987, and four years later 
Viacom launched MTV Asia, reaching 42 countries by sat-
ellite. These channels were strongly based on the American 
MTV template and tended to play the same mix of 
English- language pop videos. The assumption was that 
MTV’s powerful brand would be enough to hook global 
audiences and that it did not need to customize its pro-
gramming to suit local tastes. The vast majority of video 
clips featured American and British artists (Banks 1997, 48). 
MTV executives justified this approach by stating that 
“music transcends culture” (Hanke 1998, 223). Advertis-
ers such as Coca- Cola and Levi- Strauss, who were backing 
MTV’s international operations, were of the same opinion, 
believing that rock’n’roll was an “international language” 
(ibid.).
This one- channel- for- all approach was a failure. Faced 
with mediocre ratings, MTV learned that audiences out-
side the United States were generally less interested in 
Michael Jackson and Madonna than they were in their 
own stars, styles, and music genres— from mandopop to 
merengue. Apparently, not everybody wanted MTV, at 
least not in the same way. MTV executives soon decided 
they needed to change their approach, and they began to 
provide more locally relevant programming. Across Asia, 
Rupert Murdoch’s Channel [V]— MTV’s archrival1— had 
been tailoring its programming to local tastes with some 
success, so MTV followed suit. They increased the propor-
tion of videos by local artists, hired multilingual presenters, 
and introduced customized blocks of programming spe-
cific to each territory. Eventually, MTV Asia morphed 
into MTV Korea, MTV India, MTV Japan, MTV Taiwan, 
and so on. By the early years of the new millennium, the 
company’s strategy for global markets had evolved. MTV 
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executives now described their network as “a global brand 
that thinks and acts locally” (Santana 2003). MTV Net-
works CEO Bill Roedy spoke proudly of the differences 
between the various MTV channels in Asia:
MTV India is very colorful, self- effacing, full of humor, a 
lot of street culture. China’s [MTV] is about family values, 
nurturing, a lot of love songs. In Indonesia, with our larg-
est Islamic population, there’s a call to prayer five times a 
day on the channel. . . . Japan’s very techie, a lot of wireless 
product. (Roedy in Gunther 2004, 116)
As these comments suggest, the MTV strategy had 
changed from an “American export” model to a network 
of national channels showcasing diverse music styles 
and locally produced series and skits. MTV executives 
had learned two important lessons during this period. 
Localization matters in television markets, and the global 
will not simply displace the local.
The story of MTV’s misadventures raises issues that 
are directly relevant to Netflix’s internationalization some 
twenty years later. In both cases, we see the launch of a 
disruptive American television service, the attempted 
export of this service to global markets, uneven uptake, 
cultural blowback, and then a commitment to localization 
and local content production. MTV and Netflix are quite 
different— one is a cable/satellite network, the other a sub-
scription streaming aggregator and studio— so we have to 
be careful about comparing the two. Nonetheless, there is 
a common pattern here: initial overconfidence, followed 
by a dawning realization that what works at home does 
not always work abroad. This chapter will consider some 
of the challenges Netflix has faced in the major Asian 
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markets— China, Japan, and India— where the limits of 
U.S. media power are plainly visible.
Global Television, Local Markets
The history of transnational television is full of these fric-
tions between the global and the local. In his influential 
work on pan- European satellite television, the sociologist 
Jean Chalaby (2005, 2009) offers a detailed analysis of the 
localization process for U.S.- based channels, including Dis-
covery, National Geographic, and Bloomberg, which entered 
Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. Chalaby observes that, 
at the start of the transnational satellite boom in the 1980s, 
these channels were initially
unsure how to transmit across boundaries and were at first 
oblivious to local culture and market conditions. They had 
overestimated audience appetite for foreign programming 
and launched general entertainment channels in direct 
competition with established national broadcasters. To 
remedy this, they have progressively focused on niche 
markets and begun adapting their feed to local tastes. In 
the mid- 1990s, the emergence of networks demonstrated 
how corporate players had acquired a much better under-
standing of the relationship between the local and the 
global, and learned how to articulate the two polarities 
while benefiting from both. (Chalaby 2005, 62, my italics)
Chalaby identifies a spectrum of strategies that channels 
use to localize their offerings, ranging from superficial 
repurposing of existing content to a deeper, and more 
expensive, localization. These options include, in order of 
increasing complexity, subtitling, dubbing, or adding live 
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voiceover; splitting the original feed to create local win-
dows for additional programming; and creating “a network 
of local channels around a core broadcasting philoso-
phy,” the most expensive and complicated option, which 
involves considerable investment in original programming 
(Chalaby 2005, 56).2
Chalaby and other scholars who have studied local-
ization in television industries— including Moran (1998, 
2009), Straubhaar (2007), and Kraidy (2008)— describe in 
their work a process of cultural learning through commer-
cial experimentation. By the 1990s, television executives 
had become cosmopolitans, learning the lesson of cultural 
difference through trial and error. They understood that 
international markets do not simply exist, waiting mutely 
for great content, but must be made— which is to say that 
they must be primed, cultivated, and maintained. Audi-
ences’ preference for locally produced content cannot eas-
ily be overcome, so it must therefore be respected. These 
findings lead Chalaby to conclude that the business of 
transnational television, at least in Europe, is all about the 
challenge of localization. Serious broadcasters understand 
that global audiences have distinctive tastes, preferences, 
and expectations. Local expertise— including staff with a 
deep understanding of a country’s media landscape— is 
necessary for success. Tailored strategies and program-
ming are needed for each market. The conceptual corre-
late of this is that the logic of capital does not necessarily 
lead to standardization, as per the media- imperialist cri-
tique of multinational media corporations, but can also 
lead to increased difference.
This literature on transnational television and local-
ization offers important insights for understanding Net-
flix’s situation as it seeks to compete in more than 190 
Figure 4.2. Reed Hastings at the launch event in Bogota, September 9, 
2011. Photo by Getty Images.
Figure 4.3. Marketing campaign for House of Cards season 5 in War-
saw (“It’s time for me to take the helm”), June 2017. Photo by Grand 
Warszawski / Shutterstock.com.
Figure 4.4. In- store display promoting Netflix’s tieup with the French 
telco SFR— seen in Lyon, July 1, 2017. Photo by the author.
Figure 4.5. Promotion for the Spanish- language Netflix original series 
Las Chicas del Cable in the Puerta del Sol, Madrid, April 2017. Photo by 
Curtis Simmons/Flickr (CC BY NC 2.0 license).
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international markets simultaneously (albeit with differ-
ent levels of commitment to those markets). As we have 
seen, the tendency among multinational media companies 
is to begin the internationalization process with an undif-
ferentiated image of the global market, seen as a flat space 
waiting for innovative content (recall Reed Hastings’s 
remarks at CES— “no more waiting!”). Over time, this 
undifferentiated image of the global market is replaced 
with a more complex understanding of national markets, 
seen as discrete containers characterized by diverse tastes, 
income levels, languages, genre preferences, willingness 
to pay, and other factors. The challenge of global media 
is to adapt to these diverse conditions. Success, then, is 
not just about pushing out great content to the world but 
also about understanding and negotiating cultural dif-
ferences.3 While Netflix initially struggled with this hard 
truth, it has fully absorbed this lesson over the course of 
its internationalization.
Long- Distance Localization
One of the distinctive features of internet- distributed 
television services is that they can enter into and com-
pete in a large number of international markets without 
extensive in- country infrastructure. For earlier transna-
tional television channels and film studios setting up in 
foreign markets, market entry used to require “boots on 
the ground”— a local office, sales and customer service 
teams, local agents to advise on strategy, and partnerships 
with producers, brands, advertisers, and telcos (Thomp-
son 1985; Donoghue 2017). This was seen as the necessary 
work of media globalization. As Michael Aragon, a senior 
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executive at Sony Network Entertainment, said in 2011 
when asked about the challenge of securing local content 
for international operations: “You can’t just run this out 
of L.A.  .  .  . That was an assumption we quickly blew 
out of  the water” (Aragon cited in Wallenstein 2011). 
Netflix confounded this logic by coordinating most of 
its international expansion from its base in California. 
When entering the key European market of France, Netflix 
employed only “a stripped down Paris- based team of three 
people” (Goodfellow 2015). In Canada, its oldest interna-
tional market and still one of its most important territories, 
Netflix never opened a local office until it began producing 
in earnest there after 2017. At the time of the Australian 
Netflix launch, the only local staffer on the ground who 
could answer press inquiries was a freelance publicist.
Netflix now has offices in many countries— including 
the Netherlands, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, 
England, and India— but it centralizes its operational ac-
tivities in only a few locations. Most customers are billed 
through Singapore, Amsterdam, or Los Gatos, for instance.4 
Programming and marketing for many countries is man-
aged out of the Beverly Hills office. Wherever possible, 
Netflix prefers to invest in its technical infrastructures 
rather than spending money on foreign offices and staff. 
It mines its greatest asset— its vast stores of customer 
data— to identify trends that help it understand what kind 
of programming current and potential Netflix subscribers 
in international markets might want.5
Netflix’s approach to localization was a source of de-
rision for industry observers from the old world of 
broadcasting. John Medeiros of the Cable & Satellite 
Broadcasting Association of Asia mocked the approach: 
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“They [Netflix] sit in Silicon Valley, open the gusher, and 
the sweet crude flows all through the global network, just 
like that? . . . Maybe that happens (for a while) in a techni-
cal sense, but in a commercial sense, you still need access 
to customers and to their payments, and the governments 
that you’re flipping off might have something to say 
about that” (Medeiros cited in Frater 2016). Yet the struc-
ture has been effective in the sense that it enables Netflix 
to run most of its most labor- intensive activities from a 
few key global hubs, achieving economies of scale. The 
logic of long- distance localization extends the spatial pat-
terns begun with satellite broadcasting in the 1980s, which 
precipitated this separation of a broadcaster’s service zone 
from its operational infrastructure.
The Unavoidable Labor of Localization
While in- country overhead can be minimized, there is still 
an enormous amount of work that needs to be done on the 
Netflix platform to make the service relevant and legally 
compliant in international markets. For example, content, 
interfaces, and artwork must be translated; content must 
be classified to conform to local laws; country- specific 
catalogs must be programmed and maintained; catalog 
categories must be tweaked for each country to highlight 
local content; payment systems must be adapted so that 
people can pay with local debit cards and through their 
mobile carriers; billing systems must be flexible enough to 
collect national and state- based sales taxes and repay them 
to tax authorities; and age- verification and PIN protection 
mechanisms must be introduced to comply with national 
laws. Taking this into consideration, over- the- top dis-
tribution does not erase the need for localization; it just 
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reorganizes this labor across new spaces. As an example, 
consider how Netflix manages the essential business of 
translation. Netflix’s translation efforts are organized 
around its priority list of “official languages.” Initially this 
was a small list, including English, Spanish, and Portu-
guese, in the early years when Netflix was available only 
in the Americas, but over time it has grown to more 
than 20 languages— Arabic, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, 
Figure 4.6. Adapting to local laws: Netflix Singapore features an 
 age- verification system for R21+ content. Screenshot by Alexa Scarlata.
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English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Ital-
ian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese, 
Romanian, Spanish, Swedish, Thai, and Turkish. These 
are the languages that Netflix prioritizes for interface 
translation and subtitle availability. For licensed content, 
Netflix relies on the subtitles and audio files supplied by 
rights- holders, but for originals, the company must pro-
duce its own subtitles (and sometimes audio tracks) in 
these official languages.
Each Netflix original production requires a small army 
of translators. Two hundred translators were reportedly 
needed for subtitling one season of the Netflix original 
talk show Chelsea (Roettgers 2017). Netflix cannot do all 
this work in- house, so it uses a large network of freelanc-
ers and also subcontracts with firms in the United States, Po-
land, Spain, Australia, Mexico, England, and Sweden.6 These 
companies form part of the GILT (globalization, interna-
tionalization, localization, and translation) sector, a relatively 
new industry that has been growing since the 1990s and now 
employs thousands of localization experts across the world 
who specialize in making websites and apps work effectively 
for an international user base.7 These are the unsung foot 
soldiers of digital media globalization, the people who 
Figure 4.7. Adapting to local tastes: Netflix Australia features a category 
for Australian movies, as is the case in various other Netflix territories. 
Screenshot by Alexa Scarlata.
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know how to smooth out the frictions of culture and make 
services like Netflix work everywhere.
The number of variables to consider when translating 
for Netflix is enormous. Some licensed content has sub-
titles hardcoded into the video file. Older viewing devices 
are not always able to process non- Latin alphabets. Fonts 
must be carefully chosen, mindful of local connotations and 
visual aesthetics in different countries.8 There are also 
issues on the supply side. Even when subtitles exist for 
licensed content, they are not necessarily made available 
in all Netflix territories (studios withhold the full range 
to discourage out- of- region access). This has prompted 
a workaround that is known to many Netflix users and 
seems to be tacitly endorsed by the company: one can trig-
ger a secret menu in the desktop browser interface, then 
upload a subtitle file in DXFP format, and this will play on 
top of your chosen video.9
Interface translation has its own specific requirements. 
Arabic reads right to left, while Latin languages read left 
to right. The length and spacing of words changes from 
language to language, and thus the interface design may 
need to be adjusted to retain the standard look and feel. This 
requires some complex programming to build templates 
that can then be automatically filled with the correct text 
content. In addition to menu options, the display of con-
tent titles, ratings, and metadata may or may not change 
according to location. These illustrative examples from an 
evolving system give us a sense of the scale of backstage 
work required for Netflix to run effectively in multiple 
markets.
At the time of writing, Netflix’s translation is still done 
by humans, though the company is keen to standardize this 
work as much as possible. In 2017, the company introduced 
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a new in- house system called Hermes, described as “the 
first online subtitling and translation test and indexing 
system by a major content creator” (Fetner and Sheehan 
2017). Until it was shut down in 2018, apparently due to 
an overwhelming response from applicants, Hermes was 
Netflix’s automated system for registration, testing, and ac-
creditation of translators. Potential employees would cre-
ate a profile on Hermes and then take a test to assess their 
skill in translating idiomatic English expressions (“made a 
killing,” “hit the road”) into their own language. Test results 
determined the amount and kind of work Netflix would 
then offer the translators through the platform. Hermes 
was just one of the many ways that Netflix, in classic Silicon 
Valley style, has been trying to engineer efficiency into the 
“cultural” business of translation.
How do we critically evaluate Netflix’s translation ef-
forts? There are at least two ways of thinking about this. 
On the one hand, we could criticize the unavailability of 
minor- language translated content, noting that Netflix, 
rather than being a truly global service, tends to cater 
exclusively to the major language groups— only 20- odd 
languages out of more than 6,500. From this point of 
view, Netflix falls short of its ambition to “delight view-
ers in ‘their’ language” (Netflix 2017a), because it has not 
invested enough in minor- language interface translation, 
subbing, and dubbing. A more charitable assessment 
would be that Netflix is now translating more content into 
more languages than almost any other media service has 
done or could do. Millions of hours of content are trans-
lated annually, and savvy users can add to the stock of 
subtitles by uploading their own. Seen from this perspec-
tive, Netflix may well be the most multilingual television 
service that has ever existed.
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How successful have Netflix’s localization efforts been? 
The answer to this question depends on where you ask it. 
In the sections that follow, we will consider how Netflix 
has fared in three important Asian markets: India, Japan, 
and China. I gratefully acknowledge the work of Thomas 
Baudinette, Wilfred Wang, and Ishita Tiwary, who assisted 
me with this research.
India
India, with a vast English- speaking middle class, is a 
prized market for multinationals. Internet penetration and 
smartphone use are rising rapidly among an overall popu-
lation of 1.3 billion people. Satellite and cable systems are 
well established, with hundreds of available channels. Yet 
India’s demography, regulations, and infrastructure pose 
many challenges for foreign media companies. Higher- 
speed internet connections are still largely restricted to 
urban elites, and their typical bandwidth speeds of 1– 2 
Mbps are too slow to use video streaming services reli-
ably. Meanwhile, data caps of 40– 50 gigabytes per month 
mean that even those subscribers with high- speed home 
connections are often wary of using up their precious 
gigabytes on data- hungry video applications.
India has no fewer than 14 official languages, includ-
ing Bengali, Gujarati, and Punjabi, as well as the widely 
spoken Hindi. There is no single language that is under-
stood by all citizens across this vast nation. Proficiency in 
English, the default language of business, advertising, and 
elite communication, is limited to around a third of the 
population. What’s more, India’s film industry, Bollywood, 
is an unassailable force: it is by far the most popular form 
of moving- image entertainment, with Hollywood coming 
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in a distant second. India has its own thriving star system, its 
own storytelling traditions, its own dream factory. There is 
no obvious need for foreign content, even though the market 
is certainly big enough to support a range of styles.
In India, Netflix has been licensing Hindi, Gujarati, 
and Punjabi shows, but at the time of writing its Indian 
content collection is still seen as poor compared to what is 
available on other services. Instead, Netflix is reliant on 
the pulling power of its original content among English- 
speaking elites. As a Netflix executive told the Times of 
India shortly after the local launch, “We are after a small 
base of English- speaking people, who travel abroad, are 
wealthy and want to watch the latest shows that are being 
launched in the US” (Sarkari 2016).
Netflix got off to a late start in India, arriving as part 
of the global switch- on in January 2016. By this time, the 
streaming market was already crowded. Rupert Murdoch’s 
Star TV had its own streaming service, Hotstar. Other 
popular services included Eros Now (from the Bollywood 
studio Eros), Sony LIV, and DittoTV (from the cable and 
satellite provider Zee TV). There were also smaller ser-
vices, such as Spuul (specializing in Hindi, Punjabi, Tamil, 
Malayalam, Telugu, and regional- language content), Hooq 
(with a big catalog of classic Indian TV shows), and Mu-
vizz (specializing in independent movies). Amazon Prime 
Video was another competitor and was starting to invest 
significantly in local content. Amazon premiered its first 
Indian original series, the cricket- themed drama Inside 
Edge, in 2017, along with a series of stand- up performances 
from popular Indian comics. Hotstar had already released 
a number of original productions, including romances, 
talk shows, and several comedy series. For its part, Netflix 
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responded by commissioning several high- profile original 
series, including Selection Day, described as a “story of 
cricket and corruption” and based on a novel by Booker 
Prize winner Aravind Adiga; Sacred Games, an organized- 
crime drama also based on a best- selling novel; and the 
romantic comedy movie Love per Square Foot.
Censorship is a delicate issue in India. Movies must 
receive a certificate from the Central Board of Certifica-
tion. Explicit sex and violence is typically censored, and 
Bollywood movies steer clear of this material entirely. On 
television, offensive terms (including common words like 
sex, hell, boob, and beef) are muted or cut from the sub-
titles, while sex scenes and nudity are taboo. A number of 
U.S. cable channels operating in India, including Comedy 
Central and Fashion TV, have recently been temporarily 
taken off the air by Indian regulators for violating these 
standards.
Digital media services are not regulated under the same 
law and thus occupy a grey area. Global TVOD services— 
including Google’s Play Store and Apple’s iTunes— have 
erred on the side of caution and only sell films that have 
received a CBC certificate (and thus only sell the censored 
cinema version if multiple versions exist). Apple Music 
blocks adult- rated music from its Indian service com-
pletely. In contrast, Netflix has stated that it will not be 
cutting its original content for the Indian market. Vice 
President Chris Jaffe went out of his way in January 2016 
to reassure Indian subscribers that “nothing on the service 
is censored at this point” (Jaffe in Avari 2016). This signals 
an appeal to cosmopolitan Indian subscribers, who prefer 
uncensored content, despite the regulatory risk inherent 
in this approach.
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In January 2017, a Netflix India employee, acting in an 
unofficial capacity, took to Reddit to promote the service 
to users.10 The staffer then stuck around to field a series 
of questions from other users in what became an unof-
ficial AMA (Ask Me Anything) session about Netflix’s 
Indian service. The resulting conversation, while not nec-
essarily representing the official Netflix line, provides an 
interesting insight into how Netflix is seen by tech- savvy 
middle- class Indians. Many users raised the issue of cata-
log discrepancies, with the Netflix staffer fielding numer-
ous questions about missing titles. (“Interstellar is available 
in Cook Islands and Kiribati but not India. Can somebody 
explain plis? [sic]”) The feedback was not all negative. A 
number of users wrote that they loved the content and the 
Netflix experience, especially the lack of censorship. One 
user wrote, “Thank you . . . Netflix, our Lord and Savior 
from censored butchered content.”
Throughout the discussion, the issue of price kept rear-
ing its head as a key source of irritation. User after user 
criticized Netflix for being so expensive compared to 
other digital media. “You have to ‘Indianise’ the price,” 
wrote one user, “For example, Apple Music is R120 per 
month here as opposed to $10 in US.”11 As these com-
ments suggest, pricing is a major challenge for Netflix— 
which maintains a more or less uniform global price point 
across all countries, with a few exceptions— especially in 
low- income markets. In India, the monthly cost for the 
Netflix basic package is presently 500 rupees (US$7.50) 
per month, in line with its price in most other countries. 
However, the Indian streaming services are much cheaper 
than this. Eros Now charges only 49 rupees (US$0.70) 
per month— a tenth of the Netflix price. Hotstar is free 
Making Global Markets | 125
with advertisements, or 199 rupees per month for the pre-
mium SVOD service with new- release U.S. content and 
live cricket matches (this price is discounted to 133 rupees 
per month for upfront payments). Amazon Prime Video 
is also cheap, at 499 rupees per year (around 42 rupees per 
month).12 This massive price gap places Netflix in a differ-
ent market from its local competitors, making it strictly a 
premium service for Indian elites, expats, and well- to- do 
TV buffs. In a country where the lower classes do not 
have domestic internet access and share content through 
USB sticks and portable hard drives, paying 500 rupees 
per month for streaming media is a commitment not to 
be taken lightly— and not easily available to those without 
credit cards in any case.
International price setting is one of the most fascinating 
aspects of the global media economy— a seemingly tech-
nical process that actually reflects a whole set of embed-
ded ideas about consumers, money, and value. Digital 
media services operating transnationally can choose to 
offer a uniform global price, eliminating the possibility of 
Figure 4.8. Global pricing for the Netflix basic plan, converted to U.S. 
dollars. Data source: UNOGS.com, September 18, 2017.
126 | Making Global Markets
 arbitrage, or they may set a unique price point for each 
country that can be calibrated to local users’ willingness and 
ability to pay, allowing the maximum value to be extracted 
from each market. Faced with this choice, Netflix— like 
most multinational subscription services— chose the for-
mer option. The obvious consequence of this choice is that 
Netflix is unaffordable for all but the most affluent Indians. 
The pricing strategy “makes it more expensive than many 
local competitors, and leaves piracy an attractive option” 
(Frater 2016). This, it seems, is a price Netflix is willing to 
pay to remain a premium product.
Japan
For a different but equally instructive case, we can look 
to Japan— a wealthy, media- saturated market that has 
pioneered many forms of digital distribution. Netflix’s 
Japanese service launched in September 2015 as part of 
the company’s limited Asia- Pacific expansion, comprising 
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Initial launch pricing 
was 650 yen (US$5.50) for the basic package, rising to 1450 
yen for the Premium multiscreen HD package. This put 
Japan at the cheap end of the global scale, which seems 
surprising given the relative wealth of the Japanese market 
(it is one of a handful of countries where Netflix has set a 
low price point).13 Given the ultracompetitive nature of 
the Japanese streaming market, this was a carefully con-
sidered choice for Netflix.
Japan was already awash with digital media services, 
and had been for years prior to Netflix’s launch. Given 
long commuting times in Tokyo and other major cities, 
Japanese consumers have long had a deep familiarity with 
mobile television and interactive services. Telcos and en-
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tertainment providers in Japan have developed clever ways 
of getting content to consumers, including subscription, 
ad- supported, and transactional models, often combined 
in one platform. Popular services included NicoNico, a 
popular YouTube- like site; Gyao!, an AVOD service part 
owned by Yahoo; Hikari TV, J.Com On Demand, and dTV 
(all distribution platforms linked to major telcos and cable 
providers); and streaming- service offshoots of media retail-
ers (DMM.com, Rakuten Showtime). In the SVOD space, 
there was Avex, Amazon Prime Video, and Hulu Japan. 
The latter is a former subsidiary of the U.S.- based stream-
ing service Hulu that was purchased by Nippon TV in 2014 
and now runs independently from its American name-
sake, offering HBO content exclusively and a wide range of 
anime and Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese dramas.
Netflix did not fill a clear market gap in Japan, where 
consumers are strongly inclined toward their own national 
shows. As Rob Cain (2015) noted in Forbes, this posed a 
problem for Netflix in Japan because “the billions of dol-
lars that Netflix has invested in Hollywood movies and 
TV series, and in original programs like Orange is the New 
Black, Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt and Wet Hot Ameri-
can Summer will have negligible value there.” Instead, Cain 
predicted that Netflix “will have to spend (and probably 
overspend) for programming rights to Japanese language 
content that it will be unable to amortize anywhere else in 
the world.” This proved correct. When Netflix launched 
in Japan, the company boasted that it had 40% Japanese 
content in its catalog (Shaw 2015), which was a lot higher 
than in many other Netflix territories— but it still was not 
enough for Japanese audiences. The local content deficit 
was compounded by the fact that Amazon Prime video 
had a much larger collection of Japanese content in its 
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library, making Netflix seem uncompetitive and out of 
touch.14
This led some commentators to use the term kurofune 
(black boats) when reporting on Netflix’s launch in Japan 
(as in kurofune no nettofurikkusu— Netflix of the black 
boats).15 Kurofune is a historical reference to the gunboat 
diplomacy of Commodore Matthew Perry, who ended 
two centuries of Japanese isolationism by forcibly “open-
ing up” Japan’s markets to foreign trade in the 1850s. Used 
in this context, the term evoked the perceived threat of 
mass- scale importation of low- quality American content 
into Japan. While not a mainstream view in the Japanese 
media, the use of the kurofune discourse— including by 
some right- wing commentators— gives a sense of the 
political context surrounding Netflix and other foreign 
media services entering the Japanese market.
Netflix was especially criticized for its measly collection 
of anime, which is a must- have for any streaming service 
in Japan. To be fair to Netflix, this anime deficit was not 
entirely the company’s fault. Netflix found it very difficult 
to license high- quality anime, reflecting its wider problem 
of securing rights to popular Japanese content. The major 
Japanese TV networks already had most of the rights locked 
up— Nippon TV had teamed up with Hulu, Hikari TV had 
a deal with Asahi Media Group, DMM partnered with 
Toyko Broadcasting Service (TBS), and so on. Net flix, with 
few options, eventually inked a deal with the remaining 
commercial broadcaster, Fuji Television, and now serves as 
the exclusive online distributor of Fuji- produced content. 
But securing licensing rights to popular content remains an 
issue for Netflix in virtually all countries, and this became 
a key driver of Netflix’s decision to start producing its own 
content rather than licensing from uncooperative suppliers.
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Netflix began coproducing with Fuji in 2015, releas-
ing the reality show Terrace House and the coming- of- 
age drama Atelier (set in a lingerie company). Hibana, 
a show about aspiring stand- up comics, soon followed. 
In 2017, Netflix upped the ante by announcing it would 
 release 20 new anime series of its own, including a re-
boot of the well- known 1980s series Saint Seiya: Knights 
of the Zodiac. Even bigger news followed when Netflix 
announced it was developing a new animated family se-
ries based on the ultrafamous Rilakkuma (literally relax- 
bear) cartoon character, akin to Hello Kitty in its stature 
inside and outside Japan. These recent developments 
mark a significant shift in Netflix’s Japan strategy. In ad-
dition to claiming that these new investments would help 
them compete in the market, Netflix executives have also 
been talking up Netflix’s ability to help these quintessen-
tially Japanese shows reach an international audience. 
“Just as there are fans of Hollywood in Japan, there are 
die- hard anime fans in France, Brazil, the U.S. and all 
over the world,” stated Greg Peters, president of Netflix 
Japan (Peters in Jarnes 2016).16 He added: “There’s this 
tremendous potential in Japan; so many stories— the 
manga, the novels— and now we have the opportunity to 
unlock this potential in a way that hasn’t been able to be 
done before.”
It is too soon to tell whether these new production com-
mitments will represent a turning point for Netflix in Japan. 
Based on current trends at the time of writing, it seems rea-
sonable to think that Netflix will remain popular with An-
glophiles, expats, and hardcore TV buffs but may struggle to 
win over the masses given the fierce competition from local 
incumbents. In this uniquely inward- facing media market, 
Netflix may have to resign itself to remaining a niche ser-
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vice rather than a mass- market proposition— a solid out-
come compared to the company’s troubles in China.
China
China’s scale cannot be ignored by any serious media 
company, and Netflix has long had its eye on the “world’s 
biggest audience” (Curtin 2007) as a site for future expan-
sion. Given the nature of Chinese media and its regulation, 
Netflix executives approached the market with caution and 
care. Rather than switching- on without permission as 
they did in most other countries, Netflix undertook a long 
engagement with Chinese regulatory agencies and local 
media companies, seeking a partnership arrangement that 
would let it operate legally in the PRC.
The early signs were not promising. By early 2016, many 
commentators were wondering whether Netflix would 
ever crack the Chinese market. In the global switch- on at 
CES, China was the only major country left off the new 
Netflix coverage map. (The other non- Netflix territories— 
Iran, North Korea, and Crimea— were affected by U.S. 
trade sanctions.) Hastings knowingly quipped during his 
CES launch speech that “the Netflix service has gone live 
in nearly every country of the world but China— where 
we also hope to be in the future,” prompting laughter from 
the audience. But Netflix’s China service was not to be. In 
October 2016, Netflix included the following passage in its 
third- quarter investor release:
The regulatory environment for foreign digital content 
services in China has become challenging. We now plan 
to license content to existing online service providers in 
China rather than operate our own service in China in 
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the near term. We expect revenue from this licensing will 
be modest. We still have a long term desire to serve the 
Chinese people directly, and hope to launch our service 
in China eventually. (Netflix 2016, 4)
These sentences spelled the end of its plan to launch a 
Netflix China service. Soon after, Netflix announced a 
partnership with the streaming site iQiyi (owned by the 
search giant Baidu), which would become the official 
home of Netflix original content in China. Netflix had 
clearly decided there was no possibility of running its own 
platform for the Chinese market. It was not the only 
American company to come to this conclusion. Earlier in 
2016, Uber had sold its China operation to rival ride- 
hailing company Didi Chuxing.
To understand why Netflix failed to enter China, we 
need to know something of the country’s famously complex 
and opaque internet regulations. State control over digital 
platforms falls under the jurisdiction of at least three regu-
latory bodies, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the 
Ministry of Culture, and the Cyberspace Affairs Council 
of China, each of which issues its own decisions. Approval 
from all three regulators is needed for a service to operate 
safely in China. Further regulatory risk was added by the 
fact that the official rules made no semantic distinction be-
tween subscription streaming services and live streaming 
services (i.e., amateur webcam channels)— the latter being 
a particularly sensitive area for the Chinese government, 
which was cracking down on “anti- social” online activities. 
Professional video streaming services risked being tarred 
with the same brush as the live streamers.
Even if Netflix had been able to enter the Chinese mar-
ket, it would have found it difficult to attract more than a 
132 | Making Global Markets
niche audience. As in India, cost was an issue: the stan-
dard Netflix global price of $7.99 USD/EUR was around 
four times what Chinese services such as iQiyi and Leshi 
were charging. Without lowering its price point, Netflix 
would have been out of reach of most consumers. Another 
challenge was the highly competitive nature of China’s 
streaming ecology. Powerful incumbents— including video 
streaming platforms run by Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, 
the all- powerful “BAT” triumvirate that dominates China’s 
tech economy— left little room for Netflix to make an im-
pression. These platforms also have a distinctive style that 
Netflix could not easily compete with. Unlike Western por-
tals, Chinese video services are multipurpose platforms that 
integrate free ad- supported video alongside many other 
services, including dating, shopping, real estate, and trans-
port. Netflix’s pure- play SVOD model would have been 
quite unfamiliar to most Chinese (and possibly somewhat 
boring). Netflix would also have inevitably faced the same 
local- content problem it encountered in other markets.
In any case, Netflix never got a chance to try its hand 
in China. The regulatory hurdles that blocked its entry re-
mind us that global media is a domain of national policy 
as well as of commercial strategy. In this sense, the China 
case stands as a reminder that “the state remains the pri-
mary site of governance with the capacity to make deci-
sions, assign resources and enforce laws within territorially 
defined societies, and they do so in the context of a global 
order that— in spite of multiple forms of supranational 
institutional and organizational innovation— remains pri-
marily defined around a system of states” (Flew, Iosifidis, 
and Steemers 2016, 7).
Reading across these three case studies— India, Japan, 
and China— we can appreciate how difficult and messy 
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the internationalization process is in practice for mul-
titerritory digital services. Seen from this perspective, 
dynamics of demand in global television do not appear 
to have been fundamentally changed by digital distribu-
tion, in the sense that localization remains vital to ex-
plaining the success or failure of transnational television 
services. Netflix, despite its many powers, cannot easily 
overcome the locality of taste— it must localize itself if 
it wishes to compete on a global scale. Furthermore, it 
is by now apparent that global markets do not simply 
lust after Netflix in the same way that MTV thought the 
world might “want their MTV”— as a pure kind of ob-
session for a superior product. Instead, Netflix is in the 
more difficult position of needing to try and find its own 
niche within resilient and highly local taste formations 
wherever it goes.
In this sense, the story of Netflix is not entirely new; 
indeed, it closely resembles the history of transnational 
satellite channels expanding into Europe, Latin America, 
and Asia in the 1990s. The basic dynamics of taste and 
demand— what television audiences in different coun-
tries want from their television services— do not appear 
to have been fundamentally altered by digital distribu-
tion, confirming the home truths established by Chalaby 
and Straubhaar. Nonetheless, there are structural differ-
ences between an over- the- top television service like Net-
flix and the earlier broadcast and satellite TV companies. 
While Netflix faces the same market challenges as other 
transnational television companies, it has distinct ways 
of addressing them. Its long- distance localization model 
represents a Silicon Valley engineering response to a much 
older, and thoroughly cultural, business challenge— the 
stubborn locality of taste.
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Que le carnage commence! (Let the carnage 
begin!)
— Le Monde newspaper, September 13, 2014, 
the day before Netflix’s launch in France
In previous chapters, we have explored the technical 
infrastructure behind Netflix’s international service and 
the commercial issues the company has faced in enter-
ing diverse markets. Now it is time to turn our attention 
to matters of content and to the vast array of movies and 
television series that the platform makes available to audi-
ences around the world.
Netflix’s internationalization has presented some fas-
cinating content- related questions, many of which recall 
long- standing debates in media and communications 
research about the origin and intensity of international 
television flows. The most contentious issue across the 
board is the relative lack of local content within the plat-
form compared to the abundance of U.S. programming. 
Netflix chief content officer Ted Sarandos has stated on 
several occasions that the company follows a “secret for-
mula” when curating its international catalogs, involving 
“around 15% to 20% local [content] . . . with the [other] 
Figure 5.1. Netflix: a global pipeline for U.S. content? Screenshot by the 
author.
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80%, 85% being either Hollywood or other international 
content” (Netflix 2014; see also Block 2012). This definition 
of local appears to be quite flexible: in English- language 
markets, local might mean a mix of British and Ameri-
can content, whereas Spanish or Mexican dramas might 
count as local in South American nations, and Egyptian 
and Turkish soaps might count as local in the Arab world. 
Relatively few Netflix catalogs— especially those of small, 
minor- language markets— actually offer 20% local content 
from the country in question. Many smaller markets make 
do with a mishmash of whatever bargain- basement mate-
rial has been licensed to Netflix under global terms. In any 
case, the bulk of the catalog in each country— including 
both licensed titles and original productions— skews 
heavily American.
Netflix makes no apologies for this. On its investor re-
lations website (Netflix 2017c), the company explains that 
“local content represent[s] a minority of viewing in our 
markets.” It explains its strategic and selective investment 
in original local content as “a way to onboard members 
and to introduce them to our global [i.e., U.S.] catalog,” 
adding that “our aim is not to replicate the programming 
of the local broadcaster or TV network in a given market 
but to complement our service with local content where 
appropriate.”
For countries with strong traditions of local content 
regulation, this is a potential problem. Netflix now com-
petes in some markets with broadcast and pay- TV compa-
nies that are often obliged to screen a substantial amount 
of local, national, or regional content as part of the condi-
tions of their license. Netflix, as an over- the- top service, is 
generally immune from such requirements. As a result, 
regulators, screen industry bodies, and civil society groups 
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are increasingly looking closely at the Netflix catalog in 
their country and even commissioning their own studies 
of its content mix.
In Canada, where Netflix has been operating since 2010, 
research conducted for the Canadian Radio- Television 
and Communications Commission estimated that only 
3.3% of feature films and 13.7% of TV content in the Netf-
lix catalog were of Canadian origin (Miller and Rudinski 
2012). In Australia, where Netflix launched in 2015, there 
were only 34 Australian movies in the catalog and around 
the same number of TV shows available upon launch 
(Scarlata 2015). More recently, research conducted by the 
European Audiovisual Observatory (Fontaine and Grece 
2016) noted that across Netflix’s 28 European catalogs, 
Hollywood movies typically account for over two- thirds 
of the film titles on offer. In the majority of European 
countries— including Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Lith-
uania, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, and the Slovak 
Republic— there were no local films available on Netflix 
at all.1
As these figures suggest, the rise of Netflix presents 
challenges for existing media policies— especially local 
content policies designed in a broadcast era— that seek to 
maintain “some kind of dynamic equilibrium over time 
between locally produced media content and material 
sourced from overseas” (Flew 2007, 121).2 Policymakers 
trying to keep up- to- date with the furious pace of tech-
nological change are increasingly looking to Netflix and 
asking questions such as: Is it a problem that Netflix is so 
Hollywood- centric? How does it compare on this front to 
local broadcast and pay- TV channels? Should Netflix be 
expected to screen and support local media productions? 
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Does the service provide a diverse “window onto the 
world,” or is it yet another vehicle for U.S. domination?
Many of these questions involve normative assump-
tions about the relationship between national and global 
media and as such demand careful assessment. They also 
require us to think about the relative power of Netflix in 
particular national markets, and the sometimes divergent 
desires of audiences and policymakers in those markets. 
Approaching the Netflix catalog as an object of policy and 
politics, this chapter surveys some of the content- related 
controversies that have emerged in various countries and 
explores how media regulatory debates around this issue 
have been evolving in recent years.
Revisiting the One- Way Flow
The current discussion about Netflix catalogs is remi-
niscent of an earlier debate in international television 
research that may be familiar to many readers. Since the 
1970s, media scholars, policymakers, and activists have 
been passionately arguing about the idea of cultural impe-
rialism, a term referring to the wholesale export of media, 
information, and culture from the West to “the rest,” and 
the relationship of economic and cultural dependence 
thus created. The idea first came to public attention in the 
late 1960s and 1970s through the work of Herbert Schil-
ler (1969) and Armand Mattelart (1979), and in books like 
Allan Wells’s Picture- Tube Imperialism (1972) and Jeremy 
Tunstall’s The Media Are American (1977). It also gained 
institutional traction via UNESCO research and policy 
debates in the 1970s, as newly postcolonial nations across 
Africa and Asia asserted their cultural independence from 
former imperial powers.
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For television studies, a legacy of the cultural imperial-
ism debates has been the idea of the one- way flow. This is a 
much- contested notion, but the term itself simply refers to 
the argument that the United States (and to a lesser extent 
the United Kingdom and Western Europe) dominates the 
global television trade through the mass export of movies 
and TV series into foreign markets, including the deliber-
ate dumping of content at cut- rate prices. As the theory 
goes, U.S. exports provide a cheap way to fill local sched-
ules while also instituting a relationship of dependence 
between center and periphery. The end result is that CSI 
and Grey’s Anatomy can be seen almost anywhere, while 
flagship productions from the rest of the world travel less 
frequently beyond their national borders.
The one- way flow has been a divisive topic within tele-
vision studies, and while the theory has been questioned 
on conceptual and empirical grounds, it persists as a 
powerful meme in global policy discussions. For this 
reason, when thinking about the issue, it is necessary to 
distinguish between explanatory theories and actually ex-
isting discourses that shape policy and practice. The key 
is not so much whether the one- way flow idea was right 
or wrong but rather the fact that many people continue to 
feel there is a one- way flow, which requires an understand-
ing of where this idea came from and how it circulates in 
the context of contemporary discussions about internet- 
distributed television.
A key document in this regard is the 1974 UNESCO 
 report Television Traffic— A One- Way Street? by Kaarle 
Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis. This famous study examined 
broadcast TV schedules in 50 countries to establish an evi-
dence base about the origin and direction of cross- border 
flows— culminating in the authors’ well- known diagnosis 
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of a one- way, West- to- rest pattern.3 The report used a 
simple infographic to illustrate this finding (Figure 5.1). 
These conclusions were confirmed by additional UNESCO 
studies that appeared over the next decade (Larsen 1990; 
Mowlana 1985).
While raising tricky definitional issues when it came to 
determining the national origin of coproductions or news 
programs with inserted material, this approach provided 
an empirical basis for strong claims as to the direction and 
intensity of international television flows. Similar conclu-
sions were reached in the major 1977 study Broadcasting 
in the Third World by Elihu Katz and George Wedell, who 
concluded that “the flow of entertainment programs and 
entertainment formats is almost wholly in one direction,” 
Figure 5.2. The distribution patterns of the major program exporting 
countries in the early 1970s, showing annual exports in hours. The 
width of the arrows is proportionate to the share of the total export 
flow. Source: Nordenstreng and Varis (1974, 30).
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adding that “the flow of news is even more unidirectional” 
(Katz and Wedell 1977, 166). While their assessment of the 
cultural impact of television exports was carefully quali-
fied, Katz and Wedell were clear in their argument that 
developing nations (in the 1970s at least) were structurally 
reliant on cheap imports from the United States and on a 
“homogenized brand of popular culture either copied or 
borrowed from broadcasting in the West” (vii).
The basic method for international television studies in 
the 1970s was analysis of broadcast schedules. But such re-
search also embodied a critical argument about the global 
order as it seemed to be emerging at the time. Taken to 
its logical extreme, the one- way flow could be seen as one 
element in an imperial project that extended longer his-
tories of political and economic domination. Television 
functioned as a microcosm of a larger truth: the continued 
domination of the developing world by means economic, 
political, and cultural. This way of thinking, which Miller 
et al. (2005) would later describe as the “Global Effects 
Model,” was clearly of its time— a product of Cold War 
politics and the political turbulence associated with decol-
onization, postcolonial nationhood, and the emergence of 
the nonaligned bloc in the United Nations and UNESCO. 
As Jean Chalaby observed, it was also a product of Marxist 
dialectics in that it “transposes the Marxist interpretation 
of social classes in perpetual conflict to the relation be-
tween place and culture” (Chalaby 2009, 231).
Television export studies were fundamentally about 
the distribution, not reception, of content. Like today’s 
research on Netflix that shows the measly amounts of 
local content in national catalogs, the 1970s studies could 
measure the presence of American content in global sched-
ules but could not account for the relevant prominence, 
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popularity, or cultural impact of such content. Nor could 
they explain what American TV meant to people in their 
everyday lives. This led many scholars to question cultural 
imperialism’s hypodermic- needle theory of reception and 
its romantic notion of the nation as a besieged space of 
cultural purity (Tomlinson 1991; Miller 1992). Barker 
(1997, 182) went so far as to claim that cultural imperi-
alism had become “an increasingly inadequate concept 
for understanding television under contemporary condi-
tions.” Meanwhile, Straubhaar (1991) and Sinclair, Jacka, 
and Cunningham (1995) offered revisionist accounts 
foregrounding the scale of interregional television trade, 
especially in Latin America. Their research established 
that many nations replaced imported content with local 
production as their media systems developed, which sug-
gested that American content was less monolithically 
dominant than originally thought. Under the weight of 
this new evidence, U.S. imports came to be seen by some 
scholars as “a kind of televisual Polyfilla, plugging the gap 
in the schedule” (Tracey 1985, 22), rather than an unstop-
pable force of cultural domination.
In rehearsing these arguments, I make the obvious 
point that export power does not translate directly into 
cultural power. At the same time, at least some aspects of 
the cultural imperialism thesis remain important for un-
derstanding how global audiences feel about digital media 
services like Netflix. The dominance of U.S. media is still 
an empirical fact that must be reckoned with, as Netflix 
programming shows. Concerns about the one- way flow 
have never gone away, and inequalities in television trade 
are a live and legitimate issue— regardless of how we ac-
count for their cultural effects. Audiences still want to 
watch TV in their own languages (and complain when 
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they cannot do so), and policies still exist in many countries 
to protect local content and nurture local stories. All of this 
suggests that the basic conditions for public concern about 
one- way flow remain broadly intact.
Milly Buonanno is a scholar who has carefully nego-
tiated this apparent contradiction between the explana-
tory deficiencies of the one- way flow and the persistent 
anxieties of national media policy. Buonanno’s research on 
European television programming in the 1990s and the fol-
lowing decade revealed that 50 % of the movies and drama 
series shown on terrestrial TV in Europe were North 
American. Nonetheless, she is extremely careful about 
making claims on the basis of such evidence. Consider 
this passage from her marvelous book The Age of Televi-
sion, which provides a nuanced account of export dynam-
ics that carefully qualifies the idea of U.S. dominance:
It may indeed be true on the supply side that “the media 
are American” (Tunstall 1977), but this assertion is sub-
ject to the distinctions mentioned . . . : not television in 
general, but television drama; not as a permanent state of 
affairs, but subject to variations in time and space. But on 
the consumption side things are different. . . . We do not 
need to espouse the theory that the public has become 
saturated with too much American television, although 
this may be true. We should rather uphold the structural 
nature of the gap between supply and demand for the foreign 
product, which has not come about by chance. (Buonanno 
2007, 94)
Following this logic, the challenge of explaining inter-
national television flows is not so much about picking 
one paradigm over another (globalization vs. cultural 
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imperialism) but rather about making careful distinctions 
between distribution and reception, economic structure 
and audience/buyer agency, and the more specific dynam-
ics of various program types. Buonanno’s other key insight 
here is that while the paradigm of cultural imperialism 
“has lost its central position in the field of explicit theo-
ries,” it “still maintains its hold at the level of the implicit 
theories that underlie public discourse and ordinary con-
versation” (87). Many small nations still feel the specter of 
cultural imperialism even if they use a different vocabu-
lary to express it, and whether or not the perceived threat 
comes from the United States, France, India, Japan, China, 
or Korea.
How does this apply to Netflix? It is impossible to 
understand the international policy landscape around 
internet- distributed services, especially SVOD, unless we 
heed the lessons of the cultural imperialism debate. As 
SVOD services command an increasing share of global 
television viewing in many nations, concerns about the 
one- way flow on unregulated and mostly U.S.- based plat-
forms are increasing. This involves a renaissance of cultural 
protectionism in many nations and a reassertion of the 
regulatory power of the nation- state (Flew, Iosifidis, and 
Steemers 2016). The advent of internet television has some-
what unexpectedly served to intensify long- simmering argu-
ments about television flows in general, precisely because of 
internet- distributed television’s  increased capacity for “pro-
gramming from afar.”
Netflix Catalogs and Media Policy in Europe
The European Union’s undiminished commitment to the 
“cultural exception”— the idea that “creations of the spirit 
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are not just commodities” and “the elements of culture are 
not pure business,” in the words of former French presi-
dent François Mitterand— has shaped continental media 
policy at a deep level. A central goal of the European 
Union’s overarching media law, the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive (AVMSD, 2010), is to nurture a “Euro-
pean audiovisual space.” The AVMSD, which replaced the 
former Television without Frontiers Directive (1989), thus 
seeks to ensure that content from EU member states flows 
liberally across national borders within the region while 
preserving access to local- language and national- language 
film and television content in specific countries: Dutch 
films for the Dutch, Spanish television for the Spaniards. 
To this end, current EU law provides minimum standards 
of European content (at least 50% of broadcast television 
content must be European), which individual member 
states may increase if they wish.
The AVMSD— which is under revision at the time of 
writing— has until recently been vague about on- demand 
services, referring only to a general obligation to “promote” 
European works.4 European member states have been left 
to make their own rules about how this might happen (for 
example, through content quotas, levies, or investment 
requirements). Quotas now apply to video- on- demand 
services in a number of European nations, though the 
specified percentage of content varies considerably. For 
example, VOD services based in France, Austria, and Lith-
uania must dedicate at least half of their catalogs to Euro-
pean content, while services based in the Czech Republic, 
Malta, and Slovenia face a much lower hurdle (10%).5 
Broadly speaking, Central and Eastern European nations 
have tended to favor lower or no quotas, while Western 
European nations opt for more stringent quotas.
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In addition to these rules about the presence of European 
content in on- demand catalogs, some countries have also 
imposed specific rules about how digital platforms present 
their content to viewers (European Commission 2014).6 
In Romania, it is required that providers indicate the 
country of origin of titles in the catalog. In Poland, rules 
specify how platforms should promote European content 
in trailers, home pages, and catalogs. Estonian law requires 
that providers give some prominence to recent European 
works, those released within the last five years. These laws 
add another layer of complexity to the European content 
quotas that already exist in many EU nations.
The most regulatory- minded country in the EU on cul-
tural policy issues is France. Here, interlocking policies exist 
to protect national customs, language, and media from An-
glophone influence. France, which has chosen to ramp up 
the minimum EU content quotas to a higher level, pres-
ently requires that 40% of broadcast television and radio 
programming must be of French origin, and no less than 
60% of on- demand content must be European. In addition, 
free- to- air TV, pay- TV, and TVOD services are obliged to 
invest a portion of their revenue in European and French 
original productions, and strict chronology rules regulate 
a film’s movement through nontheatrical windows (Blaney 
2013; O’Brien 2014; Keslassy 2013). France also has spe-
cific rules about discoverability in on- demand services. 
Current law specifies that “the home / front page of the 
service provider must display a substantial proportion of 
European or French- speaking works” and that visuals and 
trailers of these works must be shown, not just the title 
(European Commission 2014). These rules apply only to 
services based in France and have no effect on services 
based in other countries, even when they cater to French 
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audiences. Under the AVMSD’s “Country of Origin” prin-
ciple, providers must satisfy only the rules of the country 
in which the service is registered. Hence, Netflix’s Euro-
pean operations, which are headquartered in the Neth-
erlands, only need to satisfy the lax Dutch requirements 
about European content, no matter the size of the audience 
in France. As a result, Netflix and other providers have 
an incentive to set up their operations in less regulatory- 
minded member states.
European regulators are well aware of this issue, which 
results in uneven compliance with the spirit of European 
content rules across the continent. In response, they have 
been seeking to harmonize national rules to create a more 
uniform regulatory environment. To this end, the European 
Commission announced in 2014 that, as part of its Digital 
Single Market strategy, it would begin consultations for a 
new version of the AVMSD. Three months of intense lob-
bying followed, during which major European telcos and 
U.S. tech companies (including Netflix and Verizon) ar-
gued the case for retaining the status quo, while European 
screen industry groups (and a number of EU member 
states) argued for stronger regulation. France was espe-
cially vocal in its submission to the EC: it wanted a new 
content quota to promote cultural diversity and to protect 
European audiovisual industries from unfair competition 
from American companies. In its submission, France also 
attacked the tendency of “certain non- European compa-
nies” to set up shop in EU member states with light- touch 
regulation:
This strategic relocation, associated in particular with dig-
ital services, is a form of “forum shopping” and ultimately 
takes place at the expense of the value chain of European 
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content. Thus publishers established in France— who are 
subject to ambitious regulations to support the audiovi-
sual industry, protect creators and offer diversified and 
quality content to viewers— are in direct and unfair com-
petition with the services established in another country, 
which are not subject to the same rules but generate profits 
in the same market. (Government of France 2015)7
Unsurprisingly, Netflix came out strongly against these 
proposals. Its submission to the European Commission 
warned that “rigid numerical quotas risk suffocating the 
market for on- demand audiovisual media services” and 
that “an obligation to carry content to meet a numerical 
quota may cause new players to struggle to achieve a sus-
tainable business model.” Netflix even offered some free 
policy advice to Brussels, suggesting that “the focus of 
European audiovisual media policy should be on incen-
tivising the production of European content and not 
imposing quotas on . . . providers who may then struggle 
to meet the supply” (Netflix 2015c, 16– 17).
After much deliberation, the European Commission 
eventually came down on the side of France. Its proposed 
new AVMSD package, released in March 2016 as “a media 
law for the 21st century,” contained some very significant 
new regulatory requirements that are likely to reshape the 
audiovisual landscape in Europe (at the time of writing, 
these have yet to be implemented).8 The most controver-
sial requirement was a 20% European content quota in 
VOD and SVOD catalogs (subsequently increased to 30% 
by the European Parliament), designed to create “a more 
level playing field in the promotion of European works.” 
Importantly, these rules would apply regardless of the coun-
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try of origin: major European and foreign services like 
Netflix would all have to comply if they wished to do 
business on the continent. A second element of the new 
AVMSD applied to the recommendation systems used 
by digital video platforms. Platforms would be required 
to give European content a reasonable degree of visibility 
within their catalogs, even if this meant rewriting algo-
rithms to prioritize such content. These discoverability re-
quirements are significant, signaling the EC’s intention to 
ensure providers could not work around the content quota 
by licensing cheap, low- quality European content and bury-
ing it in their catalogs.
EU regulators were merely acknowledging the obvious 
fact that users of Netflix and similar services do not expe-
rience the catalog as a catalog or as a static list or schedule 
but rather as a series of interactive, personalized recom-
mendations that are algorithmically sorted according to 
user viewing history, demographic, and location data. 
Given the importance of recommendations in driving 
viewing behavior, these systems are clearly important ob-
jects for cultural policy regulations to consider. If imple-
mented, this second rule would require changes to the way 
Netflix’s algorithms work, given that content recommen-
dation is tailored to an individual’s viewing history.
Naturally, Netflix pushed back on the filtering propos-
als, noting that they are “not compatible” with how people 
use SVOD services, and claiming they would undermine 
Netflix’s ability to recommend what people are most in-
terested in. Netflix had previously argued to the EC that 
personalized recommendations were the best kind of pro-
motion for EU works, precisely because they are based on 
demonstrated preferences and will therefore recommend 
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more EU content to people already known to like such 
content. In Netflix’s words, “the consumer personalization 
approach allows for more European works to be available 
to subscribers that are interested in such types of content 
and helps them find those European works— in effect, 
promoting them and creating a virtuous demand- supply 
cycle” (Netflix 2015c, 17).
Netflix’s talk of a “virtuous demand- supply cycle” may 
be gilding the lily, but they do have a point about recom-
mendation. In SVOD services, the catalog is really the raw 
inventory of content from which selections are algorithmi-
cally drawn and is rarely visible to users in its entirety. The 
algorithm has considerable agency here. However, this also 
means that regulators’ arguments can be considered valid 
when they insist that the algorithm is a legitimate target 
for regulation. This tension reflects the fuzzy boundaries 
of today’s media policy debates, which are not just about 
how and how much to regulate but also what to regulate 
(i.e., which objects, technologies, and practices count as 
“media”). The EU, for its part, seems to be moving in the 
direction of treating algorithmic recommendation as a 
media system in its own right, or at least an appropriate 
surface for regulation.
At the time of writing, these new regulations have yet 
to be legislated. Nonetheless, the fact that these proposals 
are being debated at the highest level is testament to the 
level of concern about these issues within Europe, where 
questions of national sovereignty, cultural diversity, and, 
indeed, cultural imperialism are still taken quite seri-
ously. In bringing discoverability into the equation, the 
AVMSD foretells a new approach to media regulation— an 
attempt to retrofit existing regulatory models for the 
more complex, context- dependent landscapes of digital 
Content, Catalogs, and Cultural Imperialism | 151
distribution— and suggests some of the techniques that 
future governments may use to intervene in the digital 
media economy.
The Canadian Situation
The EU’s interventionist position in these debates is 
worth noting as an exception to the general deregula-
tory  thrust of global media policy in recent decades. 
Relatively few governments have the resources or appetite 
to enforce these kinds of measures. Others are discour-
aged from imposing national content quotas on digital 
platforms because of preexisting commitments in trade 
agreements— Australia, for example, traded away this 
right during negotiations for the 2004 U.S.- Australia Free 
Trade Agreement.
Canada— a midsize country with a long history of cul-
tural policy protections for its bilingual media space— is 
an interesting case. With nationally funded public- service 
media institutions, Canada has long- established systems 
of state support for cinema and television production and 
a quota system for Canadian content (Cancon), including 
requirements that VOD services include Canadian movies 
in their catalogs.9 Netflix has a relatively long history in 
the country, having operated there since 2010, and 53% of 
English- speaking Canadian households are now thought 
to subscribe (Robertson 2017). By this measure, Netflix 
would have to be considered a mainstream rather than a 
niche media service in Canada. Yet, as a digital service, it 
is not required to invest in Canadian production in the 
same way as television and pay- TV companies are. Pro-
gressives in Canada argue for tighter regulation of Netflix 
as a way of preserving Canadian culture in the face of 
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unfair over- the- top competition. A report by the Cana-
dian Centre for Policy Alternatives gives a sense of this 
position:
Canada is no stranger to turning points in the media 
landscape, and Ottawa has proven its ability to respond 
in ways that continue to support Canadian cultural pro-
duction. In the 1930s, for example, we created the CBC to 
counteract the domination of the English- language air-
waves by U.S. radio. In the 1960s, when American televi-
sion programming flooded Canadian airwaves, we wrote 
new Canadian content regulations. Today the issue is once 
again domination, but this time of the Internet by mostly 
U.S. OTTs, which have become their own distribution 
networks as well as their own creators of new media. 
(Anderson 2016, 9– 10)
Here the content regulation question once again becomes 
entangled with questions of national sovereignty. The 
argument is that unless Canada moves urgently to regulate 
internet television services, the country will be “in danger 
of losing control of its broadcasting system and of causing 
severe damage to the production and delivery of Canadian 
cultural programming”— something the report describes 
as “akin to the unregulated radio era of the 1930s and 1940s, 
when Canadian airwaves were dominated by American 
programming and we were merely a branch plant location 
for U.S. culture” (44). This vision of Netflix as yet another 
U.S. media company muscling into the national media 
space is familiar to Canadians. As a journalist from the 
Globe and Mail wrote recently, “Canadians’ digital habits 
are stripping millions out of the system as the dollars spent 
on ad buys, Netflix subscriptions and Amazon purchases 
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all flutter down to California. Meanwhile, Canadian con-
tent risks drowning in the Internet ocean” (Taylor 2016).
On the other side of the political spectrum, Cana-
dian conservatives are skeptical of the quota system and 
of media regulation in general (Globerman 2014). They 
argue that imposing new taxes or obligations on online 
services is unnecessary for quality Canadian content to 
thrive, and that such regulation stifles digital innovation 
and free markets (seen as the best vehicle for creating cul-
ture). Conservatives, like progressives, have also found 
reasons to bring Netflix into the political debate. During 
the 2015 Canadian federal election campaign, prime min-
ister Stephen Harper released a scripted video on Twitter 
promising that he— unlike Justin Trudeau— would never 
tax over- the- top services. “I love movies and TV shows,” 
he tweeted, “I’m 100% against a #Netflix tax. Always have 
been, always will be #NoNetflixTax.”
From 2013 to 2014, the Canadian Radio- Television and 
Telecommunications Commission ran a public consul-
tation process called Let’s Talk TV to guide the future of 
national television policy. Hearings were held in 2014, and 
Netflix representatives were called to give evidence. How-
ever, Netflix executives would not divulge commercially 
sensitive data requested by the commission— such as the 
number of Canadian subscribers and Netflix’s dollar- figure 
Table 5.1. Paid subscriptions to over- the- top services in 
Canada (English- speaking population estimates)
Netflix 53%
CraveTV 9%
Amazon Prime Video 5%
Sportsnet Now 5%
Data source: Media Technology Monitor Survey, cited in Robertson (2017).
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investment in Canadian content— other than to claim that 
“Canadian content is thriving on Netflix.” In response, the 
commission struck Netflix’s evidence from the public re-
cord as a rebuke for the company’s recalcitrance. This fuss, 
which made a few headlines in Canada at the time, gives 
an insight into Netflix’s sometimes insouciant attitude to-
ward national media regulators. Ultimately, Netflix did not 
need to play by the CRTC’s rules and was able to opt out of 
the process when it was expedient to do so (Pedwell 2014; 
Anderson 2016, 36; Wagman 2017).10
The relationship between Netflix and Canadian regula-
tors has grown more complicated over time. In 2017, while 
announcing the recommendations of the government’s 
new Cancon review, heritage minister Mélanie Joly made 
two major announcements concerning Net flix. The first 
piece of news was that Netflix and the Canadian govern-
ment had signed off on a deal for Netflix to establish a 
production base in Canada and to invest C$500 million in 
Canadian screen production over five years. Net flix claimed 
this was new money as opposed to already- committed 
funds; however, some observers were skeptical of the claim, 
and others asked whether the funds would be used to pro-
duce runaway U.S. productions, taking advantage of the 
lower production costs over the border. Netflix (2017b) in-
sisted that they “invested in Canada because Canadians 
make great global stories”— a response that did not seem 
to sway its critics (Taylor 2017). The second piece of news 
was that the government had decided not to proceed with 
plans to impose a sales tax on digital streaming services. 
Despite announcing these two commitments on the same 
day, both Netflix and the Canadian government stressed 
there was no link between them and that the produc-
tion spending was not given in return for the tax break. 
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Nonetheless, the timing of the announcement raised many 
eyebrows.
Comparing policy debates in the EU and Canada reveals 
some differences as well as some similarities. Canada, 
unlike the EU, is not proposing a Netflix quota, though 
the issue of Cancon on Netflix remains highly contro-
versial. Canada’s current audiovisual policy emphasizes 
“strengthen[ing] the creation, discovery and export of 
Canadian content,” suggesting a more strategic subsidy 
model for telling Canadian stories, in contrast to the 
European quota model. The term “discovery” connotes 
distribution, search, and algorithmic filtering— all the 
characteristics of the Netflix era. Canada, like the EU, is 
putting digital distribution front and center in its thinking 
and is attempting to retrofit long- standing media policies 
around this theme. Whether this will be enough to satisfy 
Canadian content creators and cultural policy advocates 
remains to be seen.
Do Audiences Actually Want Local Content  
(on Netflix)?
We have heard a lot from policymakers and policy advo-
cates, but what about audiences? How do they feel about 
the local content issue? The voice of the audience does 
not feature prominently in local content debates and, as a 
result, it can be difficult to know how local they want their 
television to be and how this sentiment might vary across 
different kinds of television services.
In thinking about this issue, it is worth going back again 
to the Television Traffic— A One- Way Flow? report and to 
some comments in the report’s appendix from Elihu Katz. 
Writing more than 40 years ago, Katz identified some im-
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portant questions that are still highly relevant to the Netflix 
case. He began by noting that critiques of U.S. or European 
dominance in broadcasting rest on “certain value assump-
tions which deserve to be made explicit”:
There is the assumption, first of all, that national 
creativity— that is, home- made programmes— is a good 
thing. Some people may disagree: it is possible to argue 
that nation- states ought not to be striving to create their 
own cultures or to continue their own parochial tradi-
tions. Perhaps it is better to be more cosmopolitan. It is 
certainly cheaper to let Sam do it.
A related question is what kind of free- flow of informa-
tion do we want? Underlying this study is the assumption 
that an egalitarian flow in all directions is an ideal toward 
which to strive. But perhaps some people would be satis-
fied with today’s more unidirectional flow, if only because 
they prefer not to tamper with information. Perhaps the 
global village is not so bad? Perhaps the nation- state will 
wither away more quickly if television and other cultural 
media are homogenized! Perhaps conflict among nations 
will be reduced if they find common ground in Peyton 
Place. Perhaps the audiences everywhere do really prefer 
Bonanza to locally made cultural products? (Katz, in 
Nordenstreng and Varis 1974, 47)
Swap Peyton Place and Bonanza for Stranger Things and 
you see how Katz’s point applies to Netflix. The assumption 
that audiences necessarily want to see their own stories on 
Netflix more than they want to see Hollywood stories 
is questionable because the wider national media land-
scape may already be structured and regulated to provide 
significant amounts of local content through existing 
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broadcast and pay- TV channels. The issues Katz identifies 
here clearly remain unresolved.
It is difficult to speak in general terms here. Every coun-
try has its own story when it comes to local content. In 
Chapter 4, we considered the situation in India, where 
Netflix is very much a niche service. India is not having the 
same kind of policy debate about “Indian content on Netf-
lix.” With a very mature and successful commercial screen 
industry of its own— where language functions as a natural 
protection measure— India has no real need for Netflix to 
add to the existing stock of national self- representation. 
Instead, Netflix’s signature brand of edgy English- language 
content appeals to those audiences already predisposed to 
imported content— and everybody is more or less happy 
with that arrangement, at least until Netflix becomes popu-
lar enough that it starts to unsettle existing incumbents. 
But the story is different in Anglophone countries such 
as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
In these countries, American programming can have a 
stronger substitution effect on local programming, be-
cause of the language factor. Many Australians, Kiwis, 
Brits, and Canadians are more than happy to trade up 
their local dramas for higher- budget English- language 
Netflix programming.
Here we can see how the cultural policy debates vary 
significantly from country to country. Inherent differences 
in national markets shape the potential impact of Netflix 
within those markets. An additional complicating factor is 
that Netflix occupies different market niches within those 
countries. In the United States, Netflix is a mainstream 
middle- class product, affordable and accessible to most 
people with a high- speed internet connection. In other 
parts of the world, Netflix use is either negligible or limited 
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to cosmopolitan upper classes whose tastes may not be in-
dicative of those of their fellow citizens. (Recall that the 
company explicitly targets “English language- speaking 
elites” in foreign markets [Netflix 2016].) In other words, 
Netflix caters to different kinds of global users, as well as 
different national markets, so how regulators feel about 
Netflix (the perceived threat level) varies accordingly.
This raises some fascinating regulatory questions. If 
Netflix is effectively a niche service, serving only a small 
number of viewers, should it still be asked to represent the 
local way of life in its programming? Perhaps this is an 
unfair expectation to begin with. After all, Canadians do 
not expect European art house movie SVOD services like 
Mubi to support local production, because they have very 
small audiences. Nor would a New Zealander expect a 
Chinese video- on- demand service to support Kiwi pro-
ductions just because that service is potentially available 
in New Zealand. This is why media policies designed for 
convergent media landscapes often make a distinction 
between media services on the basis of size and audi-
ence rather than delivery mechanism. For example, the 
EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive is clear about 
the fact that it is designed for “mass media” and that “low 
turnover companies, thematic services and small and 
micro enterprises are exempted from these requirements.” 
Netflix certainly does not have a low turnover when con-
sidered as a global operation, but its turnover is low in 
specific countries. Is this enough to qualify Netflix for reg-
ulatory immunity? Should regulatory definitions of size be 
based on the receiving- country presence or the overall size 
of the corporation? These are some of the policy debates 
that the case of Netflix brings into focus.
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In this context, calls for Netflix to behave more like a 
national television service may be somewhat naïve, and 
possibly counterproductive. As Katz observed many years 
ago, we must accept the possibility that many global viewers 
prefer House of Cards to their local shows (or rather, they 
like the option to watch it as well as their local shows). This 
is what Netflix chief content officer Ted Sarandos thinks, 
at any rate. Speaking on a quarterly result call to financial 
analysts in 2014, Sarandos made the following observa-
tions about how his 80/20 rule was working in Western 
Europe, where Netflix had recently launched:
One of our first indicators that we are getting the mix 
right is how many hours of viewing people are participat-
ing in. And in France and Germany, the viewing hours are 
quite healthy relative to all of our other launches. So . . . 
the consumers are finding the things they want.
The tricky thing is figuring out, is the local content 
something that people want in the long term. Because when 
we first go at a new market, I think people are mostly ex-
cited about those things that they didn’t have access to 
before.
So Orange Is the New Black was by far the most watched 
show in both France and Germany, and in fact all of the 
markets that we launched. So it tells you that with all the 
differences in taste, . . . they all rallied around that show. 
(Netflix 2014)
It is in Netflix’s interest to say this, and we should not 
place too much stock in a company’s public relations. But 
nor should we dismiss Sarandos’s argument out of hand. 
Implicit in his comments are certain claims: that Netflix 
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subscribers mostly want international content as opposed 
to local content (though I doubt Sarandos would say this 
of North American Netflix subscribers) and that premium 
content can be transcultural in its appeal. With access 
to the Netflix black box, Sarandos may be in a position 
to know, but it is worth emphasizing how controversial 
such claims still are in the context of media globalization 
debates.
Is there a way to reconcile these positions? On one level, 
the problem remains intractable, because actually existing 
audience activity rarely aligns neatly with cultural theory. 
But if we look once more to the history of debate around 
global television flows, we see a path through the fog. The 
trick is to use both/and rather than either/or thinking. 
Audiences do not choose between the local and the global 
but combine both in their everyday lives; they move be-
tween these scales of identification, at different times and 
for different purposes. Audiences understand that local pro-
gramming is good for some things (news, sports, comedy, 
reality TV), while American imports are often better for 
other things (high- end drama, spectacle, thrills). And, of 
course, the sheer predominance of a particular kind of con-
tent in the SVOD catalog does not determine viewer expe-
rience as much as it would in a linear schedule, precisely 
because the outer reaches of the catalog can be conjured 
to appeal to and appear to those users who have already 
expressed an interest in watching more obscure content, 
whether Scandi- crime, Hindi blockbusters, or Nollywood 
(Nigerian) movies (all of which can presently be found in 
Netflix catalogs).
Netflix’s specificity for international television research 
therefore lies not in the issues it raises about cross- border 
content flows— because we have seen this before— but in 
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the fact that it can effortlessly combine the local and the 
global within the one platform and constitute itself as many 
different products simultaneously because of the magic of 
algorithmic filtering. Hence, while its political economy 
seems to be an extreme case of the local/global dialectics 
that much media globalization theory is based on (North 
American enterprise coming over the top of the national), 
its internal constitution as a platform blurs these bound-
aries in new ways. This may not be enough to redeem the 
platform in the eyes of regulators, who are likely to remain 
focused on the number of national titles in the catalog, 
but it should act as a prompt for television scholars to 
develop new ways to think about the articulation between 
catalogs, recommendation algorithms, and national media 
policies as we move further into an on- demand media 
environment.
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6
The Proxy Wars
When considering how internet- distributed television has 
evolved globally, it is important to take into account the 
many informal user practices that have developed along-
side, and in interaction with, the major platforms. Let me 
begin by offering a personal story that explains why this 
issue is significant for understanding Netflix. Like many 
TV fans in Australia— where Netflix was geoblocked until 
late 2015— I first experienced Netflix not as a local service 
but as a U.S.- based service that had to be accessed covertly 
by using a virtual private network (VPN). During these 
years of nonavailability between 2010 and 2015, several 
hundred thousand Australians covertly signed up for the 
U.S. Netflix service using a credit card, a fake U.S. residen-
tial address, and a VPN or other proxy service.1 As long as 
our VPNs were active when we signed in, we could experi-
ence Netflix in the same way as Americans do. This 
workaround provided many happy hours of streaming 
until Netflix introduced an antiproxy policy in early 2016.
Australia was not an isolated case. In the early years of 
Netflix’s internationalization, use of VPNs and proxy ser-
vices was common in many countries— including Mexico, 
Canada, New Zealand, France, and Britain— where a local 
Figure 6.1. Marketing for Getflix, one of the many DNS proxy and VPN 
services that facilitated unauthorized cross- border streaming (May 
2016). Screenshot by Chris Baumann.
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Netflix service was not available or where the local cata-
log was perceived as inferior to the U.S. version. Count-
less YouTube tutorials and websites offered step- by- step 
instructions on getting around geoblocking, making this a 
fairly mainstream practice. While all this was against Net-
flix’s terms of service, the company did not seem to mind 
having the extra paying customers, and it all seemed like 
harmless fun.
My point here is that the history of Netflix as a global 
platform cannot be understood only as a tale of Silicon 
Valley innovation and international market entry. It is 
also, inevitably, a history of user experimentation, circum-
vention, and copyright infringement. These unauthorized 
practices are not just margin notes around the edges of 
the Netflix story; they are integral elements underlying 
the growth of Netflix as a global media service. Equally, the 
policies developed by Netflix to curtail this activity— the 
“proxy wars”— also form an important part of the wider 
institutional history of internet- distributed television.
User Practices and Platform Policies
In their influential work on Twitter, new media scholars 
Jean Burgess and Nancy Baym (2016) develop a “plat-
form biography” approach to understand how platforms 
change over time. This involves attending not only to 
the features and design of a platform but also to how 
the platform is experienced, adapted, and transformed 
by its users. In the case of Twitter, it is well known that 
many popular user features— such as adding a hashtag 
to posts— were invented by users rather than platform 
designers. For Burgess and Baym, this raises the question 
of how everyday digital practices can “emerge . . . through 
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user experimentation, as people seek to concretize the 
platform’s emerging uses and norms, and in some cases 
to develop tools to enhance and better coordinate these 
conventions” (Burgess and Baym 2016, 10).
Extending this way of thinking to Netflix, we can start 
to appreciate the delicate back- and- forth between plat-
form design and user activity that is a feature of most 
digital media. How have people variously used, adapted, 
and in some cases tricked the Netflix service? What tools 
and technologies have they employed to do this? Netflix 
is a relatively more closed platform than Twitter, but it is 
nonetheless amenable to a range of unofficial user prac-
tices. These run the gamut from innocuous platform hacks 
to more serious transgressions.
At the minor end of the spectrum, we find activities 
like password sharing, where users share their login cre-
dentials with friends, family, or strangers. This is a com-
mon practice: 40% of Netflix subscribers in the United 
States have reportedly let other people use their logins 
(Wallenstein 2013).2 Other examples include uploading 
custom subtitles to Netflix or installing Chrome and 
Firefox browser extensions that add extra features to the 
Netflix website, such as IMDB (Internet Movie Database) 
ratings, random- play functions, microgenre browsing, or 
enhanced personalization. These user practices are uncon-
troversial and widely tolerated.
In contrast, geoblocking circumvention has proven to 
be a more troubling issue for Netflix and for entertainment 
industries generally. To understand why this is so, we need 
to know a little about the technology and business of geo-
blocking. This begins with the humble IP (internet proto-
col) address, the set of numbers assigned to a device that is 
used to send and receive data online. IP address “lookups” 
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are a simple, cheap, and very widely used way to geolocate 
customers. Various free and proprietary databases have 
been developed for this purpose. Leading providers such 
as Akamai and Maxmind offer automated country- level 
and city- level geolocation databases, costing a fraction 
of a cent per query.3
From a commercial perspective, digital media plat-
forms use IP geolocation because it offers a cheap and easy 
mechanism for market segmentation, personalization, and 
legal compliance (Svantesson 2004; Goldsmith and Wu 
2006; Trimble 2012, 2016). Streaming services will typi-
cally check a user’s IP address to confirm the user is in an 
authorized service zone. Outside this zone, the user will be 
confronted with an error message or an endlessly buffering 
screen.
IP geolocation is an imperfect system with many limi-
tations, the most important being that geolocation can 
only tell you about the IP address of the device rather than 
the physical location of the person using it. Despite mod-
est improvements over time, the system remains open to 
manipulation. As an Akamai representative has stated, IP 
geolocation “isn’t meant [for] people are who trying to be 
evasive.  .  .  . It’s meant for the 99 percent of the general 
public who are just at home surfing” (Associated Press 
2004).4
For the remaining 1%, various technical solutions exist 
to circumvent geoblocks and gain out- of- region access 
to online services (Lobato and Meese 2016). The most 
commonly used tools are VPNs, Smart DNS (domain 
name system) proxies, and free browser add- ons. VPNs, 
which can be used for privacy and business purposes as 
well as for circumvention, typically cost around US$5– $15 
per month and provide an encrypted tunnel to a remote 
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server. There are hundreds of VPN suppliers in the mar-
ketplace, including well- known brands such as Private 
Internet Access, Hotspot Shield, and HideMyAss. Smart 
DNS proxies are cheaper than VPNs, costing a few dollars 
per month. They will effectively mask your IP address but 
do not encrypt your traffic. Finally, free browser add- ons 
such as Hola and MediaHint are easily installed and much 
simpler to use than VPNs or proxies. Users select from a 
list of countries, then choose an available video streaming 
service (e.g., selecting U.K. in Hola then allows the user to 
select BBC iPlayer).5
For simplicity, the rest of the chapter will use VPN as an 
umbrella term for these various circumvention tools, even 
though they are all technologically distinct. The next step 
in our analysis is to understand how Netflix responded to 
the rising popularity of these tools. We will then consider 
Table 6.1. Popular DNS services used by Netflix’s 
international subscribers, and their marketing slogans  
(circa 2015)
Service Marketing Slogan
Unblock.US (DNS) “Unblock Everything on Netflix, Spotify, Hulu and More”
uFlix (DNS) “Expand your Netflix library!”
Proxy DNS “Netflix, Sling, HBO, Hulu, and more . . . Outside USA.”
Unotelly (DNS) “Freedom. Security. Flexibility.”
Blockless (DNS) “Your Internet. Your Freedom.”
MediaHint (DNS) “Content Unblocked— Countries have borders. The 
Internet shouldn’t.”
Getflix (DNS) “Unblock Netflix and Hulu Plus FREE with our 14 day 
trial”
Torguard DNS “Unblock content anywhere”
TV Unblock “American DNS codes”
Unlocator “Watch Netflix anywhere”
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how the company’s policies changed over time, and iden-
tify the strategies and values that motivated these changes.
Historicizing Netflix’s Shifting Policies 
on Geoblocking
Netflix’s internal policies on VPN use can be divided into 
roughly three periods. The first phase of international-
ization, between 2010 and 2014, was characterized by a 
relatively permissive attitude. The second phase, between 
2014 and 2016, witnessed growing external pressure to 
adopt a stricter policy. Finally, in 2016, Netflix introduced 
a new VPN- detection technology and recommitted to 
geoblocking as a principle.
During the first phase, Netflix was only available in the 
Americas and parts of Europe. Users outside these regions 
would see the message “Sorry, Netflix is not available in 
your country yet,” and many used a VPN to get around 
this block. It is impossible to tell how many users accessed 
Netflix using VPNs at this time, but the practice was suf-
ficiently well known for Variety to refer to Netflix’s “black 
market diaspora” (Wallenstein 2014). The limited research 
literature also gives clues as to the cultural drivers of VPN 
use in various countries. Vanessa Mendes Moreira de Sa 
(2016) notes that tech- savvy Brazilian Netflix subscrib-
ers used VPNs to access the U.S. Netflix service because 
it offered English- language closed captions not available 
in Brazil (which was important for students). Studies by 
Leaver (2008), Beirne (2015), Stewart (2016), Shacklock 
(2016), and Lobato and Meese (2016) also show the promi-
nence of geoblocking and circumvention in various other 
countries.
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Netflix preferred not to comment publicly on VPN 
use at this time. The company was busy building a global 
brand with global market awareness. In fact, cultivating 
tech- savvy early adopters was part of its long- term strat-
egy. Netflix enjoyed a reputation as a company that un-
derstood the internet and its users. It was reluctant to turn 
away paying customers, who helped to inflate the com-
pany’s U.S. subscriber numbers and share price.
The second phase of Netflix’s VPN policy was charac-
terized by intense industry pressure. Rights- holders were 
starting to get anxious about what they saw as wholesale 
parallel importation or, worse, piracy. Tense conversations 
took place between Netflix, its suppliers, and its com-
petitors. Concerns about VPN use were publicly aired in 
the trade papers and tech press, and were amplified by the 
publication of a number of reports (some rather speculative 
in nature) about the scale of the VPN “problem.” One re-
port by Global Web Index, “The Missing Billion,” estimated 
that 28% of its global sample had used VPNs— amounting 
to “419 million people in GWI’s 32 markets” (Global Web 
Index 2014, 9).
Armed with these statistics, many rights- holders pres-
sured Netflix to take a tougher line on VPNs. “I know the 
discussions are being had . .  . by the distributors in the 
United States with Netflix about Australians using VPNs 
to access content that they’re not licensed to access in Aus-
tralia,” stated Simon Bush, CEO of the Australian Home 
Entertainment Distributors Association (Bush in Reilly 
2014), “They’re requesting for it to be blocked now, not just 
when it comes to Australia.” By late 2014, all eyes looked to 
Netflix for a solution to the perceived VPN problem. The 
collateral damage from their laissez- faire approach was 
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starting to mount as grumpy rights- holders continued to 
air their grievances.
The tension ratcheted up a notch in November 2014, 
when WikiLeaks released an archive of emails from Sony 
Pictures— including a leaked memo from Sony Pictures’ 
chief digital strategy officer Mitch Singer, dating from De-
cember 2013— that revealed the depth of feeling within the 
studio about Netflix’s lack of action on VPNs.6 Noting that 
“this is a politically and emotionally charged issu[e] with 
Netflix,” the Sony memo concludes that “Netflix can and 
should do a much better job geofiltering.” Other leaked 
emails criticized Netflix’s geolocation as “very leaky” and 
lamented its “reluctance to address this issue.”7
Rights- holders like Sony saw circumvention as a prob-
lem for at least two reasons. The idea of consumers wan-
tonly “stealing” content from out- of- region services was 
naturally upsetting because it undermined the ideal of 
an orderly digital marketplace. VPN use seemed like an 
affront to the whole intellectual property system, and es-
pecially to the idea of territorial market segmentation— a 
foundational concept of copyright. Industry lobby groups 
began to speak of “VPN piracy,” equating circumvention 
(which is actually more akin to parallel importation than 
piracy) with the specter of illegal downloading.
The second, more tangible concern was that VPN users 
were starting to dilute the value of content rights. If Ca-
nadian or British Netflix users could use VPNs to watch 
a particular program via the U.S. Netflix catalog rather 
than paying to watch it on a local Canadian or British 
pay- TV service, then major rights- holders (especially 
the Holly wood studios) would not be able to demand the 
same prices for their content that they were used to charg-
ing, because they could not guarantee territorial exclusiv-
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ity. Whichever way you looked at it, rights- holders and 
distributors both had a lot at stake in territorial market 
segmentation. The geoblocking circumvention problem 
was showing just how crucial market segmentation was to 
digital media business models.
Asked about VPNs during a Netflix quarterly results 
call in April 2015, Ted Sarandos tried to play down the dis-
quiet among suppliers. “Yes, [VPN use is] one of the many 
things that we have discussions with studios about on an 
ongoing basis, and we do continue to work with them, and 
work with the VPNs,” Sarandos stated. “To be honest with 
you, it’s kind of a whackamole to get ahead of the different 
usage of VPNs. It’s become kind of a lifestyle thing for a very 
small segment of the population” (Sarandos in Netflix 2015a, 
8). Rights- holders were not mollified by these remarks, and 
the pressure continued to build throughout 2015.
Finally, on January 14, 2016, Reed Hastings announced 
the global switch- on at CES in Las Vegas. Shortly afterward, 
Netflix issued a press release— “Evolving Proxy Detection 
as a Global Service”— announcing the introduction of an 
industry- standard geoblocking policy. Noting that Net-
flix’s new status as a global service had removed the need 
for out- of- region access workarounds, the press release re-
stated Netflix’s commitment “to respect and enforce content 
licensing by geographic location,” adding that “we look for-
ward to offering all of our content everywhere”— a reference 
to the company’s goal of achieving global licensing terms 
with its suppliers.
Shortly after the press release went out, internet forums 
lit up with commentary, criticism, and skepticism. Was 
Netflix serious about blocking VPNs? What technology 
would they use to do so? What would happen to the VPN 
industry, which thrived on consumer demand for cross- 
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border streaming? For the first few weeks, it appeared that 
nothing had changed. Most VPNs were still working as 
usual. On internet forums and social media, many gloated 
that Netflix’s new VPN blocking system had failed. How-
ever, by the end of February 2016, most VPN users were 
seeing an unfamiliar and unwelcome message, shown in 
Figure 6.2.
Over the next few weeks, countless reports appeared 
on social media about VPN users being blocked from 
the U.S. catalog. Virtually all major VPNs seemed to be 
affected. Netflix’s new proxy detection system was build-
ing up a dynamic database of IP addresses it determined 
were  associated with VPNs and then blocking them all. 
Of course, there were still various ways to fool the system 
(VPN providers could actively change their IP address 
ranges, and tech- savvy users could set up a premium VPN 
subscription with an individually assigned IP address). 
Figure 6.2. Netflix error message for VPN users. Screenshot by the 
author.
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However, it was all starting to look too much like hard work 
to many users. Some decided it was not worth the hassle.
Meanwhile, VPN companies scrambled to come to 
terms with the new policy. Private Internet Access and 
Mullvad took the opportunity to distance themselves from 
circumvention, noting that they never endorsed such ac-
tivity. Other VPN companies stuck to their guns. Torguard 
insisted it could still outsmart Netflix with its premium 
dedicated- IP service. The company’s CEO stated that: “We 
greatly expanded our Dedicated VPN IP pool and now offer 
Dedicated IP options in over 55 countries worldwide. This 
has proven to work flawlessly for users who wish to bypass 
VPN blockades with geo- restricted streaming services” (Er-
nesto 2017a). Other providers quietly intimated that they 
would be able to work around Netflix’s new policy. An Ex-
press VPN representative rather ambiguously stated “the 
first rule of Netflix is: do not talk about Netflix” (ibid.).
DNS proxy services were hit especially hard by Netflix’s 
policy shift, because they relied heavily on the hardcore 
streamer user base. Several companies disappeared or 
morphed into VPN providers. Others experienced techni-
cal challenges. My colleague Chris Baumann and I tested 
a range of these DNS services in 2016 and discovered 
that, while the majority of them could still allow access 
to the U.S. Netflix catalog, they were not always reliable. 
Few services were consistently effective as circumvention 
tools, meaning that circumvention was now a fairly time- 
consuming activity that was likely to appeal only to the 
most committed users.
While certainly not bulletproof, Netflix’s anti- VPN 
technology has been more or less effective in its stated aim. 
The blocking of VPNs changed the public perception of 
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circumvention, making it appear difficult and bothersome 
instead of quick and easy. It also mollified the suppliers on 
whose content Netflix was absolutely reliant. In this way, 
Netflix was able to contain the perceived threat and rede-
fine VPN use as a niche activity for hardcore geeks rather 
than mainstream internet users.
Making Sense of the Policy Shifts
Aside from the whack- a- mole games, what does the his-
tory of Netflix’s VPN policy tell us about the relationship 
between user practices, technological restrictions, and 
company policies?
The digital media business is inherently leaky because 
it is built on the sale and leasing of access to infinitely re-
producible goods, such as digital videos and ebooks. His-
tory tells us that what people do with these digital goods 
cannot easily be controlled, no matter how strong the 
digital rights management, so the imperative for forward- 
thinking media companies is not necessarily to stop all in-
formal use of their property but rather to extract as much 
value as possible from a leaky market.
Netflix understood this well. Until 2016, its response to 
the VPN problem was not punitive. It was not about shut-
ting down informal uses of its system. Rather, it was about 
extracting the maximum value from VPN users. This is 
why Netflix dragged its feet and carefully timed the in-
troduction of its anti- VPN policy to align with the global 
switch- on— even though it had already known about the 
circumvention problem for years and rights- holder con-
cerns had been growing for some time.
The trigger for the policy shift was economics rather 
than ideology. At a certain point, it made commercial 
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sense for Netflix to stop thinking like a new- economy Sili-
con Valley company (committed to enhancing user expe-
rience through innovation) and to start thinking like an 
old- fashioned media company (by aggressively protect-
ing its rights). The logic of the market dictated a cultural 
change in the company’s values and self- identity. Netflix 
transformed from a “friend of the geeks” into an intellectual 
property defender because it made commercial sense to 
do so.
As further evidence of this shift, consider how Netflix’s 
policies on illegal downloading have evolved in recent 
years. In public statements up until 2015, Reed Hastings 
took a moderate position on piracy, avoiding extreme 
antipiracy positions in favor of a pragmatic attitude that 
emphasized the importance of converting piracy into paid 
consumption. In 2013, Hastings stated:
Certainly there’s some torrenting that goes on, and that’s 
true around the world, but some of that just creates the 
demand. Netflix is so much easier than torrenting. . . . We 
don’t even think about trying to get rid of it. What we re-
ally think about is how to build an awesome service that 
people just want to use. (Hastings cited in Schellevis 2013)
Public statements like this— of which there are many on 
record by Hastings and other Netflix executives— suggest 
market realism rather than copyright puritanism. At this 
point in its history, Netflix wanted to present itself as a 
company that was reasonable, forward- thinking, and 
understanding of the internet and its users.
This relatively permissive attitude changed once Netflix 
became a major- league content producer. In recent years, 
Netflix has been aggressively enforcing its copyrights by 
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sending out more than one million takedown notices to 
pirate websites (Google 2017). At the same time, it has 
expanded its legal team to include more copyright at-
torneys with antipiracy expertise. A March 2017 job ad-
vertisement for a Global Copyright Protection Counsel 
position at Netflix’s Los Angeles office gives a sense of this 
work. In charge of “industry- wide anti- piracy strategic 
initiatives and tactical take down efforts with the goal of 
Reed Hastings on piracy and VPNs
April 2015: “The key thing about piracy is that some fraction of it is 
because [users] couldn’t get the content. That part we can fix. Some 
part of piracy however is because they just don’t want to pay. That’s 
a harder part.”
April 2015: “[VPN- enabled viewing is] certainly less bad than piracy. 
It’s not something we encourage. It’s actually very hard to detect, be-
cause VPN gets very good at covering their tracks for all the obvious 
reasons. And because we’re focused on getting global very quickly, 
I think we’ll see this issue disappear, and it will disappear because 
we’ll be able to meet the demand directly in all the countries.”
June 2015: “Well, you can call it a problem, but the truth is that [pi-
racy] has also created a public that is now used to viewing content on 
the Internet. . . . We can think of this as the bottled water business. 
Tap water can be drunk and is free, but there is still a public that 
demands bottled water.”
October 2016: “We’ve been very successful at finding technological 
ways of inhibiting the cross- border VPNs, which is roughly, like I’d 
mentioned, we didn’t win the bidding for the Disney movies in the UK, 
so it’s clearly not fair to allow our UK subscribers to watch the Disney 
movies from Canada or to the US. And so we found, with the help of 
the studios, some more technology that enforced their rights.” 
Sources: various press reports; Netflix quarterly earnings call transcripts 
2015Q1 / 2016 Q3
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reducing online piracy to a socially unacceptable fringe 
activity,” the counsel would be responsible for providing 
“detailed landscape and piracy trends analysis”; spotting 
“new trends and changes in the ecosystem”; lobbying; and 
providing “outreach” to pirate sites, sharing platforms, and 
social media services (Ernesto 2017b). In January 2018, 
Netflix and its partners in the Alliance for Creativity and 
Entertainment— including Amazon, HBO, BBC, and the 
Hollywood studios— also started filing lawsuits against 
suppliers of pirate streaming boxes (Ernesto 2018).
Antipiracy “education” was also part of the agenda. In 
2017, Netflix also released a memorable antipiracy promo 
on YouTube, targeted at the French market. The subtitled 
video featured four Narcos cast members from the Cali 
Cartel, who threaten viewers with all manner of unpleasant 
deeds should they access Narcos illegally. “Hey you,” intones 
Pêpê Rapazote, who plays the menacing character Chepe in 
the series, “Do you think we didn’t see you Googling ‘Nar-
cos season 3 download’?” Other cast members offer various 
warnings, such as, “If you want your entertainment, if you 
want your show, you gotta pay the Cali Cartel, hijo de puta,” 
and “There is no please, no por favour, no s’il vous plait. . . . 
There’s bullets for you, your family, and all the people you 
send to watch Narcos on those shitty websites full of pop- 
ups sucios [dirty].”
This was a new, humorous take on the old antipiracy 
advertising formula. While it stands in sharp contrast 
to Netflix’s previous statements on piracy, this position 
makes sense when we consider what Netflix had at stake 
in its original content investment. By 2016, Netflix was 
spending billions of dollars on original content produc-
tion each year. The company was now a major rights- 
holder, and it was starting to act like one— by introducing 
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Hollywood- style content protection and antipiracy poli-
cies. This investment in original content now colors every 
aspect of the company’s strategy. Netflix wants to recoup 
this multibillion- dollar cost, enforce its rights, and mini-
mize leakage in the system. Having orderly territorial mar-
kets and an effective antipiracy strategy is essential in this 
regard.
Cultural Consequences of the Proxy Wars
In this chapter, we have seen how Netflix progressively seg-
mented its international markets into defined territories 
while users variously accepted, resisted, or circumvented 
this segmentation. A few years out from these events, 
and with the benefit of hindsight, we are in a position to 
answer some longer- range questions about these turbu-
lent years: How did the “proxy wars” shape the evolution 
of television streaming as a global media practice? What 
did hundreds of thousands of internet users learn from 
the experience of using VPNs to access Netflix? Do these 
geoblocking battles have any wider relevance to internet 
culture?
It seems to me that one of the key legacies from these 
years has been an increased public awareness of the geog-
raphy of digital markets. During the geoblocking and VPN 
debates, people started asking questions that showed some 
of the amusing inconsistencies of the copyright system. 
(“Why is this series available in Albania but not Alberta?” 
“Why can’t I watch my favorite show online even when I’m 
happy to pay for it?”) Many internet users experiencing 
geoblocking on a regular basis also came to form views on 
related issues like international price discrimination and 
windowing. In some countries, these concerns translated 
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directly into government policy, as policymakers sought to 
constrain “unjustified geoblocking.”8
Any user of a VPN or similar service during these 
years would have become familiar with marketing slogans 
promising “borderless TV” or the ability to “watch TV 
like a local.” Meanwhile, Netflix catalog comparison sites 
such as AllFlix, FlixList, and Flixsearch encouraged users 
to consume media beyond their national borders. These 
websites were brazen about drawing attention to the dis-
parities in the catalog system and promoting their own 
services as a workaround. A new popular discourse had 
emerged, characterized by a logic of cross- border com-
parison of digital media services and contempt for the 
principle of territoriality.
Catalog differences have eroded over time as more 
Netflix originals have been produced, but they remain 
significant in many users’ minds. Unlike music streaming 
platforms, which enjoy global licensing terms, and social 
media sites, which are full of user- uploaded content that 
is not typically georestricted, Netflix was a global service 
with an obviously territorial catalog system. As such, it 
became a stalking horse for all the failings of territorial 
copyright generally, even though it arguably did more 
than most other companies to minimize them. In other 
words, Netflix came to stand in for a wider set of problems 
that were not of its making.
It is easy to dismiss all this controversy about VPNs and 
geoblocking as a first- world problem, and in some senses 
this is true: access to new- release movies and TV series is 
a privilege, not a human right. But to do so would also be 
to miss the subtle consequences of the events outlined in 
this chapter. The desire for a borderless Netflix inevitably 
helped to acquaint early adopters with digital rights and 
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internet privacy discourses promoted by VPNs. It fostered 
a popular awareness of what are otherwise obscure techni-
cal matters. The common experience of geoblocking, lead-
ing to a desire for circumvention, operated like a “gateway 
drug” for a wider set of political issues.
The love affair with VPNs and cross- border streaming 
could be perceived as a degraded form of popular cosmo-
politanism, in the sense that it involves a desire to cross 
borders and come into contact with media systems (or 
servers at least) in far- off lands. At the same time, this cos-
mopolitan impulse was also a symptom of cultural imperi-
alism, because mostly what people were looking for when 
using VPNs to access Netflix was new- release American 
content. Regardless, it is safe to say that the rise of global 
Netflix helped foster in users a vernacular awareness of 
the geography of copyright and the contradictions of digi-
tal markets. The proxy wars may be over for now, but this 
genie cannot easily be put back in its bottle.
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Conclusions
When Reed Hastings stood on stage at CES 2016 and 
announced that Netflix had been switched on in 130 new 
countries, he evoked an image of effortless market entry— 
the annihilation of space by digital technology. The reality 
of digital markets as shown in this book is rather more 
complex. Netflix, like other multiterritory television oper-
ators before it, has learned that global reach is not the 
same thing as global popularity. Digital distribution does 
not come “over the top” of culture; it must negotiate the 
rough terrain of markets characterized by fundamental 
differences in tastes, values, cultural norms, viewing hab-
its, income levels, and connectivity.
The regulatory blowback that Netflix has confronted 
as it has established itself in different countries has been 
more intense than anticipated. Looking forward, there 
is a strong possibility of more aggressive regulation and 
quotas on the cultural policy front, especially in the EU 
and the Anglosphere. We can also expect that concern 
about Netflix’s unlicensed status will become contentious 
in countries with strong traditions of state media control. 
Meanwhile, the wider political backlash against Silicon 
Valley may lead to further scrutiny of Netflix’s tax and ac-
counting practices.
Taking all this into account, it seems that the idea of 
digital markets as borderless, “flat” spaces of exchange and 
consumption is misguided. As Netflix discovered, the reality 
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of doing business in hundreds of markets simultaneously 
is messy and difficult, and governments are actively pur-
suing ways to extend national sovereignty online. Internet 
delivery has not resolved the political tensions inherent in 
running a global media business; indeed, it seems to be 
intensifying existing political debates.
Old and New Lessons
There are several lessons to be learned (or relearned) 
here for television studies. As I have argued throughout 
this book, the story of Netflix’s internationalization and 
eventual localization is unique in many ways, but it also 
confirms a few home truths about global television that 
have already been established in previous research by 
Liebes and Katz (1990), Chalaby (2005, 2009), Buonanno 
(2007), Straubhaar (2007), Pertierra and Turner (2013), 
and others. These lessons can be summed up as follows.
Audiences still skew local in their tastes 
Netflix’s localization strategy and its commitment to new 
original production in multiple languages underscore the 
fundamentally local nature of global taste. While there are 
pockets of demand for high- touch English- language con-
tent in many nations, the general pattern is that audiences 
still want television in their own language, with familiar 
faces and culturally relevant stories. The urbane English- 
language dramas and comedies that Netflix has specialized 
in so far are not enough to build a mass- market televi-
sion service on a global scale. Demand for local- language 
news, talk shows, reality television, and other local genres 
will continue to be satisfied primarily by national televi-
sion providers who have a long history of producing this 
kind of content and a deep understanding of what their 
Conclusions | 183
audiences want. Netflix cannot— by definition— be the future 
of television in all countries.
The global does not displace the local, 
but the two can happily coexist While Netflix 
cannot replace mainstream television at global scale, it can 
certainly exist as a successful niche service. As various sat-
ellite channels have shown, catering to a small user base 
that finds a lot of value in imported media can still be a 
profitable endeavor if extrapolated across many countries. 
The conceptual implication here is that the relationship 
between local/national and global/U.S. content is often 
complementary rather than substitutive: the latter is a 
desirable extra layer of content that appeals strongly to 
certain kinds of viewers. Netflix’s offering can therefore be 
highly valued alongside local- language talk shows, news, 
and other staples, because they satisfy different and com-
plementary desires.
There is  no coherent Netflix effect at 
global scale Rather than having a uniformly dis-
ruptive effect, Netflix has had quite different effects in 
different national contexts— ranging from disruption of 
broadcast and pay- TV incumbents (as in Canada, Aus-
tralia, and other English- language markets), to modest 
success as a niche service (in much of Europe and Latin 
America), or no impact at all (in Africa and the Middle 
East, for example). Netflix’s subscriber base now differs 
substantially from country to country precisely because 
Netflix occupies different market positions within those 
countries.
Uniform global pricing “prices out” low- 
income consumers Netflix’s decision to maintain a 
broadly consistent price point from country to country, 
calibrated to suit the incomes of westerners, means it must 
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remain a niche service in most low- income countries. 
Recall the situation in India, where Netflix’s user base is 
English- speaking urban elites. Compare this to North 
America, Australasia, and Western Europe, where Netflix 
is a cheap, mainstream offering enjoyed by a more diverse 
group of users. Its low price point in these markets com-
pared to average wages means it is more accessible to low- 
income groups and is a better value than buying or renting 
DVDs. In other words, Netflix is a different service and a 
different value proposition in each market. The conceptual 
implication here, building on the previous point, is that we 
need to be careful about speaking about a typical Netflix 
audience, a typical Netflix user, or a coherent Netflix ef-
fect. These generalizations are useful for analysis but ob-
scure a more important insight, which is that Netflix has 
had differentiated effects on the markets it has entered. This 
brings us to a final point with an important conceptual 
implication.
N et f l i x  has  b e e n  st ru c t u r a l ly  t r a n s -
formed by its internationalization Netflix is 
not the same service worldwide: catalogs, language op-
tions, and platform features change when accessed from 
different countries. Looking forward, the general trend is 
toward more differentiation rather than less, because of 
increasing regulatory pressure for Netflix to behave dif-
ferently in different countries. Taking this into account, 
in some senses it may now be more appropriate to see 
Netflix as a collection of national media services tied to-
gether in the one platform rather than as a uniform global 
service. Consequently, the recent history of Netflix is not 
just a story of a singular service encountering the frictions 
and differences of the global market; it is also the case that 
Netflix is becoming internally differentiated as it moves 
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into and through these new markets. “How is the object 
transformed— and how does it transform— from stage 
to stage, context to context?,” Scott Lash and Celia Lury 
(2007) ask in their study of global brands. The Netflix case 
provides some answers to this question, suggesting that 
the accrual of difference is an inevitable consequence of a 
brand’s movement through the world.
Streaming beyond Netflix
In the previous chapters, I have endeavored to use Netflix 
as a thinking tool— a platform, if you will— to explore the 
evolving relationship between television and global media 
in a context of internet distribution. At the start of the 
book, I noted that Netflix is a specific service with unique 
lines of development. It does not stand in for internet- 
distributed television as a whole. Netflix is presently the 
world’s largest SVOD platform, but SVOD is only one kind 
of service alongside AVOD, TVOD, hybrid platforms, and 
set- top box systems. In other words, Netflix is a small, 
but very powerful, part of a wider ecology. What happens 
when we provincialize Netflix and shift our focus to the 
rest of the ecology?
One way to answer this question is to look to China, 
where a very different streaming economy has emerged 
in recent years. In China, the streaming economy is 
dominated not by pure- play SVOD services but by mul-
tipurpose video platforms, such as Youku and Tencent 
Video, that integrate professional scripted content with 
news, shopping, education, games, investment advice, 
and other services. At the same time, the staggering rise 
of Chinese live streaming— amateur live channels hosted 
on video platforms— points toward an alternative future 
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for internet- distributed television that lies somewhere 
between unscripted reality television and YouTube, with 
dashes of gamer culture thrown in.1
Live streaming is about everyday intimacy rather than 
high spectacle, distraction rather than immersion—
a casual, low- intensity kind of television that stands in 
sharp contrast to Netflix’s immersive, scripted- content of-
fering. Within this emerging paradigm, the Netflix model 
appears rather quixotic. Even on its home turf, Netflix is 
quite unlike the other major platforms. YouTube, for ex-
ample, is a multipurpose, mostly free service based on 
advertising. Amazon Prime Video is a loss leader for an 
e- commerce platform that also distributes individual linear 
channels for cord- cutters. Facebook is different still: a social 
network that is still experimenting with its video model. 
For this reason, the idea of a coherent “big tech” sector— 
exemplified in the “FAANG” stock category (Facebook 
Amazon Apple Netflix Google)— can be deceptive because 
each platform is imagining and shaping the future of tele-
vision in distinct ways.
Seen in this context, Netflix’s unwavering commit-
ment to scripted narrative, spectacle, and old- fashioned 
televisual pleasure seems very old- fashioned (Wolff 2015). 
Netflix, at this stage of its evolution at least, is all about 
professional content; it has no interest in user- generated 
content. Its platform design encourages a cinematic mode 
of viewing. There are no opportunities for social interac-
tion. As Amanda Lotz (2017a) argues, Netflix may well be 
structurally more similar to HBO and other subscriber- 
funded portals (and even to historical precursors such as 
lending libraries and subscription publishing) than it is to 
other digital video platforms. Hence our analysis needs 
to take into account the internal heterogeneity within the 
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category of internet- distributed television. These parallel 
lines of development between SVOD, social media, and 
live streaming may eventually converge, but I suspect they 
are just as likely to keep diverging— with the effect that 
the ecology will become more complex and differentiated 
as it ages.
A final trend that I have observed while writing this 
book is the parallel growth of internet- distributed linear 
television services (live channels as opposed to on- demand 
libraries). These come in formal, semiformal, and infor-
mal variants. In particular, I have been fascinated by the 
rise of what is known as IPTV piracy, or low- cost internet- 
distributed subscription services offering hundreds of live 
satellite channels— a new and distinctive “global televi-
sion” experience. Usually delivered through grey- market 
Android set- top boxes, pirate IPTV services offer a dis-
tinctive experience that is completely different from the 
way Netflix imagines television. Pirate IPTV is linear, 
live, and full of ads. Netflix is nonlinear, on- demand, and 
 immersive. Both are global but in different ways: IPTV ag-
gregates diverse international channels, while Netflix 
aggregates diverse pieces of content into a curated data-
base. This is a very different vision of the future from what 
Netflix offers, reminding us of the heterogeneous nature of 
internet- distributed television.
There are other examples we could point to, although 
it would take another whole book to do them justice. My 
overall point here is that the evolutionary path of television 
from this point onward will not be unidirectional. There 
will continue to be many different models of internet- 
distributed television— each with their own geography— 
just as there have been many competing visions of television 
in the past. Within this evolving international context, 
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Netflix stands as a singular but fascinating case study— a 
specific vision of what global television might mean in an 
internet age— as well as a reminder that digital distribution 
cannot easily overcome the stubbornly local dynamics of 
culture, consumption, and taste.
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Notes
Introduction
 1 The video of Hastings’s presentation can be viewed at www 
.youtube.com/watch?v=l5R3E6jsICA.
 2 This was the rule, but there were many exceptions— witness the 
spillover of broadcast signals across national borders, especially 
in Europe (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2).
 3 YouTube fits in this category, too, but it is more properly 
described now as a hybrid site offering a subscription package 
(YouTube Premium), free videos, and paid transactional rentals.
 4 The MAVISE database is available at mavise.obs.coe.int.
 5 China Global Television Network (CGTN), formerly CCTV 
International, is China’s 24- hour English news channel.
 6 These policies were documented in a famous slideshow (avail-
able at www.slideshare.net/reed2001/culture-1798664) that has 
been viewed 17 million times and is now taught in management 
schools.
 7 I refer here to Wagman and Barra’s Cultures of Netflix panel at 
the 2016 ECREA (European Communications Research and 
Education Association) conference.
Chapter 1. What Is Netflix?
 1 This historical progression can be studied via the company’s 
quarterly earnings releases since 2002, available at ir.netflix.com.
 2 Think here of how Netflix wants to compete with international 
pay- TV services while simultaneously insisting that it should not 
be regulated like a media company— a topic we return to later.
Chapter 2. Transnational Television
 1 An example is Time Warner CEO Steve Ross’s 1990 speech 
praising the electronic media’s capacity for “free flow of ideas, 
products and technologies in the spirit of fair competition” (cited 
in Morley and Robins 1995, 11).
 2 Note the trajectory implied in the subtitle, which gives a clue as 
to Straubhaar’s argument.
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Chapter 3. The Infrastructures of  
streaming
 1 A note on sources: there is a considerable amount of techni-
cal material available online, as many of Netflix’s engineers use 
open platforms such as YouTube, Slideshare, and Github to share 
internal information, as is common among tech circles. Useful 
sources include Netflix’s Github repository (github.com/Netflix); 
the Netflix UI engineering, Netflix OSS, and Netflix Performance 
and Reliability Engineering channels on YouTube; and online 
videos from tech industry events where Netflix engineers regu-
larly give keynote talks, such as AWS re:Invent. The Netflix Tech 
Blog is another rich resource, which gives a sense of how Netflix 
projects itself to the tech community at large.
 2 There exist numerous lists of this kind (e.g., Jackson et al. 2007; 
Star and Ruhleder 1996) and many more studies that could  
be mentioned as exemplars. The list of terms and references  
here includes those I think are most useful for media and cul-
ture scholars.
 3 Netflix CEO Reed Hastings is also well connected on the pro-
gressive side of U.S. politics and is a major donor to the Demo-
cratic Party.
 4 In Africa, the most popular applications in terms of downstream 
internet traffic are YouTube (19%), general web browsing/HTTP 
(18%), Facebook (9%), and BitTorrent (8%) (Sandvine 2016b).
 5 An AWS region includes various server locations within it, 
although it is difficult to pin down their geography with any 
accuracy. As a journalist from The Atlantic discovered when 
she tried to find out exactly where the AWS servers in North-
ern Virginia were located, “Unlike Google and Facebook, AWS 
doesn’t aggressively brand or call attention to their data centers. 
They absolutely don’t give tours, and their website offers only 
rough approximations of the locations of their data centers, 
which are divided into ‘regions.’ Within a region lies at minimum 
two ‘availability zones’ and within the availability zones there are 
a handful of data centers” (Burrington 2016).
 6 Open Connect is for larger ISPs that have 100,000 users or more.
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Chapter 4. Making Global Markets
 1 Murdoch initially partnered with MTV, carrying MTV on his 
Star satellite service in Asia. He later broke off the agreement and 
developed his own clone service, Channel [V].
 2 Individual broadcasters may use a combination of these strate-
gies for different markets and combine country- specific channels 
with regional feeds suitable for a wider geolinguistic market. 
Bloomberg, when expanding into Europe, decided to develop 
country- specific channels for France, Italy, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the Germanic countries, whereas Fox Kids pur-
sued a more expansive localization strategy (note the impor-
tance of dubbing for children, who may not read subtitles), with 
dedicated channels for France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, the 
Netherlands, the German- speaking countries, Scandinavia, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
and Eastern Europe (Chalaby 2005).
 3 In recent speeches, Hastings has repeatedly used the words 
“listen” and “learn” in reference to Netflix’s international strategy, 
suggesting that the company is now moving along the localiza-
tion knowledge curve described by Chalaby.
 4 As an example, Taiwanese customers are billed, improbably, 
through Amsterdam.
 5 Netflix executives have also acknowledged studying BitTorrent traf-
fic as a proxy for demand in international markets (Schellevis 2013).
 6 One example is the multinational firm Deluxe, which has offices 
in seven countries. Suppliers can be viewed at the Netflix Pre-
ferred Vendors website: npv.netflix.com.
 7 The GILT industry has its own conferences (LocWorld, which 
hosts three international events per year), magazines (Multilin-
gual), associations (Globalisation and Localisation Association, 
Localisation Industry Standards Association, etc.), and even a 
journal (International Journal of Localisation). Major companies 
in the GILT sector include Lionsbridge, CSOFT, Viacom, and 
VSI. The GILT professions are commonly referred to by the 
numeronyms L10N, I18N, and G11N.
 8 One localization expert working at Netflix recalls the following 
anecdote in a localization podcast: “Last year . . . in Korea it was 
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pointed out, not very subtly, by a Korean journalist that the font that 
we [Netflix] were using in our artwork was not appropriate, and 
was not good enough. This was pointed out to our CEO in a press 
conference. It wasn’t great for us in localization” (Jentreau 2017).
 9 DFXP files can be created from the more common SRT- format 
files via various free websites. Free Chrome and Firefox add- ons 
offer users a similar solution.
 10 The transcript of this conversation can be seen at np.reddit.
com/r/india/comments/5lwg89/hey_rindia_netflix_employee_
here_just_wanted_to/.
 11 Another asked, “When can we expect all sorts of payment op-
tions like all debit cards and others? For this exact reason, I’m 
unable to use Netflix.”
 12 This is the price for Amazon Prime membership, spread over a year.
 13 The Premium Netflix package, however, is in line with the USD 
price.
 14 Amazon Prime Video had 70% Japanese content at launch (Had-
field 2015).
 15 An example can be found at matome.naver.jp/
odai/2144270998283023201 (courtesy of Thomas Baudinette).
 16 Peters would later be promoted to chief product officer in April 
2017.
Chapter 5. Content, Catalogs, and  
Cultural Imperialism
 1 While the range of television (as opposed to movie) content on 
Netflix is somewhat more localized— around half the TV series 
in each catalog are American, and around a third are European 
(mostly British, French, and German)— TV series from smaller 
European countries are still largely absent from the Netflix 
platform (Fontaine and Grece 2016). New research is constantly 
appearing; for example, a 2017 study of the Australian Netflix 
catalog puts the level of local content at around 2% (Lobato and 
Scarlata 2017). Given the dynamic nature of catalogs, these stud-
ies need to be seen as part of an evolving research enterprise; 
there is still a lot we do not know about how catalogs change over 
time. Nonetheless, the general implication here regarding the lack 
of local content in most national Netflix services is fairly clear.
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 2 Flew is invoking Philip Schlesinger’s notion of “communicative 
boundary maintenance” here.
 3 Nordenstreng and Varis (1974) used a questionnaire to ask TV 
broadcasters around the world about their programming, and 
they supplemented this with their own analysis of publicly avail-
able TV schedules.
 4 Article 13 of the AMSVD requires that on- demand services 
“promote . . . the production of and access to European works.” 
One form of promotion specified in the directive is “the share 
and/or prominence of European works in the catalogue of 
programmes offered by the on- demand audiovisual media 
service.”
 5 The approach used in the French- speaking areas of Belgium 
is notable for its rather more complex approach, which makes 
reference to a very wide range of factors, including the presence 
of “specialized” and “thematic” collections within the catalog and 
the terms under which European content is licensed (how long 
films stay in the catalog).
 6 A summary of current legislation can be found in the European 
Commission document “Promotion of European Works in 
Practice,” available at ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document 
. cfm?doc_id=6296.
 7 My translation from the original French.
 8 See ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/revision-audiovisual-
media-services-directive-avmsd.
 9 The existing quotas for Canadian movies in VOD services, as 
specified in Broadcasting Regulatory Policy 2014– 444, are as fol-
lows: at least 5% of English- language films, at least 8% of French- 
language films, and at least 20% of all other programming must 
be Canadian. The VOD category does not include over- the- top 
TV services like Netflix.
 10 Google also refused to provide this commercially sensitive data 
to the CRTC.
Chapter 6. The Proxy Wars
 1 This figure, based on a private industry report commissioned in 
Australia, was very widely reported in press coverage throughout 
2014 and 2015. Its accuracy cannot be verified, but neither was it 
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ever really questioned by industry stakeholders, most of whom 
seemed to think it was roughly on target.
 2 One analyst, Michael Pachter from Wedbush Securities, esti-
mated at the time that Netflix may have as many as ten million 
unauthorized users accessing its service via shared passwords 
(Wallenstein 2013). For his part, Reed Hastings (Netflix 2016 Q3 
call) has stated that password sharing “is something you have to 
learn to live with, because there’s so much legitimate password shar-
ing like, you know, you sharing with your spouse, with your kids,” 
adding that “there’s no bright line” (i.e., clear distinction between 
legality and illegality) here. Hastings went on to note that password 
sharing was not a significant issue when it came to revenues and 
therefore not a major concern to the company— suggesting a prag-
matic rather than ideological approach to the issue.
 3 Maxmind’s basic country- level service costs US$0.0001 per 
query— a modest but substantive cost for websites attracting 
millions of hits daily.
 4 The tech blog Techdirt recently did an accuracy test of various 
city- level geolocation services (which produced rather mixed 
results), concluding that “these tools are as accurate as taking a 
dart and throwing it not at a map on the wall, but at a Google 
map display on your computer screen” (Norton 2016).
 5 Once extremely popular, these add- ons fell out of favor some-
what after it was revealed in 2015 that Hola’s parent company 
had been selling access to users’ bandwidth for botnet attacks. 
ISP- level unblockers are another option, though more obscure 
than consumer- facing devices. The Auckland company Bypass 
developed a tool called Global Mode that could circumvent geo-
blocking for customers of participating ISPs. Global Mode was 
trialed by a few ISPs in Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, 
then discontinued in 2015 following pressure from rights- holders 
(Pullar- Strecker 2015).
 6 The content of these emails has been previously reported in 
the trade press. The full text of the emails was subsequently 
archived by WikiLeaks in April 2015 and can be accessed on the 
WikiLeaks Sony Archives website.
 7 Various other references to this issue can also be found in emails 
dated throughout 2013 and 2014, in which very senior people at 
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Sony voiced similar concerns about the Netflix geofiltering issue. 
Clearly the issue had been simmering internally within Sony for 
some time before becoming public in 2014.
 8 See, for example, the European Union’s Digital Single Market 
policy and the Australian House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Infrastructure and Communications report At 
What Cost? IT Pricing and the “Australia Tax” (2013).
Conclusions
 1 Live streamers monetize their channels by receiving virtual 
“gifts” from their fans.
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